i.—weapons.

i come lastly to the author's chapters on "reconnaissance, screening, and raids." as i explained before, it is the critic's simplest course to leave them to the last, because, although they come first, they almost ignore the subject of weapons and combats, on the assumption, apparently, that the opposing cavalries, at any rate in the first two of the functions in question, will, as a matter of course, fight with the lance and sword in the pure and proper fashion. but we have now considered and tested the worth of the author's views on combat and weapons, and can apply our criticisms to these chapters.

combat and weapons are not wholly overlooked. at the very outset comes the maxim which i quoted further back, to the effect that "the essence of cavalry lies in the offensive," and that for defence they are to "abandon their proper r?le and seize the rifle on foot." the[pg 164] reader can appreciate now the value of this maxim, when we are dealing, as the author in these chapters is dealing, with two opposing cavalries who are assumed to be acting against one another independently of other arms. to tell both these cavalries that their essence lies in the offensive is, to say the least, a superfluous platitude. to say that it is only in defence that they are to "seize the rifle" is to say something wholly meaningless. unless by seizing it they can force their antagonists also to relinquish shock as useless and to seize the rifle, they might as well not seize it at all. if they can force their antagonists to seize it—and the whole mass of modern experience shows that they can and do—then their antagonists, whether we call their r?le proper or improper, are acting in offence with the firearm, and the maxim is stultified—as, indeed, any maxim which applies medieval language to modern problems must be stultified. experience shows that if you arm men with long-range, smokeless, accurate missile weapons, whatever their traditions of etiquette and sportsmanship in peace, they will in war use those weapons to the exclusion of lances, swords, battle-axes, scimitars, and the various other weapons which were highly formidable before the days of gunpowder, but which have steadily[pg 165] declined since the invention and the progressive improvement of arms of precision.

besides this general maxim upon the functions of the rifle and the steel, there are a few incidental allusions which must be noticed. the reader will remember the rule as to the powerlessness of the squadron as a unit for fire-action. the rule is anticipated here in directions for reconnoitring squadrons (p. 44), which, even by night, are only to fight with the arme blanche, "because dismounted action is generally dangerous, and, on account of the weakness of the force, usually leads to failure"; and we wonder again how both of two opposing reconnoitring squadrons can "fail," and how such a situation is actually to be dealt with on such principles in "real war"—say in the hedge-bound country which covers two-thirds of england. we are also told (p. 57) that patrols, "on collision with the enemy's patrols," are to take action "in as offensive a spirit as possible, but after due reflection." "should a charge promise any kind of success, the opponent must be attacked in the most determined way." nothing is said about fire, but we are left with the impression that a fire-attack can be neither "offensive" nor "determined," and for the rest we have to be content with guidance like the following: "it does not[pg 166] promise success to attack the front of an advancing squadron under the apprehension that it is a single patrol."

one day's personal experience of modern war would teach the author the perilous futility of all these "speculative" conjectures. has he forgotten altogether the power and purpose of the modern rifle—the rapidity, accuracy, and secrecy of its fire—when he speaks of patrols indulging in due reflection about their determined offensive charges? it is to be feared that at the hands of any but utterly incompetent troops his own contemplative patrols would receive short shrift. and the lesson of south africa? it is hard to see why, in the matter of patrols at any rate, those three years of war should be regarded as abnormal. yet it is the fact, as i must repeat, that no cavalry patrol or scout from the beginning to the end of the war ever used the lance or sword; that in reconnaissance no boer ever came near being hurt by those weapons; and, furthermore, that the cavalry were consistently and thoroughly outmatched in reconnaissance, which was governed universally by the rifle. it was exactly the same in manchuria. instead of reminding his german confrère of these facts, sir john french complains that the difficulty of the cavalry in south africa was that they had[pg 167] nothing to reconnoitre, while he implicitly approves and applauds the conception of the reflective charging patrol.

to clinch the matter, we need only remind ourselves that our own divisional mounted troops, whose sole weapon is the rifle, are entrusted not only with reconnaissance for their own division, but, in certain events, with exactly the same duties as the independent and protective cavalry. in these duties they will be pitted (in the event of a continental war) against steel-armed cavalry. if steel weapons were of any use, this would be criminal.

such are the scanty clues as to combat which we obtain from the chapters on reconnaissance. it remains to ask, what is von bernhardi's view upon the great question of the employment of the army or independent cavalry (as distinguished from the divisional cavalry) in the most important of all its functions in modern war—reconnaissance? i defy anyone to answer that question. so far as it is possible to construct any positive view from a series of obscure and contradictory propositions, it appears to be a view which is in direct conflict with that of sir john french and of the cavalry manual which presumably he approves, while approving equally of general von bernhardi. anyone familiar with[pg 168] cavalry literature will know of the old controversy between the theories of concentration and dispersion. is the army cavalry at the opening of a campaign to concentrate and "drive from the field" the enemy's army cavalry, or is it from the outset to begin its work of exploring the various lines of approach of the various hostile columns over the whole front—an enormously extensive front—upon which great modern armies must develop their advance?

ii.—the preliminary shock-duel.

in view of the great size and vast man?uvring areas of modern armies and of the small numbers and transcendently important reconnaissance duties of cavalry, that question would, i think, be decided in favour of dispersion, were it not for the fatal influence of the arme blanche. but cavalrymen must have the gigantic shock-duel which i described and criticized in chapter iv., 2. the idea of dispersion for sporadic bickering and scouting before this imposing tournament has been arranged is unthinkable to them. our manual therefore (pp. 193, 194) sets forth in all its naked crudity the idea of the preliminary shock-duel between the concentrated masses of the two independent (or strategical) cavalries—a duel that cannot, it is expressly laid down, be conducted by[pg 169] fire-action, which is negative and inconclusive, but which, conducted with the steel, is assumed to result in the complete and final "overthrow" of one party or the other. one side, in the words of the manual, is "disposed of," and the surviving party proceeds to disperse and reconnoitre undisturbed in the vast area of war.[5]

needless to say, the theory is purely academic. such things have never happened in any war, ancient or modern, and assuredly never will happen. one cavalry or the other may be depended upon in the future to act at the last moment with common sense. if it does not at once set about its work of reconnaissance, it will, at any rate, shiver to pieces with fire the massed shock-formations of its opponent.

general von bernhardi seems to be conscious of the weakness of the theory, though he cannot bring himself to shatter it outright. there are, of course, two distinct questions involved: (1) should the independent cavalries concentrate at the outset? (2) if so, should the resulting collision be a shock-collision? number 1 is at any rate open to debate. number 2 is not, but it always[pg 170] confuses the discussion of number 1. the general could dispose of number 2 merely by references to other parts of his own work—to the passages, for example, where he says that not only in the great battles of all arms, but in the contests of independent cavalries, shock-charges are only to be "rare" and "exceptional" events. for "squadrons, regiments, and even brigades, unassisted by other arms, the charge may often suffice for a decision. but where it is an affair of larger masses, it will never be possible to dispense with the co-operation of firearms" (p. 103). and there is the passage about modern european topography where he shows the physical difficulty of bringing about these combats. on the broader question (no. 1) he speaks with two voices. in direct contradiction of sir john french's introductory remarks and of our own manual, he says (p. 20) that the strategical cavalry is not necessarily "to seek a tactical battle"; that it is "by no means its duty under all circumstances to seek out the enemy's cavalry in order to defeat it," because "by such conduct it would allow the enemy's cavalry to dictate its movements." "on the contrary, it must subordinate all else to the particular objects of reconnaissance," etc.

it is clearly in his mind that, since the various[pg 171] corps or columns which are the objects of reconnaissance may be "advancing to battle" on a total front of 50 to 100 miles (this is his own estimate, p. 81), it will be advisable to explore their zones of approach at once. but there are other passages which support the opposite principle: for example, on page 15: "the circumstances of modern war demand that great masses of mounted men shall be used as army cavalry and concentrated in the decisive direction.... the front of the army, therefore, can never be covered throughout its entire length by the army cavalry," etc. on page 87 also he is quite decisive in the same sense: "the universal principle most always good for cavalry, that when a decisive struggle is in prospect all possible strength must be concentrated for it"—an unexceptional truism, applicable as it stands to all struggles, great or small, by land or sea, but in its context only too suggestive of the gigantic shock-duel.[6] but on the whole he stands committed to nothing more definite than the following: "it remains for the leader to make his preparations in full freedom, and to solve the task confided to him in his own way." profoundly true, but not very helpful in an instructional treatise on war.

[pg 172]

iii.—divisional reconnaissance.

the chapter on "divisional reconnaissance" is still less intelligible. it would be interesting to know how sir john french would sum up its "logical" and "convincing" doctrines. the divisional cavalry are in all cases to "cleave to the infantry" (p. 75) of their respective divisions, yet they are to take the place of the army cavalry "when a concentration of that force in a decisive direction takes place" (another hint of the gigantic preliminary shock-duel), and are even to indulge in "strategical exploration" (pp. 72-75). in fact, these amazing super-cavalry are to perform physical feats in reconnaissance analogous to the feats designed for them in the pre-arranged battle of all arms (vide p. 149). yet they cannot "fight independently" even with the hostile divisional cavalry, nor clear the way for their own patrols, nor find their own outposts (pp. 75-76).

and then we come to a passage which, quite parenthetically and as it were by accident, throws a searching light upon the many dark places of this volume. the divisional cavalry, inter alia, is to perform the "close reconnaissance along by far the greater part of the front of the army." but the close reconnaissance, owing to the range of modern firearms, is "considerably more diffi[pg 173]cult." "it thus becomes possible for the cavalryman in general to get no closer to the enemy than his rifle will carry" (p. 80). "his rifle," be it noted. and the hostile cavalryman (surely an "enemy") is presumably in the same case. what, then, of the charging patrols and squadrons?

i suppose i should add that only two pages later (p. 82) the author, in a fit of remorse, rehabilitates the charging patrol. "rude force can alone prevail, and recourse must be had to the sword." rude force! the tragi-comic irony of it!

iv.—screens.

as to the chapter on screens, we can only respectfully appeal to sir john french to explain it. the ordinary reader can only give up the problem of elucidation in despair. what is the connection with his previous chapters on reconnaissance? is the "screen" something different from or supplementary to the normal reconnoitring, patrolling, and protective duties of the army and divisional cavalry, as described under the headings, "main body of the army cavalry," "reconnoitring squadrons," "distant patrols," "divisional reconnaissance," etc.? one would infer from the opening paragraph that it is[pg 174] something wholly different. "the idea of the screen," runs the opening sentence, "is first touched on in the 'field service manual' of 1908; it is also, however, demanded by the conditions of modern war"; and from what follows we gather that the screen means an inner and purely protective cordon of cavalry, as distinguished from a distant offensive reconnoitring cordon. the same distinction is drawn in page 13 of the first chapter of the book. this is the kind of distinction drawn by our own manual, which, though it does not speak of a "screen," divides the cavalry into three bodies—one "independent" or "strategical," the second "protective," while the third is the divisional cavalry. logically, of course, the distinction has but a limited value, unless, indeed, one regards the protective force as merely a chain of stationary outposts or sentries. all reconnaissance must obviously be defensive as well as offensive, because it represents a conflict between two opposing parties. if the protective cavalry are pressed, it is their duty, as the manual does, in fact, lay down, not only to resist the scouts and patrols of the hostile force, but to find out the strength and disposition of that force, and even in certain cases, explicitly provided for, to take the place of the independent cavalry; just as it is the duty of the independent[pg 175] cavalry, not only to pierce the hostile independent cavalry and inform themselves of the strength and disposition of the hostile army, but to resist similar action on the part of their opponents. these principles would be taken for granted, with a vast improvement in the simplicity of regulations, if it were not for the influence of the arme blanche, impelling cavalry writers to call their arm a peculiarly offensive arm, and inspiring the grotesque idea of the great preliminary shock-duel for the opposing independent cavalries, who are both presumed to be perpetually in offence as regards one another.

still, within reasonable and well-understood limits, the metaphorical term "screen," as denoting the protective aspect of a widespread observing force, is both useful and illuminating. to regard it, as general von bernhardi does, as a brand-new idea, the result of "reflection and experience" on the needs of modern war, is to convict himself of ignorance of war. screens of a sort there always have been and always must be: the only new factor is the vastly increased efficacy of modern firearms; and if he could bring himself to concentrate on that new factor, of whose importance he shows himself in other passages to be perfectly aware, he would be able[pg 176] to convert into an intelligible, practical scheme his strange medley of inconsequent generalizations. he is, of course, handicapped by the official regulations, which, unlike our own, do not formally provide for a "protective cavalry" as distinguished from the divisional cavalry, and which seem to be more than usually obscure and confused in their theories about "offensive" and "defensive" screens, and in their hazy suggestions as to what troops are to perform the respective functions; but he cannot or will not see the fundamental fallacy which, like puck in the play, is tricking and distracting the minds of those who framed the regulations, and so he himself makes confusion worse confounded. the protective aspect of the screen is no sooner insisted on than it is forgotten, and we have a disquisition on the offensive screen, which appears to be only another name for the normal activities of the army cavalry, behind the "veil" formed by whom a second screen is to be established by the divisional cavalry (p. 87).

this, however, is disconcerting, because in the previous chapter (p. 74) we have been told with emphasis that the army cavalry "in the most usual case" will not be able to reconnoitre the whole army front, but will be "concentrated in a decisive direction," and that the divisional[pg 177] cavalry in such cases, in spite of their unfitness for the task, will have to do the "distant reconnaissance" and "strategical exploration" at all points not directly covered by the main cavalry mass. and, sure enough, the "veil" just alluded to now disappears in its character as veil, and reappears as a "concentrated" mass. "the principal task of the offensive screen is to defeat the hostile cavalry, and for this object all available force must be concentrated, for one cannot be strong upon the field of battle" (p. 87). it is amazing that serious exponents of any métier should write in this fashion. a concentrated screen is a contradiction in terms.

once committed, however, the general persists. all cyclist detachments and patrols are "to be brought up to the fight" from everywhere. roads are not to be blocked (in accordance with the screen idea) until the supreme cavalry struggle, with its conventional "complete overthrow" of the hostile cavalry, is over; and all this in flat contradiction of at least two-thirds of the earlier chapter on the army cavalry, where it was laid down that reconnoitring squadrons were from the first to be pushed forward from the "various groups of army cavalry," and were to be allotted reconnaissance zones; that a separation of cavalry force was far[pg 178] the most probable line of action; and that reconnaissance was "an every-day task of the cavalry," its "daily bread," a "duty which should never cease to be performed" for a single moment.

and yet on page 89 we come to the staggering, if cryptic, conclusion that "the army cavalry will only undertake an offensive screen when the army is advancing and where the country does not afford suitable localities for the establishment of a defensive screen."

the writer then enlarges on the merits of the defensive screen, and, now that his mind is occupied with the idea of defence, makes it perfectly clear that the rifle is absolute master of the situation for the patrols, troops, squadrons, or any other units of both belligerent parties. your defensive screen acts by fire, and obviously, therefore, whoever tries to pierce your screen must act by fire. these pages reduce to nullity all the romantic hints elsewhere about the charging patrol or squadron, with its "rude force" and its "determined" and "remorseless" attacks.

and what of illustrations and examples from modern war? not one. nothing but "speculative and theoretical reflection." for anyone who cares to study them, the facts are there—plain, hard, incontrovertible, convincing facts.[pg 179] sir john french knows all about the south african facts. screens, on a small or great scale, were matters of daily experience. he himself, with a force of all arms, sustained a screen for two months—primarily protective, but tactically offensive, as all screens must be—in the colesberg operations of november-january, 1899-1900. he knows perfectly well that lances and swords, for all the use made of them, might as well have been in store, and that the cavalry engaged acted on precisely the same principles as the colonial mounted riflemen engaged.

during most of the operations from bloemfontein to pretoria, and from pretoria to komati poort, our great force of all arms was pitted against what (if we consider relative numbers) was little more than a mounted screen, and every day's operations exemplified the fighting principles involved. the rifle was the great ruling factor. if the rifleman had a horse, so much the better—he was a more mobile rifleman; but lances and swords were useless dead-weight. precisely the same phenomena reappear in manchuria. on the japanese side much excellent screening work was done by infantry, against whom the cossack scouts and reconnoitring squadrons, trained solely to shock, were impotent. infantry move slowly, but their rifle is a good[pg 180] rifle, and it is not the horse which fires it, but the man. no infantry patrol of any army—certainly, at any rate, of our own army—is afraid of the lances or swords of a cavalry patrol. it is only—strange paradox!—cavalry patrols who are taught to fear the lances and swords of other cavalry patrols.

i am reminded here of some remarks made in a letter to the times of march 26, 1910, by the military correspondent of that journal, whom i had respectfully reproached with having abandoned his old hostility to shock. cavalry patrols, unless they are to be "trussed chickens," must, he now said, have lances and swords in order, inter alia, to be able, when meeting other cavalry patrols "in villages and lanes, or at the corner of some wood," to "tear the eyes out of" them! these "?dipean evulsions" form a picturesque improvement even on von bernhardi's "rude force," and strike a decidedly happier note than the patrol "charging after due reflection." but why, i asked, could not the act be performed on even one single occasion in three years of war in south africa? why not in one single recorded case in a year's war in manchuria? well, one must admit that the "corner of the wood" was an ingenious touch. it suggested a close, blind, wooded district of england, so prohibitive of[pg 181] shock in large bodies and for that reason so unlike south africa and manchuria. yet there were many similar obstacles in both those regions: there were hundreds of villages; there were hills, mountains, ravines, dongas, sharp rocky ridges, river-beds, clumps of bush and trees, farm buildings; there were the great tracts of bush-veldt in the transvaal, the tall millet of northern manchuria, and so on—quite enough, certainly, to lead to the tearing out of the eyes of at least one careless scout or patrol. colonel repington knows these facts as well as i do, and once more, in view of his great—and deservedly great—influence on contemporary thought, i beg him to return to his earlier manner, and speak once more in his old slashing style about the futility of "classic charges and prehistoric methods." after all, this is the very language used by von bernhardi, whom, in the letter i have been alluding to, colonel repington described as a "very eminent authority."

i have the letter before me, and it is with a somewhat grim satisfaction that i observe the nemesis which overtakes publicists who are rash enough to recant opinions founded on national experience and confirmed by the most recent facts of war. it was written just before von bernhardi's book was published, and a large part of it[pg 182] took the form of an eulogy on the german cavalry, whom he defended hotly from my charge of "sentimental conservatism," whose new regulations about fire-action he quoted with admiring approval, and whose revivification he distinctly associated with the name of that "very eminent authority" general von bernhardi. the very eminent authority spoke a few weeks later, and said that his "writings had fallen on barren soil." his language about the sentimental conservatism of the present german cavalry beggared any i had used. he made his own colonel repington's epithet "prehistoric"; his phrase "old-fashioned knightly combats" is surely an adequate counterpart to "classic charges"; in many a passage of biting invective he deplores as literal truth at the present moment what colonel repington scouted as a libellous myth invented by me—namely, that in peace man?uvres "solid lines of steel-clad cavalry are led across open plains"; and, as i have shown, he regards as utterly unprepared for war a cavalry which colonel repington holds up as an example to his british readers of "the best modern cavalries," and which, if we do not imitate their methods, would, he thinks, in the event of a war, tear the eyes out of ours. as to fire-action, perhaps colonel repington had not[pg 183] studied the german regulations with a very critical eye before he praised them to the point of asking, "could botha or delarey or de wet ask for more?" in the light of von bernhardi's strictures and of his still stranger alternatives, the topic, i am sure, will need different handling if colonel repington returns to it.

finally, i repeat once more that, for englishmen, one of the best practical criteria of the steel theory, in regard both to reconnaissance and battle functions, lies in the existence of our mounted infantry force. their revised manual (1909), reticent and incomplete as it is sometimes in the interests of the sacred shock theory, is, in effect, a crushing indictment of that theory. they are trained to do precisely the same work as the cavalry. they are not only to act as purely divisional mounted troops, but, like the german divisional cavalry, are intended to co-operate with and, in circumstances which must constantly happen, act as substitutes for the independent cavalry. this is criminal folly if, from the lack of a sword or lance, they are "trussed chickens," whose morale, in the words of colonel repington, will be "destroyed" by steel-armed cavalry. thank heaven, they listen with indifference to this language—language which would indeed be calculated to destroy the morale[pg 184] of any force with less self-respect and less splendid war traditions behind it. they know in their hearts that their methods are in reality not despised but feared by continental cavalry, for the reasons frankly and honestly set forth by general von bernhardi. their leaders now are the sole official repositories of what is really our great national tradition for mounted troops in civilized war; for the steel tradition is a legend dating from balaclava, a battle which is scarcely more relevant to modern needs than crécy—and crécy, by the way, was one of the greatest of all the historic triumphs of missile weapons over shock. it was not the lack of swords and lances, but the possession of swords and lances, which tended to turn men into "trussed chickens" in south africa and manchuria. it was the rifle in both cases which made cavalry mobile and formidable. it is melancholy to think that our true principles and sound traditions of mounted warfare are embodied in so small a force, organized on such an illogical system, provided with a training of altogether inadequate length, and hampered by nominal subservience to a steel-armed cavalry whose theories of action have been proved in two long and bloody wars to be obsolete.

it is perhaps even more melancholy to see so[pg 185] many yeomanry officers agitating for an opportunity to ape the worst features of the cavalry, while neglecting the best features of the very force whose exact tactical counterpart they are; dreaming sentimental nonsense about bredow's charge at vionville, while under their eyes lie the pitiless records of idleness and failure on the part of those whose aim it was to imitate bredow, and the still sadder story of the penalties paid in south africa for inexperience in the rifle by the yeomanry themselves.

i sometimes wonder if houndsditch will open the eyes of the public to the unrealities of cavalry man?uvre. how many cavalry, condemned to remain in their saddles, would it take to disable or capture a patrol of determined men using automatic pistols (to say nothing of magazine rifles) either in a "village or lane or at the corner of some wood," or on the rolling downs of salisbury or lambourne?