as soon as it became evident that the afridis were up, and that there would be stern fighting, the conversation in the mess room naturally turned on past expeditions against the wild tribesmen. two or three of the officers had exchanged into the regiment, when their own went home. having been two or three years on the frontier, they had many tales of hill fighting to tell; and these were eagerly listened to by all the younger officers, as they felt certain that they too would, ere long, be taking part in such struggles.

"a fine instance of defence," one of the junior captains said, "was that of thobal in 1891. as you all know, i am a ranker, and i received my commission for that business. i was with a mere handful of men, thirty ghoorkhas and fifty rifles of the 12th burmah infantry. we were commanded by lieutenant grant. i was with him as quartermaster sergeant, and general assistant. the ghoorkhas had sixty rounds per man for their martini rifles, the burmah men one hundred and sixty rounds per man for their sniders. they were a pretty rough lot, only twenty of them being old soldiers, the rest recruits.

"one morning we received news that mr. quintin with four civil officers, and an escort of seven british officers and four hundred and fifty-four ghoorkhas, who had gone up to manipur, had been massacred. happily the news was exaggerated, but a treacherous attack was made upon the party, and mr. quintin and many others killed. grant thought that this was probably the case, and determined to push on with his little force, in the hope of rescuing some survivors.

"the distance from tamu to manipur is about fifty-five miles. we started at half-past five, on the morning of the 28th. the difficulties were so great that we only moved at the rate of a mile an hour. at two in the morning we started again, and marched about ten miles; in the course of which we were occasionally fired at by the enemy. the moon rose at eleven, and the advance was continued.

"the resistance now became severe. the telegraph wires had been cut, taken down from the poles, and twisted about the road; and trees had also been felled across it. while we were endeavouring to clear away the obstacles, a heavy fire was poured into us. small parties were therefore sent out to disperse the enemy, and this they did most successfully, capturing three guns and a good deal of ammunition.

"pushing on, we issued, at six in the morning, on the hills. before us was the village of palel, which was garrisoned by two hundred manipur soldiers. you must remember that manipur had been a sort of subsidiary state, and had a regular army, drilled by europeans. however, grant attacked them at once, and drove them out with loss.

"after halting at palel for some hours a start was made, at eleven o'clock at night; and at daybreak we came upon some villages, each house in which was standing alone in a large enclosure, surrounded by a wall, ditch, and hedge. we went at them and carried them, one by one, without any great loss to ourselves. issuing on the other side, we came upon a plain about a thousand yards across. beyond this was a bridge, on fire. the enemy were strongly posted in trenches and behind hedges.

"grant decided to attack, and to try and save the bridge. he advanced across the plain with two sections of ten men each, supported by another section of the same strength. the rest of his force, consisting of forty men, he kept in reserve.

"i own that it seemed to me a desperately risky thing; for, from what we could see, we judged that the enemy were about a thousand strong. grant himself led the party, and he put me in charge of the reserve. a very heavy fire was opened by the enemy; but grant and his men steadily advanced, and succeeded in getting within a hundred yards of the enemy. here i came up with him; and we dashed into the river, carried the enemy's trenches at the point of the bayonet, and hunted them out, from enclosure to enclosure, till they all drew off.

"by the side of the bridge was the village of thobal; and as, with so small a force, it was impossible to advance against the overwhelming numbers that would meet us before we got to manipur, fifteen miles away, grant determined to hold thobal; where he could, he thought, defend himself, and afford refuge to any who had escaped the massacre. as soon as the enemy had retired, we all set to work to prepare a defensive position; by setting fire to the crops, so as to prevent the enemy from creeping up unseen, and by making an abattis.

"the night passed off quietly. at six in the morning the enemy were seen advancing in force, but lieutenant grant sent out thirty men to the farthest wall of the village, some four hundred yards in advance of the enclosure; and their fire checked the enemy, and forced them to retire. at three in the afternoon the enemy advanced in great force, their line being over a mile long. grant again occupied the front wall, and held his fire till the enemy reached a point which had been carefully marked as being six hundred yards away. fire was then opened, the muskets being sighted for this known range. the tribesmen fell in great numbers, and drew back under the protection of their artillery, who now opened fire at a range of about a thousand yards. in half an hour they were completely silenced.

"they then withdrew to another hill, five hundred yards farther off but, even at this range, we got at them with our martinis, and they soon began firing wildly. the infantry advanced several times, but were always driven back as soon as they reached the six-hundred-yards limit.

"it was now becoming dark, and the enemy were working round on our flank. we therefore fell back on the entrenched position and, though the enemy kept up a heavy fire till two in the morning, ammunition was too scanty to allow us to waste a cartridge, and no reply was made. at three we set to work to strengthen the defences, using baskets filled with earth and sacks filled with sand, as well as adding to the abattis.

"in the course of the day the enemy sent in a flag of truce, offering to allow us to retreat. this grant refused to do, till all prisoners still in the hands of the manipuris were delivered over to him. in order to deceive the enemy as to his strength, grant put on a colonel's badge and uniform and, in his communications with the enemy, spoke and behaved as if he had the whole regiment under his command in the village. the enemy were undoubtedly misled, and wasted three days in negotiations.

"then fighting recommenced and, at daybreak, the enemy made a determined attack upon the advance, with artillery. by eight o'clock they had pushed the attack home, and passed the line of walls and hedges a hundred yards from our position. the situation was growing serious when, leaving me in command, grant went out with ten ghoorkhas, crept along unobserved to the end of one of the walls and, turning this, made a sudden attack upon the enemy from behind. taken wholly by surprise they fled, leaving six or seven dead behind them.

"at eleven o'clock they were again pressing hotly and, encouraged by the success of his first sortie, grant determined to make another. this time he took me with him. with six ghoorkhas he had driven the enemy from one hedge, when he discovered a party of about sixty men behind a wall, twenty yards distant.

"'now, my lads,' he said, 'we have got to run the gauntlet, but you need not be afraid of their fire. seeing us so close to them, it is sure to be wild.'

"then, with a cheer, we dashed across the open. the enemy blazed at us, but their fire was wild and confused; and we were among them before they could reload, killing a dozen, and sending the rest to the right about, many of them wounded.

"on returning to the camp, we found that there were only fifty rounds left for the snider rifles, and thirty rounds each for the martinis. strict orders were therefore given that no one was to fire till the enemy were within close range. however, there was no doubt that the fight was all taken out of them, by the spirit with which those two little sorties had been made. they kept up a steady fire till nightfall, but took good care not to show themselves; and they retired, as soon as they could do so, in the darkness.

"that was really the end of the fighting. three days passed, and then a letter arrived from the officer in command of the expedition, ordering him to fall back to tamu, whence a detachment had been despatched to meet him. this order had fallen into the hands of the enemy. they no doubt informed themselves of its contents, and were so utterly glad to get rid of us, without further loss, that they gladly sent it in to us. that night there was a heavy thunderstorm, with a tremendous downpour of rain, and under cover of it we withdrew quietly, and before long were met by the relieving force."

"that was a splendid resistance."

"magnificent! you certainly earned your commission well, towers.

"now, major, let us hear the story of the battle of ahmed kheyl, where you met the fanatics in force. i doubt whether the afridis will fight in the same way; but they may and, at any rate, the story will be instructive."

"well, it is seventeen years ago, now," the major said, "and i was a junior lieutenant. i was, as you all know, marching from kandahar to kabul under sir donald stewart; and at ahmed kheyl, twenty-three miles south of ghuzni, we met the afghans in force, estimated at fifteen thousand foot and a thousand horse. for several days we had known that they were in the neighbourhood. their cavalry scouts could be seen marching parallel to us, about eight miles away, on the right flank.

"on the 19th of april we marched at daybreak. the advance guard consisted of seven hundred rifles, seven hundred and fifty cavalry, and six guns; the main body of somewhat over a thousand rifles, three hundred and forty-nine sabres, and ten guns; then came the trains and hospitals, guarded by strong detachments on each flank; while the rear guard was fourteen hundred infantry, three hundred and sixteen cavalry, and six mountain guns. the length of the column was about six miles.

"its head had marched about seven miles, when the cavalry in advance caught sight of the enemy, in position, three miles ahead. preparations were made for receiving an attack and, at eight o'clock, the march was resumed. half a squadron of bengal lancers were sent to cover the left front of the infantry brigade, which was now close to a range of low hills that ran parallel to the line of march for some distance, then made a bend to the east. the enemy were seen in position, covering the point of passage through the hills, and also upon the hills flanking the road by which the division would advance.

"when within a mile and a half of the enemy, two batteries moved out and took up positions to shell them in front; while the infantry deployed, the line on the left facing the enemy on the hills. the 2nd punjab cavalry were on the right of the guns, whose escort consisted of a squadron of 19th bengal lancers, and a company of punjab infantry.

"it was the general's intention to advance to the attack but, at nine o'clock, before his dispositions were completed, the whole crest of the hills held by the enemy seemed to be swarming with men. scarcely had the guns opened fire, when the enemy swept down from the hills, in successive lines of swordsmen, stretching out far beyond either flank of our force. at the same time a large body of horse rode along the hills, threatening the left flank.

"as the swordsmen swept down on the infantry and guns, the afghan horse came out of two ravines, and charged the bengal lancers before they could acquire sufficient speed to meet them fairly. the lancers were forced back, disorganizing the 3rd ghoorkhas, who composed the left battalion of the line. the colonel of the ghoorkhas threw his men into company squares, and they stood their ground; but the lancers could not be rallied until they had swept along almost the whole rear of the infantry.

"in the meantime the swordsmen on foot swept down with fanatical fury, and it became necessary to bring up the whole reserve into the fighting line. the two batteries of artillery on the right were now firing grape shot, at close range, into the mass of afghans; but neither this, nor the fire of the infantry supporting them, could check the advance of the enemy. the batteries, having used up all their case shot, were compelled to retire two hundred yards; and the right of the infantry line was also forced back.

"the situation at this moment was horribly critical: both our flanks were turned, and the troops were a good deal shaken by the suddenness and fierceness of the attack. the enemy's horsemen, however, pushing round to the left flank, were checked by the firmness of the 3rd ghoorkhas--who stood their ground bravely--and by the fire of the batteries on that flank. on the right the 2nd punjab cavalry charged and drove back the enemy, thus giving time for the two batteries to take up their fresh position, and again come into action.

"the infantry on the right also recovered from the confusion into which they had been temporarily thrown, and poured a withering fire into the afghans. in the centre the 2nd sikhs maintained, through out the fight, a steady and unyielding front. the steady and well-directed fire of the whole line, aided by the batteries, was creating terrible havoc among the enemy and, after an hour's gallant and strenuous exertion on both our flanks, their efforts began to slacken and, before long, the whole of them were in flight, leaving a thousand dead and wounded on the ground.

"it was calculated that they had at least two thousand casualties, while our own loss amounted to only one hundred and forty-one. they were not pursued, as the cavalry were required to guard the baggage."

"it was a grand fight, major," the colonel said; "but you were at maiwand also, were you not?"

"yes; and it would be hard to find a greater contrast to the fight i have just described. the two british forces were attacked under almost precisely similar circumstances. one was splendidly commanded; and the other, it must be confessed, was badly led.

"there was a good deal against us. the day was in july, and terribly hot and, at every step the troops took, they found the power of the sun increasing, until the heat became intense. a solitary traveller, in such circumstances, would make but poor travelling; and of course it was vastly worse for troops, advancing heavily laden and formed in column. the 66th foot had had tea, and a light breakfast before starting; but the native troops had had nothing to eat since the night before. one regiment, indeed, had no water; but the others had managed to fill their canteens during the halt at half-past nine.

"the brigade, at the end of the march, were again ordered to change front. the grenadiers, which was a pivot regiment, did not slacken their pace and, consequently, the centre were greatly exhausted in trying to keep up with it, and were certainly in no condition to take part in the battle at midday.

"the whole thing was a hideous mistake. general burrows had brought his line into such a position that behind him lay a great nullah and, during the course of the battle, the enemy were enabled to bring guns up to within five hundred yards on front and flank. it was a ghastly day. both flanks were driven back, and the line became bent into the form of a horseshoe. the two cavalry regiments, whose support should have been invaluable, behaved badly and, early in the fight, left the field.

"after the first line gave way, everything went badly. some of the troops stood and died on the ground they held, others soon became a mob of fugitives. the loss, as long as they held their positions, was comparatively slight; but the grand total mounted up, during the retreat.

"it was a hideous business, and one that i do not like to recall. men staggered along, overpowered by heat and thirst; falling, in many cases without resistance, under the sabre of the pursuing enemy. had these fought properly, it is probable that not a single man, except the cowardly cavalry, would have reached kandahar to tell the tale."

"thank you, major. you were also, i believe, in two or three dashing affairs before maiwand?"

"yes, colonel. certainly one of the most successful was that which cavagnari, who was afterwards murdered at kabul, made. it was not much of an affair, but it shows what can be done with dash.

"in 1877 we were making a canal, to tap the swat river at a point where it enters british territory. naturally, the swat villagers on the other side of the frontier considered that the operation was a deep-laid plot for injuring them; and it was at the village of sappri that the chief went down, with a number of desperate men, and murdered all the coolies engaged in the work. cavagnari issued orders that the chief must pay a heavy fine, in money and cattle; and that the actual murderers must be tried for their crime. the khan, however, took no notice of the demand.

"forty miles southeast of sappri was the british cantonment of murdan, where the corps of guides is permanently quartered. the greater portion of these were, however, absent on another expedition; and there remained available a few squadrons of cavalry, and eleven companies of infantry.

"cavagnari kept his plans a profound secret. he did not even give the slightest hint of his intentions to their commanding officer, captain wigram battye. so well, indeed, was the secret kept, that the officers were playing a game at racket when they were called upon to start. the first intimation that the men had of the movement was the serving out of ball cartridge, when the gates of the fort were closed in the evening. the old soldiers were well aware that this meant that fighting was at hand; and they gave a great shout, which was the first intimation to the officers that something was on foot. we were as glad as the men.

"mules had been got in readiness, and the small detachment set off on its long night march. the mules were picked animals and in good condition, and were able to keep up with the men. after covering thirty-two miles in seven hours, we halted at the frontier fort of abazai, seven miles south of sappri.

"beyond this point the country was impracticable for cavalry; and the force, now consisting of two hundred and twelve men, dismounted and marched forward on foot. after seven miles of severe toil, they arrived in the vicinity of the hostile village; and captain battye placed his men on the surrounding high ground, so as to completely command the place, and cut off all retreat. his disposition had been completed without arousing the enemy and, in a short time, day broke.

"cavagnari immediately sent in a demand, to the khan, to surrender the outlaws and pay the fine. the khan refused to comply with the terms. there was a short but desperate fight, in which the guides were victorious, the khan and many of his leading men were killed, and the village captured. the fine was then exacted, and the troops marched back to fort abazai.

"this was a fine example of a punitive expedition thoroughly well managed. the movements were made with secrecy and rapidity. horses, men, and mules were all in readiness. the cavalry were, on an emergency, prepared to perform the role of infantry; while the little party of infantry were ready to ride thirty miles, on mules, with the cavalry. in this raid the guides covered forty-eight miles, without a halt; but the perfect success that attended the expedition is not often attained, especially when, as in this case, the force is unprovided with guns. two or three little mountain guns make all the difference in expeditions of this kind for, though the afridis will stand musketry fire pluckily enough, they begin to flinch as soon as guns, however small, open upon them.

"there is no more awkward business than an attack upon hill forts that are well held, for some of them are really formidable. i was present at the storming of nilt fort, and the fight near chillas--both of them awkward affairs--and in the fight at malandrai. there had, for some time, been a state of hostilities between malandrai, two miles across the border, and rustam on our side of it. information was received that several of the most important of the enemy's raiders, and a considerable number of cattle would, on a certain night, be at malandrai; and it was arranged that two companies of guides should start in the afternoon for rustam, twenty-five miles distant, which they would reach after dark. at this place they were to take a short rest, and were then to follow the difficult tracks through the hills, and appear on a commanding spur in the rear of the village, at dawn. the frontal attack was to be made by six companies, who were to arrive before the bridge in the small hours of the morning. a squadron of bengal cavalry were to move independently, and to cut off any of the enemy who might escape from the frontal attack.

"the turning party arrived after a march of eighteen hours, through a terribly rough country. the main body, unfortunately, miscalculated their distance and, instead of halting in the gorge leading to the village, in which it was known that pickets had been placed, they came suddenly upon the enemy's outposts. these fired a volley, killing the colonel and some of the men. the surprise, therefore, as a surprise failed; but an attack was made in the morning, the village taken, and the turning party extricated from its dangerous position. that is a good example of the difficulty of attacking a hill fort.

"another instance is the attack upon nilt fort. the place was one of great natural strength; the fort, which was a large one, faced the junction of three precipitous cliffs, several hundred feet high, where a great ravine runs into the hunza river. owing to the nature of the ground, the fort could not be seen till the force was within three hundred yards of it; and fire could not be properly opened upon it until within two hundred and fifty yards.

"the walls of the fort were of solid stone, cemented by mud, and strengthened by strong timbers. they were fourteen feet in height, and eight feet in thickness; and were surmounted by flanking towers and battlements, which afforded the defenders a perfect cover. in front of the main gate was a loopholed wall, completely hiding the gateway; and in front of this again was a very deep ditch, filled with abattis; while a broad band of abattis filled the space between the ditch, and a precipitous spur from the adjacent mountain. this spur was, unfortunately, inaccessible for guns and, though our infantry mounted it, their fire had no effect upon the enemy, sheltered as they were behind their battlements.

"it was therefore necessary to make a direct attack, and storm the fort on a front of only sixty yards. after a vain attempt to make some impression on the forts with mountain guns, the order was given to advance; and the ghoorkhas, two hundred strong, and a company of sappers dashed forward into the ravine facing the west wall. a few of them managed to force their way into a weak point of the abattis, under a heavy fire from the fort; and worked round to a gateway. this was soon hacked down, and then they burst into the courtyard.

"captain aylmer, r.e., set to work to place a charge of gun cotton against the main entrenchment of the fort. after repeated failures, the fuse was lighted and the gate blown in. captain aylmer was severely wounded, in three places; and several of the men killed.

"so far the attack had been so astonishingly bold and quick that the main body were unaware of the success; and colonel duran, thinking the explosion was caused by the bursting of one of the enemy's guns, continued steadily firing at the fort. the position of the twenty men and three officers was precarious, indeed, as they were thus exposed to a heavy fire from behind, as well as in front. with splendid heroism, however, they held on to the advantage they had gained till some reinforcements came up; and then, pressing on through the shattered gate, they captured the fort.

"for a fortnight after this the force remained inactive, for no way of ascending the great ravine was known. at last, however, an enterprising sepoy discovered a way, and on the 19th of december a hundred men, under two lieutenants, were ordered to leave nilt fort under cover of darkness, drop silently down into the bed of the ravine, and there await daylight.

"the portion of the enemy's position that had been selected for attack was on the extreme left, on the crest of a cliff which rose, without a break, fifteen hundred feet from the bed of the ravine. another force, a hundred and thirty-five men and six british officers, with two guns, was to cover the advance of the storming party. at eight o'clock in the morning, fire was opened upon the enemy, as it was anticipated that the storming party were well up the cliff by this time; but unfortunately, after ascending the precipice halfway, they reached a point where the cliff was absolutely impracticable, and were obliged to descend again into the ravine.

"at two o'clock, having discovered a more practicable way, they ascended again, foot by foot; their commander working his way up with admirable judgment, moving from point to point, as opportunity offered, between the showers of stones. the enemy were now fully aware that the precipice was being scaled, and it was only the well-directed fire of the covering party that prevented them from issuing from their defences, and annihilating the party with rocks and boulders.

"the summit was reached at half-past eleven, and the first of the enemy's works captured. they rushed sangar after sangar, taking them in rear and driving out the enemy pell mell, killing many and capturing a large number of prisoners. at last the passage of the great ravine was gained, and the british force enabled to move forward again.

"the greatest credit was due to lieutenant manners-smith; whose conduct, in storming the height in broad daylight, was simply magnificent; and the result showed the manner in which even young officers can distinguish themselves, and how the native troops will follow them, unhesitatingly, through dangers which would well appal even the bravest.

"it is possible, however, to demand too much from our troops; as was shown in the defence of chillas. the post was held, in '93, by three hundred men of the kashmir maharajah's bodyguard, under the command of two british officers, major daniels and lieutenant moberley. for some time, daniels had been warned that he might be attacked on the night of a mohammedan feast. it was understood that this was on the 3rd of march and, when the night passed quietly, it was considered that the alarm had been a false one. during the next night, however, a determined attack was made, by about a thousand men; but was repulsed by steady volleys.

"major daniels then determined to take the offensive and attack the enemy, who were swarming in great numbers into a neighbouring village. at half-past three moberley, with thirty-five men, went out to attack the village. after severe fighting, and some loss, he effected a lodgment in an outer line of houses; but being himself badly wounded, and finding the village too strongly held for a small party to make any further progress, he retired with his detachment to the fort.

"the enemy continued a heavy fire until half-past eight, when major daniels determined to attack them again; although their numbers were now swollen to between four thousand and five thousand men. he had with him only a hundred and forty available men, a number being required to garrison the fort. dividing his little force, however, he attacked the village on two sides. the fight went on for two hours, during which one of the two attacking parties gained a partial footing in the village; but wounded men began to struggle back to the fort, and reported that major daniels and many men had been killed; and the remnants of the attacking party were brought back, by a native officer, at half-past eleven. the casualties in killed and wounded were very heavy, including the two british officers, four native officers, and forty-six rank and file. fortunately the natives; believing, no doubt, that reinforcements would arrive, scattered to their homes without further action.

"here was a case in which the native troops were ordered to perform what verged on the impossible. the houses in these native villages are almost always fortified; and to take a hundred and fifty men, to attack a place held by five thousand, was asking more than the best british soldiers could be expected to achieve.

"at any rate, the stories i have told you will give you some idea of the work we have before us. we may quite assume that such a force as is now being collected can be trusted to defeat the afridis, if they venture to meet us in open fight; but if they resort solely to harassing tactics, we shall have our work cut out for us. it must be remembered, too, that the afridis are far better fighters, more warlike, and of far better physique than the men engaged in the fights that i have been speaking of. they are splendid shots, and are almost all armed with breech-loading rifles, sniders and martinis. their country is tremendously hilly and, although it is wholly unknown to us, we do know that there are ravines to be passed where a handful of men could keep an army at bay."

"i was with the sikhim expedition, in '88," one of the captains said. "at that time i was in the derbyshires. in this case it was the wildness of the country, rather than the stoutness of the defence of the thibetans, that caused our difficulty. the force consisted of a mountain battery of four guns, two hundred men of our regiment, four hundred of the bengal infantry, and seven hundred men of the 32nd pioneers. the men were all picked and of good physique, as it was known that the campaign would be a most arduous one. in addition to the usual entrenching tools, a hundred and twenty short swords were issued to each regiment, and fifty per cent of the followers were also supplied. these swords were to be used for clearing away jungle. the country was very rugged, and the work had to be done at the altitude of twelve thousand feet, where the mountains are mostly covered with forest trees and undergrowth.

"the base from which we started was thirty miles northeast of darjeeling, and the first objective of the expedition was the fort of lingtu, forty miles distant. the advance was made in two columns; the first consisting of two mountain guns, a hundred men of the derbyshires, and three hundred of the 32nd pioneers, which were to make for lingtu; while the rest were to operate towards intchi, where the rajah of sikhim resided, and thus prevent reinforcements from being sent to lingtu.

"the latter column met with no opposition and, after accomplishing their work, retired. the first column came across the enemy at jeluk, five miles short of lingtu. here the thibetans had erected a strong stockade, at the top of a very steep ascent; and had barricaded the road with stone breastworks.

"the position was attacked, at seven in the morning, by a hundred men of the 32nd pioneers; supported by seventy-eight men of my regiment. the guns had had to be left behind. the advance was slow and, owing to the dense bamboo jungle through which we had to pass, and the steepness of the road, great caution was necessary.

"when we had reached a spot within a few hundred yards of the stockade, fire was suddenly opened on the pioneers. these, however, moved on steadily, without replying till, having worked their way close up to the stockade, they fired a volley; and then, with a loud cheer, charged with bayonets fixed. the derbyshire detachment moved up into support, and the position was captured after a sharp struggle.

"a small turning party, under captain lumsden, had been detached to the left but, after proceeding a short distance, they found that the road had been cleared to where it passed round a precipice; and that it was defended by a party of the enemy, behind a stone breastwork, at ten yards' range. captain lumsden and several of his men were knocked over, and the party were brought to a complete stand. so thick was the jungle that they did not know what was going on, on either side; and the first intimation they received, of the capture of the fort, was the descent of a party of derbyshires in the rear of the breastworks.

"the stockade, when it was examined, turned out to be a most formidable one; about two hundred yards long, both flanks resting on impassable precipices. it was constructed of logs laid horizontally, with a thick abattis of twelve trees.

"next morning the advance on lingtu was continued, in a dense mist. information was obtained, from a prisoner, that they would have to cross a spot where there was a stone shoot, down which an avalanche of rocks could be hurled by the defenders. they therefore advanced with great caution, while a party of the pioneers crept along the crest of the ridge, and attacked from the rear the party gathered at the head of the stone shoot. the road was steep and broken, and the partially-melted snow lay two feet deep on it. the pioneers captured the stone shoot without loss, and then pushed on over the hills and, without firing a shot, charged straight at the fort; and burst their way through the main gate, before the astonished thibetans had realized what was happening.

"of course, as it was against an enemy of such poor fighting quality as the thibetans, this little affair affords no idea of the resistance that we can expect in the tirah; but it does show what can be accomplished by our men, in the face of immense natural difficulties."