now, i have said that the community by means of organisation of machinery will supply the useful things, and that the beautiful things will be made by the individual. this is not merely necessary, but it is the only possible way by which we can get either the one or the other. an individual who has to make things for the use of others, and with reference to their wants and their wishes, does not work with interest, and consequently cannot put into his work what is best in him. upon the other hand, whenever a community or a powerful section of a community, or a government of any kind, attempts to dictate to the artist what he is to do, art either entirely vanishes, or becomes stereotyped, or degenerates into a low and ignoble form of craft. a work of art is the unique result of a unique temperament. its beauty comes from the fact that the author is what he is. it has nothing to do with the fact that other people want what they want. indeed, the moment that an artist takes notice of what other people want, and tries to supply the demand, he ceases to be an artist, and becomes a dull or an amusing craftsman, an honest or a dishonest tradesman. he has no further claim to be considered as an artist. art is the most intense mode of individualism that the world has known. i am inclined to say that it is the only real mode of individualism that the world has known. crime, which, under certain conditions, may seem to have created individualism, must take cognisance of other people and interfere with them. it belongs to the sphere of action. but alone, without any reference to his neighbours, without any interference, the artist can fashion a beautiful thing; and if he does not do it solely for his own pleasure, he is not an artist at all.

and it is to be noted that it is the fact that art is this intense form of individualism that makes the public try to exercise over it an authority that is as immoral as it is ridiculous, and as corrupting as it is contemptible. it is not quite their fault. the public has always, and in every age, been badly brought up. they are continually asking art to be popular, to please their want of taste, to flatter their absurd vanity, to tell them what they have been told before, to show them what they ought to be tired of seeing, to amuse them when they feel heavy after eating too much, and to distract their thoughts when they are wearied of their own stupidity. now art should never try to be popular. the public should try to make itself artistic. there is a very wide difference. if a man of science were told that the results of his experiments, and the conclusions that he arrived at, should be of such a character that they would not upset the received popular notions on the subject, or disturb popular prejudice, or hurt the sensibilities of people who knew nothing about science; if a philosopher were told that he had a perfect right to speculate in the highest spheres of thought, provided that he arrived at the same conclusions as were held by those who had never thought in any sphere at all—well, nowadays the man of science and the philosopher would be considerably amused. yet it is really a very few years since both philosophy and science were subjected to brutal popular control, to authority in fact—the authority of either the general ignorance of the community, or the terror and greed for power of an ecclesiastical or governmental class. of course, we have to a very great extent got rid of any attempt on the part of the community, or the church, or the government, to interfere with the individualism of speculative thought, but the attempt to interfere with the individualism of imaginative art still lingers. in fact, it does more than linger; it is aggressive, offensive, and brutalising.

in england, the arts that have escaped best are the arts in which the public take no interest. poetry is an instance of what i mean. we have been able to have fine poetry in england because the public do not read it, and consequently do not influence it. the public like to insult poets because they are individual, but once they have insulted them, they leave them alone. in the case of the novel and the drama, arts in which the public do take an interest, the result of the exercise of popular authority has been absolutely ridiculous. no country produces such badly-written fiction, such tedious, common work in the novel form, such silly, vulgar plays as england. it must necessarily be so. the popular standard is of such a character that no artist can get to it. it is at once too easy and too difficult to be a popular novelist. it is too easy, because the requirements of the public as far as plot, style, psychology, treatment of life, and treatment of literature are concerned are within the reach of the very meanest capacity and the most uncultivated mind. it is too difficult, because to meet such requirements the artist would have to do violence to his temperament, would have to write not for the artistic joy of writing, but for the amusement of half-educated people, and so would have to suppress his individualism, forget his culture, annihilate his style, and surrender everything that is valuable in him. in the case of the drama, things are a little better: the theatre-going public like the obvious, it is true, but they do not like the tedious; and burlesque and farcical comedy, the two most popular forms, are distinct forms of art. delightful work may be produced under burlesque and farcical conditions, and in work of this kind the artist in england is allowed very great freedom. it is when one comes to the higher forms of the drama that the result of popular control is seen. the one thing that the public dislike is novelty. any attempt to extend the subject-matter of art is extremely distasteful to the public; and yet the vitality and progress of art depend in a large measure on the continual extension of subject-matter. the public dislike novelty because they are afraid of it. it represents to them a mode of individualism, an assertion on the part of the artist that he selects his own subject, and treats it as he chooses. the public are quite right in their attitude. art is individualism, and individualism is a disturbing and disintegrating force. therein lies its immense value. for what it seeks to disturb is monotony of type, slavery of custom, tyranny of habit, and the reduction of man to the level of a machine. in art, the public accept what has been, because they cannot alter it, not because they appreciate it. they swallow their classics whole, and never taste them. they endure them as the inevitable, and as they cannot mar them, they mouth about them. strangely enough, or not strangely, according to one's own views, this acceptance of the classics does a great deal of harm. the uncritical admiration of the bible and shakespeare in england is an instance of what i mean. with regard to the bible, considerations of ecclesiastical authority enter into the matter, so that i need not dwell upon the point.

but in the case of shakespeare it is quite obvious that the public really see neither the beauties nor the defects of his plays. if they saw the beauties, they would not object to the development of the drama; and if they saw the defects, they would not object to the development of the drama either. the fact is, the public make use of the classics of a country as a means of checking the progress of art. they degrade the classics into authorities. they use them as bludgeons for preventing the free expression of beauty in new forms. they are always asking a writer why he does not write like somebody else, or a painter why he does not paint like somebody else, quite oblivious of the fact that if either of them did anything of the kind he would cease to be an artist. a fresh mode of beauty is absolutely distasteful to them, and whenever it appears they get so angry and bewildered, that they always use two stupid expressions—one is that the work of art is grossly unintelligible; the other, that the work of art is grossly immoral. what they mean by these words seems to me to be this. when they say a work is grossly unintelligible, they mean that the artist has said or made a beautiful thing that is new; when they describe a work as grossly immoral, they mean that the artist has said or made a beautiful thing that is true. the former expression has reference to style; the latter to subject-matter. but they probably use the words very vaguely, as an ordinary mob will use ready-made paving-stones. there is not a single real poet or prose-writer of this century, for instance, on whom the british public have not solemnly conferred diplomas of immorality, and these diplomas practically take the place, with us, of what in france, is the formal recognition of an academy of letters, and fortunately make the establishment of such an institution quite unnecessary in england. of course, the public are very reckless in their use of the word. that they should have called wordsworth an immoral poet, was only to be expected. wordsworth was a poet. but that they should have called charles kingsley an immoral novelist is extraordinary. kingsley's prose was not of a very fine quality. still, there is the word, and they use it as best they can. an artist is, of course, not disturbed by it. the true artist is a man who believes absolutely in himself, because he is absolutely himself. but i can fancy that if an artist produced a work of art in england that immediately on its appearance was recognised by the public, through their medium, which is the public press, as a work that was quite intelligible and highly moral, he would begin to seriously question whether in its creation he had really been himself at all, and consequently whether the work was not quite unworthy of him, and either of a thoroughly second-rate order, or of no artistic value whatsoever.

perhaps, however, i have wronged the public in limiting them to such words as 'immoral,' 'unintelligible,' 'exotic,' and 'unhealthy.' there is one other word that they use. that word is 'morbid.' they do not use it often. the meaning of the word is so simple that they are afraid of using it. still, they use it sometimes, and, now and then, one comes across it in popular newspapers. it is, of course, a ridiculous word to apply to a work of art. for what is morbidity but a mood of emotion or a mode of thought that one cannot express? the public are all morbid, because the public can never find expression for anything. the artist is never morbid. he expresses everything. he stands outside his subject, and through its medium produces incomparable and artistic effects. to call an artist morbid because he deals with morbidity as his subject-matter is as silly as if one called shakespeare mad because he wrote 'king lear.'

on the whole, an artist in england gains something by being attacked. his individuality is intensified. he becomes more completely himself. of course, the attacks are very gross, very impertinent, and very contemptible. but then no artist expects grace from the vulgar mind, or style from the suburban intellect. vulgarity and stupidity are two very vivid facts in modern life. one regrets them, naturally. but there they are. they are subjects for study, like everything else. and it is only fair to state, with regard to modern journalists, that they always apologise to one in private for what they have written against one in public.

within the last few years two other adjectives, it may be mentioned, have been added to the very limited vocabulary of art-abuse that is at the disposal of the public. one is the word 'unhealthy,' the other is the word 'exotic.' the latter merely expresses the rage of the momentary mushroom against the immortal, entrancing, and exquisitely lovely orchid. it is a tribute, but a tribute of no importance. the word 'unhealthy,' however, admits of analysis. it is a rather interesting word. in fact, it is so interesting that the people who use it do not know what it means.

what does it mean? what is a healthy, or an unhealthy work of art? all terms that one applies to a work of art, provided that one applies them rationally, have reference to either its style or its subject, or to both together. from the point of view of style, a healthy work of art is one whose style recognises the beauty of the material it employs, be that material one of words or of bronze, of colour or of ivory, and uses that beauty as a factor in producing the ?sthetic effect. from the point of view of subject, a healthy work of art is one the choice of whose subject is conditioned by the temperament of the artist, and comes directly out of it. in fine, a healthy work of art is one that has both perfection and personality. of course, form and substance cannot be separated in a work of art; they are always one. but for purposes of analysis, and setting the wholeness of ?sthetic impression aside for a moment, we can intellectually so separate them. an unhealthy work of art, on the other hand, is a work whose style is obvious, old-fashioned, and common, and whose subject is deliberately chosen, not because the artist has any pleasure in it, but because he thinks that the public will pay him for it. in fact, the popular novel that the public calls healthy is always a thoroughly unhealthy production; and what the public call an unhealthy novel is always a beautiful and healthy work of art.

i need hardly say that i am not, for a single moment, complaining that the public and the public press misuse these words. i do not see how, with their lack of comprehension of what art is, they could possibly use them in the proper sense. i am merely pointing out the misuse; and as for the origin of the misuse and the meaning that lies behind it all, the explanation is very simple. it comes from the barbarous conception of authority. it comes from the natural inability of a community corrupted by authority to understand or appreciate individualism. in a word, it comes from that monstrous and ignorant thing that is called public opinion, which, bad and well-meaning as it is when it tries to control action, is infamous and of evil meaning when it tries to control thought or art.

indeed, there is much more to be said in favour of the physical force of the public than there is in favour of the public's opinion. the former may be fine. the latter must be foolish. it is often said that force is no argument. that, however, entirely depends on what one wants to prove. many of the most important problems of the last few centuries, such as the continuance of personal government in england, or of feudalism in france, have been solved entirely by means of physical force. the very violence of a revolution may make the public grand and splendid for a moment. it was a fatal day when the public discovered that the pen is mightier than the paving-stone, and can be made as offensive as the brickbat. they at once sought for the journalist, found him, developed him, and made him their industrious and well-paid servant. it is greatly to be regretted, for both their sakes. behind the barricade there may be much that is noble and heroic. but what is there behind the leading-article but prejudice, stupidity, cant, and twaddle? and when these four are joined together they make a terrible force, and constitute the new authority.

in old days men had the rack. now they have the press. that is an improvement certainly. but still it is very bad, and wrong, and demoralising. somebody—was it burke?—called journalism the fourth estate. that was true at the time, no doubt. but at the present moment it really is the only estate. it has eaten up the other three. the lords temporal say nothing, the lords spiritual have nothing to say, and the house of commons has nothing to say and says it. we are dominated by journalism. in america the president reigns for four years, and journalism governs for ever and ever. fortunately in america journalism has carried its authority to the grossest and most brutal extreme. as a natural consequence it has begun to create a spirit of revolt. people are amused by it, or disgusted by it, according to their temperaments. but it is no longer the real force it was. it is not seriously treated. in england, journalism, not, except in a few well-known instances, having been carried to such excesses of brutality, is still a great factor, a really remarkable power. the tyranny that it proposes to exercise over people's private lives seems to me to be quite extraordinary. the fact is, that the public have an insatiable curiosity to know everything, except what is worth knowing. journalism, conscious of this, and having tradesman-like habits, supplies their demands. in centuries before ours the public nailed the ears of journalists to the pump. that was quite hideous. in this century journalists have nailed their own ears to the keyhole. that is much worse. and what aggravates the mischief is that the journalists who are most to blame are not the amusing journalists who write for what are called society papers. the harm is done by the serious, thoughtful, earnest journalists, who solemnly, as they are doing at present, will drag before the eyes of the public some incident in the private life of a great statesman, of a man who is a leader of political thought as he is a creator of political force, and invite the public to discuss the incident, to exercise authority in the matter, to give their views, and not merely to give their views, but to carry them into action, to dictate to the man upon all other points, to dictate to his party, to dictate to his country; in fact, to make themselves ridiculous, offensive, and harmful. the private lives of men and women should not be told to the public. the public have nothing to do with them at all. in prance they manage these things better. there they do not allow the details of the trials that take place in the divorce courts to be published for the amusement or criticism of the public. all that the public are allowed to know is that the divorce has taken place and was granted on petition of one or other or both of the married parties concerned. in france, in fact, they limit the journalist, and allow the artist almost perfect freedom. here we allow absolute freedom to the journalist, and entirely limit the artist. english public opinion, that is to say, tries to constrain and impede and warp the man who makes things that are beautiful in effect, and compels the journalist to retail things that are ugly, or disgusting, or revolting in fact, so that we have the most serious journalists in the world, and the most indecent newspapers. it is no exaggeration to talk of compulsion. there are possibly some journalists who take a real pleasure in publishing horrible things, or who, being poor, look to scandals as forming a sort of permanent basis for an income. but there are other journalists, i feel certain, men of education and cultivation, who really dislike publishing these things, who know that it is wrong to do so, and only do it because the unhealthy conditions under which their occupation is carried on oblige them to supply the public with what the public wants, and to compete with other journalists in making that supply as full and satisfying to the gross popular appetite as possible. it is a very degrading position for any body of educated men to be placed in, and i have no doubt that most of them feel it acutely.

however, let us leave what is really a very sordid side of the subject, and return to the question of popular control in the matter of art, by which i mean public opinion dictating to the artist the form which he is to use, the mode in which he is to use it, and the materials with which he is to work. i have pointed out that the arts which have escaped best in england are the arts in which the public have not been interested. they are, however, interested in the drama, and as a certain advance has been made in the drama within the last ten or fifteen years, it is important to point out that this advance is entirely due to a few individual artists refusing to accept the popular want of taste as their standard, and refusing to regard art as a mere matter of demand and supply. with his marvellous and vivid personality, with a style that has really a true colour-element in it, with his extraordinary power, not over mere mimicry but over imaginative and intellectual creation, mr irving, had his sole object been to give the public what they wanted, could have produced the commonest plays in the commonest manner, and made as much success and money as a man could possibly desire. but his object was not that. his object was to realise his own perfection as an artist, under certain conditions, and in certain forms of art. at first he appealed to the few; now he has educated the many. he has created in the public both taste and temperament. the public appreciate his artistic success immensely. i often wonder, however, whether the public understand that that success is entirely due to the fact that he did not accept their standard, but realised his own. with their standard the lyceum would have been a sort of second-rate booth, as some of the popular theatres in london are at present. whether they understand it or not the fact however remains, that taste and temperament have, to a certain extent, been created in the public, and that the public is capable of developing these qualities. the problem then is, why do not the public become more civilised? they have the capacity. what stops them?

the thing that stops them, it must be said again, is their desire to exercise authority over the artist and over works of art. to certain theatres, such as the lyceum and the haymarket, the public seem to come in a proper mood. in both of these theatres there have been individual artists, who have succeeded in creating in their audiences—and every theatre in london has its own audience—the temperament to which art appeals. and what is that temperament? it is the temperament of receptivity. that is all.

if a man approaches a work of art with any desire to exercise authority over it and the artist, he approaches it in such a spirit that he cannot receive any artistic impression from it at all. the work of art is to dominate the spectator: the spectator is not to dominate the work of art. the spectator is to be receptive. he is to be the violin on which the master is to play. and the more completely he can suppress his own silly views, his own foolish prejudices, his own absurd ideas of what art should be, or should not be, the more likely he is to understand and appreciate the work of art in question. this is, of course, quite obvious in the case of the vulgar theatre-going public of english men and women. but it is equally true of what are called educated people. for an educated person's ideas of art are drawn naturally from what art has been, whereas the new work of art is beautiful by being what art has never been; and to measure it by the standard of the past is to measure it by a standard on the rejection of which its real perfection depends. a temperament capable of receiving, through an imaginative medium, and under imaginative conditions, new and beautiful impressions, is the only temperament that can appreciate a work of art. and true as this is in the case of the appreciation of sculpture and painting, it is still more true of the appreciation of such arts as the drama. for a picture and a statue are not at war with time. they take no count of its succession. in one moment their unity may be apprehended. in the case of literature it is different. time must be traversed before the unity of effect is realised. and so, in the drama, there may occur in the first act of the play something whose real artistic value may not be evident to the spectator till the third or fourth act is reached. is the silly fellow to get angry and call out, and disturb the play, and annoy the artists? no, the honest man is to sit quietly, and know the delightful emotions of wonder, curiosity, and suspense. he is not to go to the play to lose a vulgar temper. he is to go to the play to realise an artistic temperament. he is to go to the play to gain an artistic temperament. he is not the arbiter of the work of art. he is one who is admitted to contemplate the work of art, and, if the work be fine, to forget in its contemplation all, the egotism that mars him—the egotism of his ignorance, or the egotism of his information. this point about the drama is hardly, i think, sufficiently recognised. i can quite understand that were 'macbeth' produced for the first time before a modern london audience, many of the people present would strongly and vigorously object to the introduction of the witches in the first act, with their grotesque phrases and their ridiculous words. but when the play is over one realises that the laughter of the witches in 'macbeth' is as terrible as the laughter of madness in 'lear,' more terrible than the daughter of iago in the tragedy of the moor. no spectator of art needs a more perfect mood of receptivity than the spectator of a play. the moment he seeks to exercise authority he becomes the avowed enemy of art and of himself. art does not mind. it is he who suffers.

with the novel it is the same thing. popular authority and the recognition of popular authority are fatal. thackeray's 'esmond' is a beautiful work of art because he wrote it to please himself. in his other novels, in 'pendennis,' in 'philip,' in 'vanity fair' even, at times, he is too conscious of the public, and spoils his work by appealing directly to the sympathies of the public, or by directly mocking at them. a true artist takes no notice whatever of the public. the public are to him non-existent. he has no poppied or honeyed cakes through which to give the monster sleep or sustenance. he leaves that to the popular novelist. one incomparable novelist we have now in england, mr george meredith. there are better artists in france, but france has no one whose view of life is so large, so varied, so imaginatively true. there are tellers of stories in russia who have a more vivid sense of what pain in fiction may be. but to him belongs philosophy in fiction. his people not merely live, but they live in thought. one can see them from myriad points of view. they are suggestive. there is soul in them and around them. they are interpretative and symbolic. and he who made them, those wonderful quickly-moving figures, made them for his own pleasure, and has never asked the public what they wanted, has never cared to know what they wanted, has never allowed the public to dictate to him or influence him in any way, but has gone on intensifying his own personality, and producing his own individual work. at first none came to him. that did not matter. then the few came to him. that did not change him. the many have come now. he is still the same. he's an incomparable novelist.

with the decorative arts it is not different. the public clung with really pathetic tenacity to what i believe were the direct traditions of the great exhibition of international vulgarity, traditions that were so appalling that the houses in which people lived were only fit for blind people to live in. beautiful things began to be made, beautiful colours came from the dyer's hand, beautiful patterns from the artist's brain, and the use of beautiful things and their value and importance were set forth. the public were really very indignant. they lost their temper. they said silly things. no one minded. no one was a whit the worse. no one accepted the authority of public opinion. and now it is almost impossible to enter any modern house without seeing some recognition of good taste, some recognition of the value of lovely surroundings, some sign of appreciation of beauty. in fact, people's houses are, as a rule, quite charming nowadays. people have been to a very great extent civilised. it is only fair to state, however, that the extraordinary success of the revolution in house-decoration and furniture and the like has not really been due to the majority of the public developing a very fine taste in such matters. it has been chiefly due to the fact that the craftsmen of things so appreciated the pleasure of making what was beautiful, and woke to such a vivid consciousness of the hideousness and vulgarity of what the public had previously wanted, that they simply starved the public out. it would be quite impossible at the present moment to furnish a room as rooms were furnished a few years ago, without going for everything to an auction of second-hand furniture from some third-rate lodging-house. the things are no longer made. however they may object to it, people must nowadays have something charming in their surroundings. fortunately for them, their assumption of authority in these art-matters came to entire grief.

it is evident, then, that all authority in such things is bad. people sometimes inquire what form of government is most suitable for an artist to live under. to this question there is only one answer. the form of government that is most suitable to the artist is no government at all. authority over him and his art is ridiculous. it has been stated that under despotisms artists have produced lovely work. this is not quite so. artists have visited despots, not as subjects to be tyrannised over, but as wandering wonder-makers, as fascinating vagrant personalities, to be entertained and charmed and suffered to be at peace, and allowed to create. there is this to be said in favour of the despot, that he, being an individual, may have culture, while the mob, being a monster, has none. one who is an emperor and king may stoop down to pick up a brush for a painter, but when the democracy stoops down it is merely to throw mud. and yet the democracy have not so far to stoop as the emperor. in fact, when they want to throw mud they have not to stoop at all. but there is no necessity to separate the monarch from the mob; all authority is equally bad.

there are three kinds of despots. there is the despot who tyrannises over the body. there is the despot who tyrannises over the soul. there is the despot who tyrannises over the soul and body alike. the first is called the prince. the second is called the pope the third is called the people. the prince may be cultivated. many princes have been. yet in the prince there is danger. one thinks of dante at the bitter feast in verona, of tasso in ferrara's madman's cell. it is better for the artist not to live with princes. the pope may be cultivated. many popes have been; the bad popes have been. the bad popes loved beauty, almost as passionately, nay, with as much passion as the good popes hated thought. to the wickedness of the papacy humanity owes much. the goodness of the papacy owes a terrible debt to humanity. yet, though the vatican has kept the rhetoric of its thunders, and lost the rod of its lightning, it is better for the artist not to live with popes. it was a pope who said of cellini to a conclave of cardinals that common laws and common authority were not made for men such as he; but it was a pope who thrust cellini into prison, and kept him there till he sickened with rage, and created unreal visions for himself, and saw the gilded sun enter his room, and grew so enamoured of it that he sought to escape, and crept out from tower to tower, and falling through dizzy air at dawn, maimed himself, and was by a vine-dresser covered with vine leaves, and carried in a cart to one who, loving beautiful things, had care of him. there is danger in popes. and as for the people, what of them and their authority? perhaps of them and their authority one has spoken enough. their authority is a thing blind, deaf, hideous, grotesque, tragic, amusing, serious, and obscene. it is impossible for the artist to live with the people. all despots bribe. the people bribe and brutalise. who told them to exercise authority? they were made to live, to listen, and to love. someone has done them a great wrong. they have marred themselves by imitation of their inferiors. they have taken the sceptre of the prince. how should they use it? they have taken the triple tiara of the pope. how should they carry its burden? they are as a clown whose heart is broken. they are as a priest whose soul is not yet born. let all who love beauty pity them. though they themselves love not beauty, yet let them pity themselves. who taught them the trick of tyranny?

there are many other things that one might point out. one might point out how the renaissance was great, because it sought to solve no social problem, and busied itself not about such things, but suffered the individual to develop freely, beautifully, and naturally, and so had great and individual artists, and great and individual men. one might point out how louis xiv., by creating the modern state, destroyed the individualism of the artist, and made things monstrous in their monotony of repetition, and contemptible in their conformity to rule, and destroyed throughout all france all those fine freedoms of expression that had made tradition new in beauty, and new modes one with antique form. but the past is of no importance. the present is of no importance. it is with the future that we have to deal. for the past is what man should not have been. the present is what man ought not to be. the future is what artists are.

it will, of course, be said that such a scheme as is set forth here is quite unpractical, and goes against human nature. this is perfectly true. it is unpractical, and it goes against human nature. this is why it is worth carrying out, and that is why one proposes it. for what is a practical scheme? a practical scheme is either a scheme that is already in existence, or a scheme that could be carried out under existing conditions. but it is exactly the existing conditions that one objects to; and any scheme that could accept these conditions is wrong and foolish. the conditions will be done away with, and human nature will change. the only thing that one really knows about human nature is that it changes. change is the one quality we can predicate of it. the systems that fail are those that rely on the permanency of human nature, and not on its growth and development. the error of louis xiv. was that he thought human nature would always be the same. the result of his error was the french revolution. it was an admirable result. all the results of the mistakes of governments are quite admirable.

it is to be noted also that individualism does not come to man with any sickly cant about duty, which merely means doing what other people want because they want it; or any hideous cant about self-sacrifice, which is merely a survival of savage mutilation. in fact, it does not come to man with any claims upon him at all. it comes naturally and inevitably out of man. it is the point to which all development tends. it is the differentiation to which all organisms grow. it is the perfection that is inherent in every mode of life, and towards which every mode of life quickens. and so individualism exercises no compulsion over man. on the contrary, it says to man that he should suffer no compulsion to be exercised over him. it does not try to force people to be good. it knows that people are good when they are let alone. man will develop individualism out of himself. man is now so developing individualism. to ask whether individualism is practical is like asking whether evolution is practical. evolution is the law of life, and there is no evolution except towards individualism. where this tendency is not expressed, it is a case of artificially-arrested growth, or of disease, or of death.

individualism will also be unselfish and unaffected. it has been pointed out that one of the results of the extraordinary tyranny of authority is that words are absolutely distorted from their proper and simple meaning, and are used to express the obverse of their right signification. what is true about art is true about life. a man is called affected, nowadays, if he dresses as he likes to dress. but in doing that he is acting in a perfectly natural manner. affectation, in such matters, consists in dressing according to the views of one's neighbour, whose views, as they are the views of the majority, will probably be extremely stupid. or a man is called selfish if he lives in the manner that seems to him most suitable for the full realisation of his own personality; if, in fact, the primary aim of his life is self-development. but this is the way in which everyone should live. selfishness is not living as one wishes to live, it is asking others to live as one wishes to live. and unselfishness is letting other people's lives alone, not interfering with them. selfishness always aims at creating around it an absolute uniformity of type. unselfishness recognises infinite variety of type as a delightful thing, accepts it, acquiesces in it, enjoys it. it is not selfish to think for oneself. a man who does not think for himself does not think at all. it is grossly selfish to require of one's neighbour that he should think in the same way, and hold the same opinions. why should he? if he can think, he will probably think differently. if he cannot think, it is monstrous to require thought of any kind from him. a red rose is not selfish because it wants to be a red rose. it would be horribly selfish if it wanted all the other flowers in the garden to be both red and roses. under individualism people will be quite natural and absolutely unselfish, and will know the meanings of the words, and realise them in their free, beautiful lives. nor will men be egotistic as they are now. for the egotist is he who makes claims upon others, and the individualist will not desire to do that. it will not give him pleasure. when man has realised individualism, he will also realise sympathy and exercise it freely and spontaneously. up to the present man has hardly cultivated sympathy at all. he has merely sympathy with pain, and sympathy with pain is not the highest form of sympathy. all sympathy is fine, but sympathy with suffering is the least fine mode. it is tainted with egotism. it is apt to become morbid. there is in it a certain element of terror for our own safety. we become afraid that we ourselves might be as the leper or as the blind, and that no man would have care of us. it is curiously limiting, too. one should sympathise with the entirety of life, not with life's sores and maladies merely, but with life's joy and beauty and energy and health and freedom. the wider sympathy is, of course, the more difficult. it requires more unselfishness. anybody can sympathise with the sufferings of a friend, but it requires a very fine nature—it requires, in fact, the nature of a true individualist—to sympathise with a friend's success.

in the modern stress of competition and struggle for place, such sympathy is naturally rare, and is also very much stifled by the immoral ideal of uniformity of type and conformity to rule which is so prevalent everywhere, and is perhaps most obnoxious in england.

sympathy with pain there will, of course, always be. it is one of the first instincts of man. the animals which are individual, the higher animals, that is to say, share it with us. but it must be remembered that while sympathy with joy intensifies the sum of joy in the world, sympathy with pain does not really diminish the amount of pain. it may make man better able to endure evil, but the evil remains. sympathy with consumption does not cure consumption; that is what science does. and when socialism has solved the problem of poverty, and science solved the problem of disease, the area of the sentimentalists will be lessened, and the sympathy of man will be large, healthy, and spontaneous. man will have joy in the contemplation of the joyous life of others.

for it is through joy that the individualism of the future will develop itself. christ made no attempt to reconstruct society, and consequently the individualism that he preached to man could be realised only through pain or in solitude. the ideals that we owe to christ are the ideals of the man who abandons society entirely, or of the man who resists society absolutely. but man is naturally social. even the thebaid became peopled at last. and though the cenobite realises his personality, it is often an impoverished personality that he so realises. upon the other hand, the terrible truth that pain is a mode through which man may realise himself exercises a wonderful fascination over the world. shallow speakers and shallow thinkers in pulpits and on platforms often talk about the world's worship of pleasure, and whine against it. but it is rarely in the world's history that its ideal has been one of joy and beauty. the worship of pain has far more often dominated the world. medi?valism, with its saints and martyrs, its love of self-torture, its wild passion for wounding itself, its gashing with knives, and its whipping with rods—medi?valism is real christianity, and the medi?val christ is the real christ. when the renaissance dawned upon the world, and brought with it the new ideals of the beauty of life and the joy of living, men could not understand christ. even art shows us that. the painters of the renaissance drew christ as a little boy playing with another boy in a palace or a garden, or lying back in his mother's arms, smiling at her, or at a flower, or at a bright bird; or as a noble, stately figure moving nobly through the world; or as a wonderful figure rising in a sort of ecstasy from death to life. even when they drew him crucified they drew him as a beautiful god on whom evil men had inflicted suffering. but he did not preoccupy them much. what delighted them was to paint the men and women whom they admired, and to show the loveliness of this lovely earth. they painted many religious pictures—in fact, they painted far too many, and the monotony of type and motive is wearisome, and was bad for art. it was the result of the authority of the public in art-matters, and is to be deplored. but their soul was not in the subject raphael was a great artist when he painted his portrait of the pope. when he painted his madonnas and infant christs, he is not a great artist at all. christ had no message for the renaissance, which was wonderful because it brought an ideal at variance with his, and to find the presentation of the real christ we must go to medi?val art. there he is one maimed and marred; one who is not comely to look on, because beauty is a joy; one who is not in fair raiment, because that may be a joy also: he is a beggar who has a marvellous soul; he is a leper whose soul is divine; he needs neither property nor health; he is a god realising his perfection through pain.

the evolution of man is slow. the injustice of men is great. it was necessary that pain should be put forward as a mode of self-realisation. even now, in some places in the world, the message of christ is necessary. no one who lived in modern russia could possibly realise his perfection except by pain. a few russian artists have realised themselves in art; in a fiction that is medi?val in character, hecauae its dominant note is the realisation of men through suffering. but for those who are not artists, and to whom there is no mode of life but the actual life of fact, pain is the only door to perfection. a russian who lives happily under the present system of government in russia must either believe that man has no soul, or that, if he has, it is not worth developing. a nihilist who rejects all authority, because he knows authority to be evil, and welcomes all pain, because through that he realises his personality, is a real christian. to him the christian ideal is a true thing.

and yet, christ did not revolt against authority. he accepted the imperial authority of the roman empire and paid tribute. he endured the ecclesiastical authority of the jewish church, and would not repel its violence by any violence of his own. he had, as i said before, no scheme for the reconstruction of society. but the modern world has schemes. it proposes to do away with poverty and the suffering that it entails. it desires to get rid of pain, and the suffering that pain entails. it trusts to socialism and to science as its methods. what it aims at is an individualism expressing itself through joy. this individualism will be larger, fuller, lovelier than any individualism has ever been. pain is not the ultimate mode of perfection. it is merely provisional and a protest. it has reference to wrong, unhealthy, unjust surroundings. when the wrong, and the disease, and the injustice are removed, it will have no further place. it will have done its work. it was a great work, but it is almost over. its sphere lessens every day.

nor will man miss it. for what man has sought for is, indeed, neither pain nor pleasure, but simply life. man has sought to live intensely, fully, perfectly. when he can do so without exercising restraint on others, or suffering it ever, and his activities are all pleasurable to him, he will be saner, healthier, more civilised, more himself. pleasure is nature's test, her sign of approval. when man is happy, he is in harmony with himself and his environment. the new individualism, for whose service socialism, whether it wills it or not, is working, will be perfect harmony. it will be what the greeks sought for, but could not, except in thought, realise completely, because they had slaves, and fed them; it will be what the renaissance sought for, but could not realise completely except in art, because they had slaves, and starved them. it will be complete, and through it each man will attain to his perfection. the new individualism is the new hellenism.

reprinted from the 'fortnightly review,' by permission of messrs chapman & hall.

the end