just to the south of the village of avion there is situated a colliery called fossé 4, with its necessary attendant, a large and ugly slag heap, shaped like a truncated cone. if our front line, at that time, might be considered as a line running due east and west and just to the south of avion, then fossé 4 was almost entirely within the german lines, with just the southern fringe of the slag heap extending into “no man’s land.”

the german front line, so far as this account is concerned, extended round the base of the slag heap and then south-east, where it joined a system of trenches known as the méricourt maze at about two hundred and fifty yards distance.

about 300 yards behind the german front line and running parallel to it was a railway embankment, scarcely less than 24 feet in height; and about midway between the german lines and our own and parallel to our line was a road (quebec road). scatter around a few rows of ruined houses, a garden fence, and a couple of brick piles and you will have what the 3rd divisional staff considered to be an ideal location for a raid.

[32]

the slag heap was reported to be a veritable nest of machine guns, and trench mortars; the railway embankment was believed to be fairly honeycombed with dug-outs, but all that was actually and really known was that the german front line was strongly barricaded and full of germans, and that quebec road was partly sunken and full of wire. the place and opportunity having therefore been supplied it remained for us to fix the time and arrange the details.

immediately upon arrival at comak camp a stretch of ground was selected for practice, and the engineers who started at once to work on the taped trenches, made such good progress that the following morning everything was in readiness for our first trial. in the meantime a plan of attack was formulated, of which the following is a brief résumé: “a” company (capt. gould) would capture and hold the german front line (known as metal trench) looking after any machine guns and trench mortar posts found on the slag heap, together with all dug-outs in the neighborhood.

“b” company (capt. allen) on the left, and “c” company (major currie) on the right would pass through “a” company continuing on to the railway embankment, which they would proceed to capture, destroying all dug-outs and m.g. emplacements. upon a given signal from battalion headquarters raiding companies would retire, protected by covering parties left along the railway embankment and communication trenches, “a” company to remain in metal trench until all of “b”[33] and “c” companies had withdrawn. the most unpleasant job of all, perhaps, that of holding the battalion front during the raid, was assigned to “d” company (capt. ritchie).

the attack was to be carried out at night (1 a.m.) and under cover of an artillery and m.g. barrage.

for the next few days the one topic of conversation was the raid, and at least two practices a day were carried out over the taped trenches, until we considered ourselves perfect enough to invite the divisional and brigade commanders to attend our final practice before going into the line. this they did and pronounced themselves well satisfied.

during these preparations our commanding officer, col. s. sharpe, was untiring in his energies towards overcoming the numerous difficulties that so frequently presented themselves, and he personally led a reconnoitring party into avion in broad daylight, which enabled us to overlook the territory to be raided from the second story of a ruined house.

on the 18th of july we received orders to move into the line and to take over the trenches occupied by the 5th c.m.r. at dusk that evening the battalion assembled, and after wishing god-speed to major cameron, our second in command, who was leaving that night for canada, a most stirring and eloquent address was made by col. sharpe; so that when we moved off by companies in the direction of vimy ridge, to the strains of “john peel,” the regimental march, there was[34] scarcely a more confident lot of men in the whole allied army.

at about 9.30 p.m., on the 22nd july, a start was made to assemble the raiding companies behind quebec road, which was the jumping-off position for the raid. each man was equipped with an electric torch-light for use in the german lines, and a large white patch was sewn on the front of everybody’s box respirator, which was thought to be a good means of identification in the dark. about midnight, therefore, the platoons were being led quietly and stealthily into position. suddenly the bells in the german trenches, not a hundred yards from the right flank, began to ring; gas fumes were rapidly making their way over our positions. it was difficult to tell whether the gas was merely lachrymatory or poisonous, and at the first indication every officer and man had slipped on his gas helmet.

it is hard enough to find your way about in the dark under ordinary conditions, but with a gas helmet on it is absolutely impossible, and in less time than it takes to tell, the greatest confusion arose, and the success of the whole operation hung in the balance. a desperate situation confronted the battalion; in a little while our artillery barrage would open, and its programme would be carried out while our men were stumbling blindly through the gas fumes, and in due course the enemy artillery would open up in retaliation, and our men, helpless with their gas helmets on, would be wiped out without a chance for their lives. for about thirty[35] minutes the situation was critical and fraught with the greatest difficulties; the darkness, the gas, the fumes, the irregularities of the ground, wire entanglements, ruins, shell holes, all combined to make the assembling of our companies slow and difficult.

chances had to be taken, and gas helmets were removed, the mouthpiece alone being used, and in this manner, our eyes streaming with tears and nerves strung to the highest pitch, we eventually reached our positions around the quebec road about five minutes before zero hour.

exactly on the stroke of one the barrage opened, falling like a hailstorm on the german front line, which was lit up along its entire length by the bursting shells. it was certainly an unmerciful pounding and seemed to fill us with an ardent desire to get over there, and like julius caesar, “negotium finire.”

as the barrage opened “a” company crept across the quebec road through the lanes in the wire which had been previously cut by the scouts, and at zero, plus three minutes, at which moment the barrage lifted off metal trench to the railway embankment, they rushed forward, closely followed by “b” company on the left and “c” company on the right. by the time “a” company reached metal trench the huns had begun to pour out of their dug-outs in which they had taken refuge during the shell storm, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in which many of the enemy were either killed or taken prisoners; leaving “a” company to deal with[36] the destruction of the dug-outs and the capture of the slag heap, as previously arranged, “b” and “c” companies proceeded to the final objective.

as already anticipated, our greatest trouble was to be from the flanks, and during the final stages of the attack, in which “b” and “c” companies rushed the embankment, capturing many prisoners, some enemy machine guns came into action and inflicted heavy casualties on us. in spite of this, everything seemed to be happening just in the way we had practised it at berthonval farm, even the special carrying parties that were to bring up trench mats for crossing the wire believed to exist around the embankment, arrived, and were much disappointed when they were told they would not be needed. also the signallers specially attached to companies for communication with battalion headquarters came through, but were unable to use their lamps on account of the smoke and gas.

considerable trouble was experienced with refractory prisoners, and the evacuation of our casualties was a matter of the greatest difficulty, since by the time “b” and “c” companies had reached the embankment all sense of direction was lost on account of the darkness and gas fumes, which were now blowing back over the german lines.

the work of destruction completed, the two companies, “b” and “c”, withdrew as best they could, covered by sections, one from each platoon, acting as a rear-guard.

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observation posts were left on the railway embankment at each flank with supporting posts behind them, “a” company remaining in metal trench until “b” and “c” companies had completed their withdrawal. the observation posts were chiefly organized by lt. lennox of “b” company and lt. neil of “c” company, who were in command of the flank platoons.

“d” company had detailed parties under lt. weber and lt. lick, which were to relieve at daybreak the posts left respectively by “b” and “c” companies. lt. lick was, however, killed by a shell near metal trench, and his sergeant and corporal wounded. lt. weber went up on the left and reached metal trench, but at 4.45 a.m. the germans had counter-attacked in force and our posts withdrew fighting as ordered. when it was learned that lt. neil and lt. lick were killed and that lt. lennox and lt. weber were missing a party was sent up meander trench to assist the posts. this party got out between metal trench and the railway embankment just as the germans began to swarm over it, and also attack from the flank. our party was obliged to withdraw, taking the balance of the men on the posts with it. stiff fighting took place all the way back, and many of the enemy were killed.

in such an operation it would be very difficult and most unfair to mention the work of any one particular platoon, section, or man, since all we had planned to do was done, and this in the face of many serious handicaps. the care of our wounded was now the first consideration,[38] and capt. moore, with his staff, who had established an advance regimental aid post (later known as “moore’s aid post”) at the junction of the lens-arras railway and the avion road, were busy until daylight, when a german observation balloon caught sight of them, and they were forced by heavy shell fire to retire to a more protected position.

and so it was only through the co-operation and courage of all ranks that we had at last won the right to our place in the 9th brigade and the canadian corps. let it be said that this was only one of a great many successful raids carried out by canadian troops, and which made them famous on all the western front.

in sum we had captured 60 prisoners, including two officers, and killed at least twice that number, our own casualties being five officers—lts. v. c. lick, c. s. lennox, f. s. neil, t. w. hutchison, g. r. weber—and twenty-five other ranks killed, three officers and forty-two other ranks wounded.

it might be of interest to compare the two communiqués published shortly afterwards:

german—strong enemy thrusts in the neighborhood of avion easily repulsed with heavy casualties.

british—early this morning our troops carried out a minor enterprise s.e. of avion. the first objective was easily captured, but heavy fighting ensued at the railway embankment. after a severe struggle the whole of the german garrison was either killed or captured and all their dug-outs were destroyed—about fifty—sixty ger[39]mans are reported to have been taken. our total casualties are believed to be about the same as the number of german prisoners. the enemy’s losses were heavy.