the submarine phase of the naval war

in the mist of war which envelops over half the entire world, no less than 264 underwater fighting ships are engaged. they form the submarine fleets of england, france, russia, japan, germany and austria; and the highly-trained crews of these modern additions to the fighting navies comprise nearly 20,000 men. but the conduct of submarine warfare on the grand scale requires far more than flotillas of submergible warships and their daring crews. this new branch of naval science is ever widening in its scope, its means of offence, and in its attendant ramifications. every important naval base has its curious submarine 10floating docks, ready for crippled members of its attached flotilla; every naval construction department has its corps of submarine experts; each of the 1,500 surface warships engaged in this titanic struggle for the dominion of europe and the mastery of the seas carries the means for delivering submarine attacks in its torpedoes and surface and submerged discharging tubes. the oceans in the theatres of war have been strewn with german and austrian mines; then they have been either counter-mined or swept clear and mined again. british seaplanes, with specially trained observers, are continually searching from high in the air for the dark patches in the semi-transparent sea-green which denote the presence of mines and submarines. within signal-range or wireless call of the aërial scouts and their attendant ships are destroyer flotillas to give battle to the hostile submarines, while hundreds of trawlers and small steamers, fitted with special apparatus, are continually sweeping 11up the hundreds of submarine mines laid by the enemy’s vessels which are fitted to enable them to sow like seeds over the pathways of the sea these deadly perils to navigation. submerged wire entanglements in conjunction with boom-defences and observation and contact submarine mines protect the seaward approaches to harbours in the same way as similar appliances are used to protect the approaches to land fortifications; and every harbour, waterway and channel of strategic importance is protected by elaborate submarine mine defences. all this is part of the new warfare underseas—that science which is daily rendering hazardous the life of the greatest battleship and the smallest merchantman afloat in the zone of war.

before placing in review order the vast preparations made for submarine attack and defence in the years which preceded the outbreak of war and describing in detail the powerful submarine fleets engaged, it is necessary to make clear 12to the reader the wonderful change which this new mode of attack has made in all branches of naval warfare and its influence on sea power. as indicative of this change we have only to survey in their submarine aspect the naval operations in the opening phase of this, the greatest war in history.

in the domain of naval strategy we find reflected the altered conditions caused by these invisible arms. every battle on land and sea teaches its lesson of concealment and sudden stealthy attack; and even as the huge siege guns and devastating artillery fire of the land forces is causing the extension of the battle-front and the rapid burrowing under earth or entrenching of positions dearly won or with difficulty retained—“approximating to siege warfare”—so are the powerful 12 and 13.5-inch naval guns (weight of projectile 850 lbs. and 1,400 lbs. respectively), combined with the rapidity and accuracy of the modern warship’s secondary armament, necessitating 13the reduction in numbers of the big surface ships of the opposing fleets by frequent submarine and torpedo attacks prior to the decisive engagements between the battle fleets. hence we find, in the opening phase of the naval war, the german and austrian fleets, inferior in numbers and gun power, skulking behind fortifications and waiting for their submarine and surface torpedo-boats and light cruisers, in conjunction with the hundreds of submerged mines strewn over the north sea, baltic, adriatic and elsewhere to reduce the number and power of the british, french, russian and japanese fleets before the decisive actions are fought; and in order that these tactics might be frustrated, and the big british ships, as well as those of her allies, costing several millions sterling each, should not be exposed to these grave risks when no good could result, they have been compelled to delay initiative, and meanwhile all their operations had to be screened by 14smaller and faster vessels of the cruiser and destroyer types, while they waited within call should the german battle fleet—in the case of the north sea—dare to come out to fight. the british submarines of the large sea-going type were in the meantime employed in watching the frisian coast with the object of attacking any of the enemy’s ships which ventured from behind the elaborate coast fortifications. not content with this rôle, however, several british submarines made their way unseen through the dangerous waters of the heligoland bight and succeeded in getting within reconnoitering distance of the german submerged harbour defences, behind which lurk their big ships.

with what degree of success this new opening or submarine phase in naval warfare has been attended is shown by the sinking, during the first few weeks of the war, of the british cruiser amphion, a vessel of 3,440 tons displacement, completed in 1912, and 15carrying ten 4-inch guns, with a loss of 131 men, by contact with a german mine; the destruction of the german submarine u.15 by the british cruiser birmingham; the sinking of an austrian torpedo-boat by a mine off pola; the torpedoing of h.m.s. pathfinder, a fleet scout of about 3,000 tons displacement, completed in 1905‒6, by a german submarine; the destruction of the wilson liner runo by a mine; the sinking of the german cruiser hela, a vessel of 2,000 tons displacement, built in 1896, by the british submarine e 9, and the torpedoing of the british armoured cruisers aboukir, hogue and cressy—vessels of 12,000 tons displacement, carrying two 9.2-inch and twelve 6-inch guns besides twelve 12-pounder quick-firing guns and two torpedo tubes—by german submarines concealed behind a trawler engaged in laying mines, over which the dutch flag had been hoisted as a blind.

this is in addition to the lamentable 16destruction of much life and property belonging to neutral powers caused by the laying of german floating mines on the trade-routes.

to the allies this submarine phase did not come unexpected. the british naval yards in conjunction with the big shipbuilding and engineering firms, such as messrs. vickers ltd., barrow-in-furness; messrs. armstrong, whitworth and co. ltd., newcastle-on-tyne; the whitehead torpedo company ltd., weymouth; messrs. siebe, gorman and co. ltd., london; and messrs. scotts’ shipbuilding and engineering co. ltd., as well as many other firms and individual submarine experts had been engaged for many years in solving one after another the problems continually arising in the practical application of all forms of submarine warfare. the first british naval submarines were launched in 1901‒2 from messrs. vickers’ works at barrow, and the subsequent growth of our submarine flotillas has been rapid 17both in number of vessels and in size and armament. the british submarine fleet now numbers 82 vessels. the original boats from which the british type has since been evolved were built from the designs of mr. john p. holland, an american inventor.

to france belongs the honour of being the first naval power to adopt the submarine torpedo-boat as a vessel of war; and the first vessel, the gymnôte, was launched in 1888, but it was not until 1893 that the republic commenced the construction of her now powerful submarine flotilla, numbering 92 vessels.

the first russian submarine was launched at kronstadt in 1902, and since that date the russian flotilla has steadily increased until it now numbers 37 vessels.

japan commenced the construction of what is now a powerful and up-to-date flotilla of seventeen vessels by the acquisition of a british-holland boat in 1904.

turning to germany we find at first 18a great reluctance on the part of the ministry of marine to provide for the construction of submarines, but in 1905‒6 this initial hesitation was overcome and the two vessels u.1 and u.2 were launched. since then the belief in a powerful submarine flotilla steadily grew until at the moment when war was declared germany possessed no less than 30 to 36 submarines of a very efficient type. the austro-hungarian navy did not adopt submarines as units of the fleet until 1909, and now possess only six small vessels.

from this brief resumé of the growth of the submarine fleets of the six great naval powers at war, it will be seen that in point of numbers as well as in priority, bringing with it practical experience, great britain and france have a very appreciable superiority. it must, however, be left for succeeding chapters to describe in detail the steady growth and present size and capabilities of the submarine fleets at war.

19the lessons taught by the russo-japanese war were not lost on the british admiralty, and special methods had been prepared to deal with submarine attack in its various forms. having in mind the destruction caused to both russian and japanese warships by submarine mines—especially those of the “offensive contact” type, which are moored to the bottom, float just under the surface and explode immediately on contact; and in the russo-japanese war were responsible for the sinking of the japanese battleships hatsuse and yashima as well as the russian battleship petropavlovsk and the cruiser boyarin—the british admiralty foresaw the danger to which both warships and merchantmen would be exposed in time of war if the seas strewn with these mines could not be quickly cleared, and a new type of auxiliary came into being. this was the mine-sweeper, and eight vessels of the old torpedo-gunboat type were fitted out for 20the work. in addition to these, however, the admiralty purchased a considerable number of steam fishing trawlers, and fitted them with mine-sweeping appliances, and made arrangements for a large fleet of similar vessels to be placed at the disposal of the navy in the event of war. in order to man this new mine-sweeping fleet with experienced sailors on the outbreak of war, a new section of the royal naval reserve was created in 1911. this is known as the “trawler section,” and consists of 142 skippers and 1,136 men taken from the fishing fleet.

realizing the value of the submarine mine in certain cases, the british admiralty went further and created a small mine-laying fleet from seven old second-class cruisers, which had their aft-decks cleared and provided with rails for a large number of mines to be run down and slid over the stern into the water as the vessels steamed along, thus quickly laying a mine-field. but as the laying of mines, speaking generally, is a defensive 21mode of warfare and the policy of the british navy—owing to its supremacy—is attack and not defence, the mine-laying fleet is of second importance to the sweeping fleet, the work of which, although much augmented by additional small steamers pressed into service, was, during the first few weeks of the war, of a nature more arduous and dangerous than will ever be realised. hundreds of german mines were swept up, and hundreds more were exploded by being dragged into contact with each other during the progress of sweeping operations.

what the clearance of these vast fields of floating and anchored mines in the north sea meant to the british navy, engaged in blockading the german fleet, and to the mercantile marine not only of england, france, russia and belgium, but also to that of the neutral countries, it is perhaps a little difficult to realize until one remembers that several hundred british and french warships were patrolling the north sea and 22channel, and, at the opening of hostilities, there were hundreds of merchantmen homeward bound whose course lay across this mine-infested sea. many of these vessels had on board not only valuable cargoes of food, raw material for manufacture and gold and silver bullion, but also officers and men returning from various parts of the world to rejoin their regiments. again, the expeditionary force had to be transported across the channel to france. this could not be attempted until a guarantee had been given by the navy that the seas were clear of hostile warships, submarines and mines. the fleet blockading the frisian coast had to be supplied with coal and fresh food; and last but by no means least it was of vital importance to the allied armies in the field that the whole coast-line from bordeaux to antwerp, forming the rear and left-flank, should be accessible to friendly shipping. it is not difficult to realize what would have been the effect had thousands of 23these deadly german contact mines been allowed to float unhindered in these narrow seas, for, notwithstanding the magnificent effort made by thousands of seamen in hundreds of mine-sweepers assisted by seaplanes, many vessels—some belonging to neutral powers and others to the enemy themselves—were destroyed before the seas could be effectively swept clear, the hostile mine-layers destroyed or chased into port and there blockaded with their cowardly fleet.

the torpedo has long been recognised as one of the most effective of naval arms. it is carried by every modern warship afloat, but it is essentially the arm of the submarine and of the small and fast surface vessel. for a torpedo attack to be successful it is absolutely necessary for the vessel carrying the weapon to get within about 1,000 yards of the object of attack. the difficulty of accomplishing this manœuvre with an enemy on the alert is easily apparent, but if the attacking vessel can creep up 24to within torpedo range unobserved her chances of sinking the enemy are decidedly good, and it is the quality possessed by the submarine of making herself invisible by sinking beneath the surface and approaching her enemy “seeing but unseen” that makes this type of vessel the ideal torpedo-boat. but, like everything else, there are limits to its use, for a submarine, although it can navigate on the surface like an ordinary torpedo-boat, cannot deliver a submerged attack at night owing to the periscopes, which are the “eyes” of these underwater fighting ships, being useless in the dark. when night covers the sea, however, the chances of the fast grey-painted surface torpedo-boat or destroyer being able to approach the enemy unseen are more than doubled, and in this way fleets become exposed to submarine torpedo attack by day and surface torpedo attack by night. further, a submarine will often attack while a seaplane hovers over the enemy in order to draw attention. it 25is this constant exposure to sudden and unseen submarine attack which is primarily responsible for the terrible nerve strain imposed on the crews of modern surface warships in time of war.

owing to the ability of submarines to deliver stealthy attacks by day, naval tacticians have designated this type of craft “daylight torpedo-boats,” but they are rapidly passing beyond the purely torpedo and coastal defensive stage and are taking on to themselves the rôle of the ocean cruiser. the size of these vessels has increased from 50 to 1,000 tons displacement in ten years. they now carry not only a considerable number of the largest size torpedo but also quick-firing guns for repelling attacks by small surface vessels, and are capable of accompanying fleets to sea. the australian naval submarines a.e.1 and a.e.2 both made the voyage from barrow to sydney under their own power and without convoy. the radius of action of the latest vessels both of the 26british and french navies amounts to several thousand miles. in the case of the british “f” class the displacement has risen to 1,500 tons, the speed to 20 knots and the armament to six torpedo tubes and four 12-pounder quick-firing guns, thus making them in every sense ocean cruisers capable of keeping the sea in almost any weather and possessing wide range of action and considerable offensive power. hitherto british submarines, like the ordinary surface torpedo-boats, have been known by numbers only, but the latest vessels are to receive names which indicates the increase in size and importance of these craft. they may be termed the advance guards of the submarine battleships of the future.

the torpedo, which is the principal arm of the submarine boat, is itself a submarine projectile. after being discharged from the firing tube it sinks a short distance below the surface and is propelled by its own engines at a high 27rate of speed in a straight line towards its object of attack. great improvements have been made during the past ten years in the construction of these delicate weapons. the extreme effective range and speed has risen from 4,000 yards at 18 knots to 7,000 yards at 45 knots or 11,000 yards at 30 knots. the “war-head” or front section of the torpedo contains a charge of about 200 pounds of damp gun-cotton which is fired by a detonator on the torpedo striking an object. this very powerful explosive charge is capable of tearing open an enormous hole in the unprotected under-water skin of the surface warship. the type of weapon used in the british, french, russian and japanese navies is the whitehead torpedo (18-inch and 21-inch). the german navy uses the schwartzkopf torpedo (18-inch and 21-inch), which is very similar to the whitehead and is a very powerful weapon.

in the first phase of the naval war no 28less than eight warships have been sunk by submarine torpedoes.

the activity of the british submarines in the theatre of war, from the beginning of hostilities, is admirably set forth in the following dispatch from commodore roger b. keyes, c.b., which is the first dispatch in the history of naval warfare to describe in detail submarine attack and reconnaissance:—

h.m.s. maidstone,

17th october, 1914.

“sir,—in compliance with their lordships’ directions, i have the honour to report as follows upon the services performed by the submarines since the commencement of hostilities:—

“three hours after the outbreak of war, submarines e.6 (lieutenant-commander cecil p. talbot), and e.8 (lieutenant-commander francis h. h. goodhart), proceeded unaccompanied to carry out a reconnaissance in the heligoland bight. these two vessels returned with useful 29information, and had the privilege of being the pioneers on a service which is attended by some risk.

“during the transportation of the expeditionary force the lurcher and firedrake and all the submarines of the eighth submarine flotilla occupied positions from which they could have attacked the high sea fleet, had it emerged to dispute the passage of our transports. this patrol was maintained day and night without relief, until the personnel of our army had been transported and all chance of effective interference had disappeared.

“these submarines have since been incessantly employed on the enemy’s coast in the heligoland bight and elsewhere, and have obtained much valuable information regarding the composition and movement of his patrols. they have occupied his waters and reconnoitred his anchorages, and, while so engaged, have been subjected to skilful and well executed anti-submarine 30tactics; hunted for hours at a time by torpedo craft and attacked by gun-fire and torpedoes.

“at midnight on august 26th, i embarked in the lurcher, and, in company with firedrake and submarines d.2, d.8, e.4, e.5, e.6, e.7, e.8, and e.9 of the eighth submarine flotilla, proceeded to take part in the operations in the heligoland bight arranged for august 28th. the destroyers scouted for the submarines until nightfall on the 27th, when the latter proceeded independently to take up various positions from which they could co-operate with the destroyer flotillas on the following morning.

“at daylight on august 28th the lurcher and firedrake searched the area, through which the battle cruisers were to advance, for hostile submarines, and then proceeded towards heligoland in the wake of submarines e.6, e.7, and e.8, which were exposing themselves with the object of inducing the enemy to chase them to the westward.

31“on approaching heligoland, the visibility, which had been very good to seaward, reduced to 5,000 to 6,000 yards, and this added considerably to the anxieties and responsibilities of the commanding officers of submarines, who handled their vessels with coolness and judgment in an area which was necessarily occupied by friends as well as foes.

“low visibility and calm sea are the most unfavourable conditions under which submarines can operate, and no opportunity occurred of closing with the enemy’s cruisers to within torpedo range.

“lieutenant-commander ernest w. leir, commanding submarine e.4, witnessed the sinking of the german torpedo-boat destroyer v.187 through his periscope, and, observing a cruiser of the stettin class close, and open fire on the british destroyers which had lowered their boats to pick up the survivors, he proceeded to attack the 32cruiser, but she altered course before he could get within range. after covering the retirement of our destroyers, which had had to abandon their boats, he returned to the latter, and embarked a lieutenant and nine men of defender, who had been left behind. the boats also contained two officers and eight men of v.187, who were unwounded, and eighteen men who were badly wounded. as he could not embark the latter, lieutenant-commander leir left one of the officers and six unwounded men to navigate the british boats to heligoland. before leaving he saw that they were provided with water, biscuit, and a compass. one german officer and two men were made prisoners of war.

“lieutenant-commander leir’s action in remaining on the surface in the vicinity of the enemy and in a visibility which would have placed his vessel within easy gun range of an enemy appearing out of the mist, was altogether admirable.

33“this enterprising and gallant officer took part in the reconnaissance which supplied the information on which these operations were based, and i beg to submit his name, and that of lieutenant-commander talbot, the commanding officer of e.6, who exercised patience, judgment, and skill in a dangerous position, for the favourable consideration of their lordships.

“on september 13th, e.9 (lieutenant-commander max k. horton) torpedoed and sank the german light cruiser hela six miles south of heligoland.

“a number of destroyers were evidently called to the scene after e.9 had delivered her attack, and these hunted her for several hours.

“on september 14th, in accordance with his orders, lieutenant-commander horton examined the outer anchorage of heligoland, a service attended by considerable risk.

“on september 25th, submarine e.6 34(lieutenant-commander c. p. talbot), while diving, fouled the moorings of a mine laid by the enemy. on rising to the surface she weighed the mine and sinker; the former was securely fixed between the hydroplane and its guard; fortunately, however, the horns of the mine were pointed outboard. the weight of the sinker made it a difficult and dangerous matter to lift the mine clear without exploding it. after half an hour’s patient work this was effected by lieutenant frederick a. p. williams-freeman and able seaman ernest randall cremer, official number 214235, and the released mine descended to its original depths.

“on october 6th, e.9 (lieutenant-commander max k. horton), when patrolling off the ems, torpedoed and sank the enemy’s destroyer s.126.

“the enemy’s torpedo craft pursue tactics which, in connection with their shallow draft, make them exceedingly difficult to attack with torpedo, and 35lieutenant-commander horton’s success was the result of much patient and skilful zeal. he is a most enterprising submarine officer, and i beg to submit his name for favourable consideration.

“lieutenant charles m. s. chapman, the second in command of e.9, is also deserving of credit.

“against an enemy whose capital vessels have never, and light cruisers have seldom, emerged from their fortified harbours, opportunities of delivering submarine attacks have necessarily been few, and on one occasion only, prior to the 13th september, has one of our submarines been within torpedo range of a cruiser during daylight hours.

“during the exceptionally heavy westerly gales which prevailed between the 14th and 21st september the position of the submarines on a lee shore, within a few miles of the enemy’s coast, was an unpleasant one.

“the short steep seas which accompany westerly gales in the heligoland bight 36make it difficult to keep the conning tower hatches open. there was no rest to be obtained, and even when cruising at a depth of 60 feet, the submarines were rolling considerably, and pumping—i.e. vertically moving about twenty feet.

“i submit that it was creditable to the commanding officers that they should have maintained their stations under such conditions.

“service in the heligoland bight is keenly sought after by the commanding officers of the eighth submarine flotilla, and they have all shown daring and enterprise in the execution of their duties. these officers have unanimously expressed to me their admiration of the cool and gallant behaviour of the officers and men under their command. they are however, of the opinion that it is impossible to single out individuals when all have performed their duties so admirably, and in this i concur.

“the following submarines have been 37in contact with the enemy during these operations:—

d.1

(lieutenant-commander archibald d. cochrane).

d.2

(lieutenant-commander arthur g. jameson).

d.3

(lieutenant-commander edward c. boyle).

d.5

(lieutenant-commander godfrey herbert).

e.4

(lieutenant-commander ernest w. leir).

e.5

(lieutenant-commander charles s. benning).

e.6

(lieutenant-commander cecil p. talbot).

e.7

(lieutenant-commander ferdinand e. b. feilmann).

e.9

(lieutenant-commander max k. horton).

i have the honour to be, sir,

your obedient servant,

(signed) roger keyes,

commodore (s).”

38in conclusion, it must therefore be set on record that the opening phase in the greatest naval war in history has been one of submarine attack and counter-attack, mine-laying and destroying, warships and merchantmen sunk in a few minutes by submarine torpedoes and mines, with sharp engagements between the cruisers and destroyers acting in conjunction with the under-water craft. the much-vaunted german fleet, like that of its ally austria-hungary, has not dared to show itself from behind the forts and carefully-screened anchorages of the naval bases, suffering rather the everlasting disgrace of having stood in cowardly idleness while the 5,000 merchant ships it was built to protect hauled down the flag of the “fatherland” and german maritime commerce was swept from the seas while the allied fleets hold undisputed command of every ocean.

the first lord of the british admiralty has said that if the german 39fleet will not come out to fight it must be “dug out like rats in a hole.” this, then, may be the second phase in the naval war, and out in the grey mist of the north sea, ready and eager for the work, lies the great battle fleets of england.