the winter was long and tedious but, whenever the weather permitted, terence set his men at work; taking them twice a week for long marches, so as to keep their powers in that direction unabated. the sandals turned out a great success. the men had no greatcoats, but they supplied the want by cutting a slit in the centre of their black blankets and passing the head through it. this answered all the purposes, and hid the shabby condition of their uniforms.

general hill occasionally rode over to inspect this and the other portuguese regiments encamped near them.

"that is a very good plan of yours, colonel o'connor," he said, the first time the whole regiment turned out in their sandals. "it is a much more sensible footgear than the boots."

"i should not have adopted them, general, if the men had had any boots to put on; but those they had became absolutely unwearable. some of the soles were completely off, the upper leathers were so cut and worn that they were literally of no use and, in many cases. they were falling to pieces. the men like the sandals much better, and certainly march with greater ease. yesterday they did thirty miles, and came in comparatively fresh."

"i wish the whole army were shod so," the general said. "it would improve their marching powers, and we should not have so many men laid up, footsore. i should say that the boots supplied to the army are the very worst that soldiers were ever cursed with. they are heavy, they are nearly as hard as iron when the weather is dry, and are as rotten as blotting paper when it is wet. it is quite an accident if a man gets a pair to fit him properly. i believe it would be better if they were trained to march barefooted. their feet would soon get hardened and, at any rate, it would be an improvement on the boots now served out to them.

"i wish the other portuguese regiments were as well drilled and as well set up as your fellows. of course, your men don't look smart, at present, and would not make a good show on a parade ground; but i hear that there are a large quantity of uniforms coming out, shortly; and i hope, long before the campaign opens, they will all be served out. the british regiments are almost as badly off as the native ones. however, i suppose matters will right themselves before the spring; but they are almost as badly off, now, as they were when they marched into corunna. the absurdity of the whole thing is that all the newly-raised portuguese levies, who will certainly not be called upon to cross the frontier until next year, have got uniforms; while the men who have to do the work are almost in rags."

two or three of the officers of the fusiliers rode over frequently, to stop for a night or so with terence; and the latter found time pass much more pleasantly than he had done before ryan had joined him. during the day both their hands were full; but the evenings were very pleasant, now that he had dick as well as herrara to talk to. the feeling of the responsibility on his shoulders steadied ryan a good deal, and he was turning out a far more useful assistant than terence had expected; but when work was over, his spirits were as high as ever, and the conversation in terence's tent seldom languished.

spring came, but there was no movement on the part of the troops. ney, with 50,000 men, began the siege of ciudad rodrigo in earnest. the agueda had now become fordable; and crawford, with his light brigade, 2500 strong, was exposed to a sudden attack at any time. on the 1st of june terence received orders to march with his regiment to guarda, where wellington was concentrating the greater portion of his army; leaving hill, with 12,000 men, to guard the southern portion of the frontier.

both the spanish and portuguese urged the general to relieve ciudad rodrigo; but wellington refused, steadily, to hazard the whole fortune of the campaign on an enterprise which was unlikely to succeed. his total force was but 56,000 men, of whom 20,000 were untried portuguese. garrisons had to be placed at several points, and 8000 portuguese were posted at thomar, a day's march from abrantes, as a reserve for hill.

it was not only the 50,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry of massena, who now commanded in front of ciudad rodrigo, that he had to reckon with. regnier's division was at coria; and could, in three easy marches, reach guarda; or in four fall on hill at abrantes; and with but 26,000 men in line, it would have been a desperate enterprise, indeed, to attack 60,000 veteran french soldiers merely for the sake of carrying off the 5000 undisciplined portuguese besieged at ciudad.

the minho regiment had only received their new uniforms a month before the order came, and made a good show as they marched into guarda, where wellington's headquarters were now established. when terence reported himself to the adjutant general, the latter said:

"at present, colonel o'connor, you cannot be employed in your former work of scouting. the french are altogether too powerful for a couple of battalions to approach them and, with 8000 cavalry, they would make short work of you. crawford must soon fall back behind the coa. his position already is a very hazardous one. it has therefore been decided to place 1500 of your men along on this side of the coa and, with half a battalion, you will march at once to almeida to strengthen the garrison of that place which, as soon as crawford retires, is certain to be besieged. it should be able to offer a long and stout resistance.

"you will, of course, be under the general orders of the commandant; but you will receive an authorization to take independent action, should you think fit: that is to say, if you find the place can be no longer defended, and the commandant is intending to surrender, you are at liberty to withdraw your command, if you find it possible to do so."

on the following morning the corps left guarda and, leaving a battalion and a half on the coa, under herrara; terence, with 500 men, after a long march, entered almeida that night. the town, which was fortified, was occupied only by portuguese troops. it was capable of repulsing a sudden attack, but was in no condition to withstand a regular siege. it was deficient in magazines and bomb proofs; and the powder, of which there was a large supply, was stored in an old castle in the middle of the town. on entering the place, terence at once called upon colonel cox, who was in command.

"i am glad that you have come, colonel o'connor," the latter said. "i know that lord wellington expects me to make a long defence, and to keep massena here for at least a month but, although i mean to do my best, i cannot conceal from myself that the defences are terribly defective. then, too, more than half my force are newly-levied militia, in whom very little dependence can be placed. your men will be invaluable, in case of assault; but it is not assault i fear, so much as having the place tumbling about our ears by their artillery, which can be so placed as to command it from several points. we are very short of artillery, and the guns are well nigh as old as the fortifications."

"we will do our best, colonel, in any direction you may point out; and i think that we could defend a breach against any reasonable force brought against it. i may say that i have been ordered, if the worst comes to the worst, to endeavour to make my way out of the town before it surrenders."

for a fortnight the place was left unmolested. crawford's division still kept beyond the coa, and his cavalry had had several engagements with french reconnoitring parties. on the 2nd of july, however, the news came that, after a most gallant resistance, ciudad rodrigo had surrendered; and it was now certain that the storm would roll westward, in a very short time. massena, however, delayed strangely; and it was not until daylight on the 24th that a sudden roll of musketry, followed almost immediately by a heavy artillery fire, told the garrison of almeida that the light division was suddenly attacked by the enemy.

crawford had received the strictest orders not to fight beyond the coa; but he was an obstinate man, and had so long maintained his position across the river that he believed that, if attacked, he should be able to withdraw over the bridge before any very strong force could be brought up to attack him. in this he was mistaken. the country was wooded, and the french march was unsuspected until they were close upon crawford's force. the light division had, however, been well trained; indeed, it was composed of veteran regiments, and had been practised to get under arms with the least possible delay. they were, therefore, already drawn up when the french fell upon them and, fighting hard and sternly, repelled all the efforts of the enemy's cavalry to cut them off from the bridge. driving back the french light infantry, the light division crossed in safety, although with considerable loss; and repulsed, with great slaughter, every attempt of the french to cross the bridge.

almeida was now left to its fate. again massena delayed, and it was not until the 18th of august that the siege was begun. on the 26th sixty-five heavy guns, that had been used in the siege of ciudad rodrigo, opened fire upon the town. the more terence saw of the place, the more convinced was he that it could not long be held, after the french siege guns had been placed in position. moreover, there was great lukewarmness on the part of several of the portuguese officers, while the rank and file were dispirited by the fate of ciudad rodrigo, and by the fact that they had, as it seemed to them, been deserted by the british army.

"i don't like the look of things, at all," he had said to bull and ryan, the evening before the siege guns began their work. "in the first place the defences will crumble, in no time, under the french fire. in the second place, i don't think that the portuguese, with the exception of our own men, have any fight in them. da costa, the lieutenant governor, openly declares that the place is indefensible, and that it is simply throwing away the lives of the men to resist. he is very intimate, i observe, with bareiros, the chief of the artillery. altogether, things look very bad. of course, we shall stay here as long as the place resists; but i am afraid that won't be for very long.

"i was speaking to colonel cox this afternoon. he is a brave man, and with trustworthy troops would, i am sure, hold the town until the last; but, unsupported as he is, he is in the hands of these rascally portuguese officers. i told him that, if he ordered me to do so, i would undertake with my men to arrest the whole of them; but he said that that would bring on a mutiny of all their troops; and this, bad as the situation already was, would only make matters much worse. i then suggested that, as the french are driving their trenches towards those two old redoubts outside the wall, i would, if he liked, place our force in them; and would undertake to hold them, pointing out that if they fell into the hands of the enemy they would soon mount their cannon there, and bring down the whole wall facing in that direction.

"he quite agreed with that view of the case, but said that it would be a very exposed position; still, as our fellows were certainly the only trustworthy troops he had, he should be very glad if i would undertake the defence at once, as the french were pushing their approaches very fast towards them. i said that i was sure we could hold them for some little time; and that, indeed, it seemed to me that the french intended to bombard the town rather than to breach the walls, knowing the composition of the garrison and, perhaps, having intelligence that their courage would be so shaken, by a heavy fire, that the place would surrender in a much shorter time than it would take to breach the walls. accordingly, he has given me leave to march our men up there, at daybreak tomorrow; taking with us ten days' provisions.

"i said that if he had trouble with the other portuguese regiments i would, on his hoisting a red flag on the church steeple, march in at once to seize and shoot the leaders of the mutiny, if he wished it. of course, one of my reasons for wanting to take charge of the redoubts was that we should have more chance of withdrawing, from them, than we should of getting out of the town, itself, in the confusion and panic of an approaching surrender."

bull and ryan both agreed with terence and, at daybreak the next morning, the half battalion marched out, relieved the portuguese troops holding the two redoubts, and established themselves there. they had brought with them a number of intrenching tools, and were accompanied by an engineer officer. so, as soon as they reached the redoubts, several parties of men were set to work, to begin to sink pits for driving galleries in the direction of the approaches that the french were pushing forward; while others assisted a party of artillerymen to work the guns. some of the best shots in the corps took their places on the rampart, and were directed to maintain a steady fire on the french working parties.

the roar of cannon, when the french batteries opened fire on the town, was prodigious; and it was not long before it was evident that there was no present design, on the part of the french, to effect a breach.

"i expect they have lots of friends in the town," terence said to dick ryan, as they watched the result of the fire; "and they make sure that the garrison will very soon lose heart. do you see how many shots are striking the old castle? that looks as if the french knew that it was the magazine. they are dropping shell there, too; and that alone is enough to cause a scare in the town, for if one of them dropped into the magazine, the consequences would be terrific. they are not pushing on the trenches against us with anything like the energy with which they have been working for the past week; and it is certainly curious that they should not keep up a heavier fire from their batteries upon us, for it is evident that they cannot make an assault, on this side of the town, at any rate, until they have captured our redoubts."

"i wish we were well out of it," ryan exclaimed. "it is quite certain that the place must fall, sooner or later; and though we might beat the french back several times, it must come to the same, in the end. the thing i am most concerned about, at present, is how we are to get away."

"i quite agree with you, dick; and you know, we have had several looks at the french lines, from the roof of the church. their batteries are chiefly on this side of the town; but most of their troops are encamped on the other side, so as to be in readiness to meet any attempt of wellington to succour the place; and also to show the garrison that there is no chance, whatever, of their being able to draw off. we agreed that the chances would be much better of getting out on this side than on the other."

"yes; but we also agreed, terence, that there would be a good deal more difficulty in getting safely back; for practically the whole of their army would be between us and wellington."

"it will be a difficult business, dicky, whichever way we go; and i suppose that, at last, we shall have to be guided by circumstances."

in a very short time, fires broke out at several points in the town. the guns on the walls made but a very feeble reply to the french batteries; and one or two bastions, where alone a brisk fire was at first maintained, drew upon themselves such a storm of missiles from the french guns that they were soon silenced.

"it is quite evident that the portuguese gunners have not much fight in them," bull said.

"i am afraid it is the disaffection among their officers that is paralysing them," terence said. "but i quite admit that it may be good policy to keep the men under cover. they really could do no good against the french batteries; which have all the advantage of position, as well as numbers and weight of metal; and it would certainly be well to reserve the troops till the french drive their trenches close up. if i thought that the silence of the guns on the walls were due to that, i should be well content; but i am afraid it is nothing of the sort. if the french keep up their fire, as at present, for another forty-eight hours, the place will throw open its gates. the inhabitants must be suffering frightfully. of course, if colonel cox had men he could thoroughly rely upon, he would be obliged to harden his heart and disregard the clamour of the townspeople for surrender; but as the garrison is pretty certain to make common cause with them, it seems to me that the place is lost, if the bombardment continues."

in a short time, seeing that the working parties in the enemy's trenches made no attempt to push them farther forward, terence withdrew the men from their exposed position on the ramparts--leaving only a few there on the lookout--and told the rest to lie down on the inner slopes, so as to be in shelter from the french fire. bull was in command of the force in the other redoubt, which was a quarter of a mile away. the redoubts were, however, connected by a deep ditch, so that communication could be kept up between them, or reinforcements sent from one to the other, unobserved by the enemy, except by those on one or two elevated spots.

all day the roar of the cannon continued. from a dozen points, smoke and flame rose from the city, and towards these the french batteries chiefly directed their fire, in order to hinder the efforts of the garrison to check the progress of the conflagration.

just after dark, as ryan and terence were sitting down in an angle of the bastion to eat their supper, there was a tremendous roar; accompanied by so terrible a shock that both were thrown prostrate upon the ground with a force that, for the moment, half stunned them. a broad glare of light illuminated the sky. there was the rumble and roar of falling buildings and walls; and then came dull, crashing sounds as masses of brickwork, hurled high up into the air, fell over the town and the surrounding country. then came a dead silence, which was speedily broken by the sound of loud screams and shouts from the town.

"it is just as we feared," terence said as, bruised and bewildered, he struggled to his feet. "the magazine in the castle has exploded."

he ordered the bugler to sound the assembly and, as the men gathered, it was found that although many of them had been hurt severely, by the violence with which they had been thrown down, none had been killed either by the shock or the falling fragments. an officer was at once sent to the other redoubt, to inquire how they had fared; and to give orders to bull to keep his men under arms, lest the french should take advantage of the catastrophe, and make a sudden attack.

"ryan, do you take the command of the men, here, until i come back. i will go into the town and see colonel cox. i fear that the damage will be so great that the town will be really no longer defensible and, even if it were, the portuguese troops will be so cowed that there will be no more fight left in them."

it was but five hundred yards to the wall. terence was unchallenged as he ran up. the gate was open and, on entering, he saw that the disaster greatly exceeded his expectations. the castle had been shattered into fragments, the church levelled to the ground and, of the whole town, only six houses remained standing. five hundred people had been killed.

the wildest confusion prevailed. the soldiers were running about without object or purpose, apparently scared out of their senses. women were shrieking and wringing their hands, by the ruins of their houses. men were frantically tugging at beams, and masses of brickwork, to endeavour to rescue their friends buried under the ruins. presently he came upon colonel cox, who had just been joined by captain hewitt, the only british officer with him; who had instantly gone off to see the amount of damage done to the defences, and had brought back news that the walls had been levelled in several places, and the guns thrown into the ditch.

da costa, bareiros, and several other portuguese officers were loudly clamouring for instant surrender and, the french shells again beginning to fall into the town, added to the prevailing terror. in vain the commandant endeavoured to still the tumult, and to assure those around him that the defence might yet be continued, for a short time; and better terms be obtained than if they were, at once, to surrender.

"can i do anything, colonel?" terence said. "my men are still available."

the officer shook his head.

"massena will see, in the morning," he said, "that he has but to march in. if these men would fight, we could still, perhaps, defend the breaches for a day or two. but it would only be useless slaughter. however, as they won't fight, i must send a flag of truce out, and endeavour to make terms. at any rate, colonel o'connor, if you can manage to get off with your command, by all means do so. of course, i shall endeavour to obtain terms for the garrison to march out; but i fear that massena will hear of nothing but unconditional surrender."

"thank you, colonel. then i shall at once return to my corps, and endeavour to make my way through."

on returning to the redoubt, terence sent a message to bull to come to him at once and, when he arrived, told him and ryan the state of things in the town, and the certainty that it would surrender, at once.

"the portuguese are so clamorous," he said, "that a flag of truce may be despatched to massena, in half an hour's time. the portuguese are right so far that, if the place must be surrendered, there is no reason for any longer exposing the troops and the townsfolk to the french bombardment. therefore it is imperative that, if we are to make our way out, we must do so before the place surrenders.

"we agreed, yesterday, as to the best line to take. the french force here is by no means considerable, their main body being between this and the coa. massena, knowing the composition of the garrison here, did not deem it requisite to send a larger force than was necessary to protect the batteries; and the major portion of these are on the heights behind the city. between the road leading to escalon and that through fort conception there is no french camp, and it is by that line we must make our escape.

"we know that there are considerable forces, somewhere near villa puerca; but when we reach the river turones we can follow its banks down, with very little fear. it is probable that they have a force at the bridge near san felices; but i believe the river is fordable in many places, now. at any rate, they are not likely to be keeping a sharp watch anywhere, tonight. they must all know that that tremendous explosion will have rendered the place untenable and, except at the batteries which are still firing, there will be no great vigilance; especially on this side, for it would hardly be supposed that, even if the garrison did attempt to escape, they would take the road to the east, and so cut themselves off from their allies and enter a country wholly french.

"of course, with us the case is different. we can march farther and faster than any french infantry. the woods afford abundant places of concealment, and we are perfectly capable of driving off any small bodies of cavalry that we may meet. fortunately we have eight days' provision of biscuit. of course, it was with a view to this that i proposed that we should bring out so large a supply with us.

"now, i think we had better start at once."

"i quite agree with you, colonel," bull said. "i will return to the other redoubt, and form the men up at once. i shall be ready in a quarter of an hour."

"very well, bull. i will move out from here, in a quarter of an hour from the present time, and march across and join you as you come out. we must move round between your redoubt and the town. in that way we shall avoid the enemy's trenches altogether."

the men were at once ordered to fall in. fortunately, none were so seriously disabled as to be unfit to take their places in the ranks. the necessity for absolute silence was impressed upon them, and they were told to march very carefully; as a fall over a stone, and the crash of a musket on the rocks, might at once call the attention of a french sentinel. as the troops filed out through the entrance to the redoubt, terence congratulated himself upon their all having sandals, for the sound of their tread was faint, indeed, to what it would have been had they been marching in heavy boots.

at the other redoubt they were joined by bull, with his party. there was a momentary halt while six men, picked for their intelligence, went on ahead, under the command of ryan. they were to move twenty paces apart. if they came upon any solitary sentinel, one man was to be sent back instantly to stop the column; while two others crawled forward and surprised and silenced the sentry. should their way be arrested by a strong picket, they were to reconnoitre the ground on either side; and then one was to be sent back, to guide the column so as to avoid the picket.

when he calculated that ryan must be nearly a quarter of a mile in advance, terence gave orders for the column to move forward. when a short distance had been traversed, one of the scouts came in, with the news that there was a cordon of sentries across their path. they were some fifty paces apart, and some must be silenced before the march could be continued.

ten minutes later, another scout brought in news that four of the french sentries had been surprised and killed, without any alarm being given; and the column resumed its way, the necessity for silence being again impressed upon the men. as they went forward, they received news that two more of the sentries had been killed; and that there was, in consequence, a gap of 350 yards between them. a scout led the way through the opening thus formed. it was an anxious ten minutes, but the passage was effected without any alarm being given; the booming of the guns engaged in bombarding the town helping to cover the sound of their footsteps.

it had been settled that ryan and the column were both to march straight for a star, low down on the horizon, so that there was no fear of either taking the wrong direction. in another half hour they were sure that they were well beyond the french lines; whose position, indeed, could be made out by the light of their bivouac fires.

for three hours they continued their march, at a rapid pace, without a check. then they halted for half an hour, and then held on their way till daybreak, when they entered a large village. they had left the redoubts at about nine o'clock, and it was now five; so that they had marched at least twenty-five miles, and were within some ten miles of the aqueda.

sentries were posted at the edge of the wood, and the troops then lay down to sleep. several times during the day parties of french cavalry were seen moving about; but they were going at a leisurely pace, and there was no appearance of their being engaged in any search. at nightfall the troops got under arms again, and made their way to the aqueda.

a peasant, whom they fell in with soon after they started, had undertaken to show them a ford. it was breast deep, but the stream was not strong, and they crossed without difficulty, holding their arms and ammunition well above the water. they learned that there was, indeed, a french brigade at the bridge of san felices. marching north now, they came before daybreak upon the douro. here they again lay up during the day and, that evening, obtained two boats at a village near the mouth of the tormes, and crossed into the portuguese province of tras os nontes.

the 500 men joined in a hearty cheer, on finding themselves safe in their own country. after halting for a couple of days, terence marched to castel rodrigo and then, learning that the main body of the regiment was at pinhel, marched there and joined them; his arrival causing great rejoicing among his men, for it had been supposed that he and the half battalion had been captured, at the fall of almeida. the portuguese regular troops at that place had, at the surrender at daybreak after the explosion, all taken service with the french; while the militia regiments had been disbanded by massena, and allowed to return to their homes.

from here terence sent off his report to headquarters, and asked for orders. the adjutant general wrote back, congratulating him on having successfully brought off his command, and ordering the corps to take post at linares. he found that another disaster, similar to that at almeida, had taken place--the magazine at albuquerque having been blown up by lightning, causing the loss of four hundred men.

the french army were still behind the coa, occupied in restoring the fortifications of almeida and ciudad rodrigo, and it was not until the 17th of september that massena crossed the coa, and began the invasion of portugal in earnest; his march being directed towards coimbra, by taking which line he hoped to prevent hill, in the south, from effecting a junction with wellington.

the latter, however, had made every preparation for retreat and, as soon as he found that massena was in earnest, he sent word to hill to join him on the alva, and fell back in that direction himself.

terence received orders to co-operate with 10,000 of the portuguese militia, under the command of trant. wilson and miller were to harass massena's right flank and rear. had wellington's orders been carried out, massena would have found the country deserted by its inhabitants and entirely destitute of provisions; but as usual his orders had been thwarted by the portuguese government, who sent secret instructions to the local authorities to take no steps to carry them out; and the result was that massena, as he advanced, found ample stores for provisioning his army.

the speed with which wellington fell back baffled his calculations and, by the time he approached viseu, the whole british army was united, near coimbra. his march had been delayed two days, by an attack made by trant and terence upon the advanced guard, as it was making its way through a defile. a hundred prisoners were taken, with some baggage; and a serious blow would have been struck at the french, had not the new portuguese levies been seized with panic and fled in confusion. trant was, consequently, obliged to draw off. the attack, however, had been so resolute and well-directed that massena, not knowing the strength of the force opposing him, halted for two days until the whole army came up; and thus afforded time for the british to concentrate, and make their arrangements.

illustration: plan of the battle of busaco.

the ground chosen by wellington to oppose massena's advance was on the edge of the sierra busaco; which was separated, by a deep and narrow valley, from the series of hills across which the french were marching. there were four roads by which the french could advance. the one from mortagao, which was narrow and little used, passed through royalva. the other three led to the position occupied by the british force between the village of busaco and pena cova. trant's command was posted at royalva. terence with his regiment took post, with a portuguese brigade of cavalry, on the heights above santa marcella, where the road leading south to espinel forked; a branch leading from it across the mondego, in the rear of the british position, to coimbra. here he could be aided, if necessary, by the guns at pena cova, on the opposite side of the river.

while the british were taking up their ground between busaco and pena cova, ney and regnier arrived on the crest of the opposite hill. had they attacked at once, as ney wished, they might have succeeded; for the divisions of spenser, leith, and hill had not yet arrived. but massena was ten miles in the rear, and did not come up until next day, with junot's corps; by which time the whole of the british army was ranged along the opposite heights.

their force could be plainly made out from the french position, and so formidable were the heights that had to be scaled by an attacking force that ney, impetuous and brave as he was, no longer advocated an attack. massena, however, was bent upon fighting. he had every confidence in the valour of his troops, and was averse to retiring from portugal, baffled, by the long and rugged road he had travelled; therefore dispositions were at once made for the attack. ney and regnier were to storm the british position, while junot's corps was to be held in reserve.

at daybreak on the 29th the french descended the hill; ney's troops, in three columns of attack, moving against a large convent towards the british left centre; while regnier, in two columns, advanced against the centre. regnier's men were the first engaged and, mounting the hill with great gallantry and resolution, pushed the skirmishers of picton's division before them and, in spite of the grape fire of a battery of six guns, almost gained the summit of the hill--the leading battalions establishing themselves among the rocks there, while those behind wheeled to the right. wellington, who was on the spot, swept the flank of this force with grape; and the 88th and a wing of the 45th charged down upon them furiously.

the french, exhausted by their efforts in climbing the hill, were unable to resist the onslaught; and the english and french, mixed up together, went down the hill; the french still resisting, but unable to check their opponents who, favoured by the steep descent, swept all before them.

in the meantime, the battalions that had gained the crest held their own against the rest of the third division and, had they been followed by the troops who had wheeled off towards their right, the british position would have been cut in two. general leith, seeing the critical state of affairs had, as soon as he saw the third division pressed back, despatched a brigade to its assistance. it had to make a considerable detour round a ravine; but it now arrived and, attacking with fury, drove the french grenadiers from the rocks; and pursued them, with a continuous fire of musketry, until they were out of range. the rest of leith's division soon arrived, and general hill moved his division to the position before occupied by leith. thus, so formidable a force was concentrated at the point where regnier made his effort that, having no reserves, he did not venture to renew the attack.

on their right the french had met with no better success. in front of the convent, but on lower ground, was a plateau; and on this crawford posted the 43rd and 52nd regiments of the line, in a slight dip, which concealed them from observation by the french. a quarter of a mile behind them, on the high ground close to the convent, was a regiment of german infantry. these were in full sight of the enemy. the other regiment of the light division was placed lower down the hill, and supported by the guns of a battery.

two of ney's columns advanced up the hill with great speed and gallantry; never pausing for a moment, although their ranks were swept by grape from the artillery, and a heavy musketry fire by the light troops. the latter were forced to fall back before the advance. the guns were withdrawn, and the french were within a few yards of the edge of the plateau, when crawford launched the 43rd and 52nd regiments against them.

wholly unprepared for such an attack, the french were hurled down the hill. only one of their columns attempted to retrieve the disaster, and advanced against the right of the light division. here, however, they met pack's brigade; while crawford's artillery swept the wood through which they were ascending. finally, they were forced to retire down the hill, and the action came to an end. never did the french fight more bravely; but the position, held by determined troops, was practically impregnable. the french loss in killed and wounded was 4500, that of the allies only 1300; the difference being caused by the fact that the french ranks, throughout the action, were swept with grape by the british batteries; while the french artillery could do nothing to aid their infantry.