the russian campaign—the burning of moscow—a new army

if one draws a triangle, its base stretching along the nieman from tilsit to grodno, its apex on the elbe, he will have a rough outline of the “army of twenty nations” as it lay in june, 1812. napoleon, some two hundred and twenty-five thousand men around him, was at kowno, hesitating to advance, reluctant to believe that alexander would not make peace.

when he finally moved, it was not with the precision and swiftness which had characterized his former campaigns. when he began to fight, it was against new odds. he found that his enemies had been studying the spanish campaigns, and that they had adopted the tactics which had so nearly ruined his armies in the peninsula: they refused to give him a general battle retreating constantly before him; they harassed his separate corps with indecisive contests; they wasted the country as they went. the people aided their soldiers as the spaniards had done. “tell us only the moment, and we will set fire to our buildings,” said the peasants.

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marshal ney (“le marechal ney, duc d’elchingen, prince de la moskowa, pair de france”).

engraved by tardieu, after gérard.

243by the 12th of august, napoleon was at smolensk, the key of moscow. at a cost of twelve thousand men killed and wounded, he took the town, only to find, instead of the well-victualled shelter he hoped, a smoking ruin. the french army had suffered frightfully from sickness, from scarcity of supplies, and from useless fighting on the march from the nieman to smolensk. they had not had the stimulus of a great victory; they began to feel that this steady retreat of the enemy was only a fatal trap into which they were falling. every consideration forbade them to march into russia so late in the year, yet on they went towards moscow, over ruined fields and through empty villages. this terrible pursuit lasted until september 7th, when the russians, to content their soldiers, who were complaining loudly because they were not allowed to engage the french, gave battle at borodino, the battle of the moskova, as the french call it.

at two o’clock in the morning of this engagement, napoleon issued one of his stirring bulletins:

“soldiers! here is the battle which you have so long desired! henceforth the victory depends upon you; it is necessary for us. it will give you abundance, good winter quarters, and a speedy return to your country! behave as you did at austerlitz, at friedland, at vitebsk, at smolensk, and the most remote posterity will quote with pride your conduct on this day; let it say of you: he was at the great battle under the walls of moscow.”

the french gained the battle at borodino, at a cost of some thirty thousand men, but they did not destroy the russian army. although the russians lost fifty thousand men, they retreated in good order. under the circumstances, a victory which allowed the enemy to retire in order was of little use. it was napoleon’s fault, the critics said; he was inactive. but it was not sluggishness which troubled napoleon at borodino. he had a new enemy—a headache. on the day of the battle he suffered so that he was obliged to retire to a ravine to escape the icy wind. in this sheltered spot he paced up and down all day, giving his orders from the reports brought him.

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attention! the emperor has his eye on us.

by raffet.

245moscow was entered on the 15th of september. here the french found at last food and shelter, but only for a few hours. that night moscow burst into flames, set on fire by the authorities, by whom it had been abandoned. it was three days before the fire was arrested. it would cost russia two hundred years of time, two hundred millions of money, to repair the loss which she had sustained, napoleon wrote to france.

suffering, disorganization, pillage, followed the disaster. but napoleon would not retreat. he hoped to make peace. moscow was still smoking when he wrote a long description of the conflagration to alexander. the closing paragraph ran:

“i wage war against your majesty without animosity; a note from you before or after the last battle would have stopped my march, and i should even have liked to sacrifice the advantage of entering moscow. if your majesty retains some remains of your former sentiments, you will take this letter in good part. at all events, you will thank me for giving you an account of what is passing at moscow.”

“i will never sign a peace as long as a single foe remains on russian ground,” the emperor alexander had said when he heard that napoleon had crossed the nieman. he kept his word in spite of all napoleon’s overtures. the french position grew worse from day to day. no food, no fresh supplies, the cold increasing, the army disheartened, the number of russians around moscow growing larger. nothing but a retreat could save the remnant of the french. it began on october 19th, one hundred and fifteen thousand men leaving moscow. they were followed by forty thousand vehicles loaded with the sick and with what supplies they could get hold of. the route was over the fields devastated a month before. the cossacks harassed them night and day, and the cruel russian cold dropped from the skies, cutting them down like a storm of scythes. before smolensk was reached, thousands of the retreating army were dead.

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napoleon after the russian campaign.

247napoleon had ordered that provisions and clothing should be collected at smolensk. when he reached the city he found that his directions had not been obeyed. the army, exasperated beyond endurance by this disappointment, fell into complete and frightful disorganization, and the rest of the retreat was like the falling back of a conquered mob.

there is no space here for the details of this terrible march and of the frightful passage of the beresina. the terror of the cold and starvation wrung cries from napoleon himself.

“provisions, provisions, provisions,” he wrote on november 29th from the right bank of the beresina. “without them there is no knowing to what horrors this undisciplined mass will proceed.”

and again: “the army is at its last extremity. it is impossible for it to do anything, even if it were a question of defending paris.”

the army finally reached the nieman. the last man over was marshal ney. “who are you?” he was asked. “the rear guard of the grand army,” was the sombre reply of the noble old soldier.

some forty thousand men crossed the river, but of these there were many who could do nothing but crawl to the hospitals, asking for “the rooms where people die.” it was true, as desprez said, the grand army was dead.

it was on this horrible retreat that napoleon received word that a curious thing had happened in paris. a general and an abbé, both political prisoners, had escaped, and actually had succeeded in the preliminaries of a coup d’état overturning the empire, and substituting a provisional government.

they had carried out their scheme simply by announcing that napoleon was dead, and by reading a forged proclamation from the senate to the effect that the imperial government was at an end and a new one begun. the authorities 248to whom these conspirators had gone had with but little hesitation accepted their orders. they had secured twelve hundred soldiers, had locked up the prefect of police, and had taken possession of the h?tel de ville.

the foolhardy enterprise went, it is true, only a little way, but far enough to show paris that the day of easy revolution had not passed, and that an announcement of the death of napoleon did not bring at once a cry of “long live the king of rome!” the news of the malet conspiracy was an astonishing revelation to napoleon himself of the instability of french public sentiment. he saw that the support on which he had depended most to insure his institutions, that is, an heir to his throne, was set aside at the word of a worthless agitator. the impression made on his generals by the news was one of consternation and despair. the emperor read in their faces that they believed his good fortune was waning. he decided to go to paris as soon as possible.

on december 5th he left the army, and after a perilous journey of twelve days reached the french capital. it took as great courage to face france now as it had taken audacity to attempt the invasion of russia. the grandest army the nation had ever sent out was lying behind him dead. his throne had tottered for an instant in sight of all france. hereafter he could not believe himself invincible. already his enemies were suggesting that since his good genius had failed him once, it might again.

no one realized the gravity of the position as napoleon himself, but he met his household, his ministers, the council of state, the senate, with an imperial self-confidence and a sang froid which are awe-inspiring under the circumstances. the horror of the situation of the army was not known in paris on his arrival, but reports came in daily until the truth was clear to everybody. but napoleon never lost countenance. the explanations necessary for him to give 249to the senate, to his allies, and to his friends, had all the serenity and the plausibility of a victor—a victor who had suffered, to be sure, but not through his own rashness or mismanagement. the following quotation from a letter to the king of denmark illustrates well his public attitude towards the invasion and the retreat from moscow:

“the enemy were always beaten, and captured neither an eagle nor a gun from my army. on the 7th of november the cold became intense; all the roads were found impracticable; thirty thousand horses perished between the 7th and the 16th. a portion of our baggage and artillery wagons was broken and abandoned; our soldiers, little accustomed to such weather, could not endure the cold. they wandered from the ranks in quest of shelter for the night, and, having no cavalry to protect them, several thousands fell into the hands of the enemy’s light troops. general sanson, chief of the topographic corps, was captured by some cossacks while he was engaged in sketching a position. other isolated officers shared the same fate. my losses are severe, but the enemy cannot attribute to themselves the honor of having inflicted them. my army has suffered greatly, and suffers still, but this calamity will cease with the cold.”

to every one he declared that it was the russians, not he, who had suffered. it was their great city, not his, which was burnt; their fields, not his, which were devastated. they did not take an eagle, did not win a battle. it was the cold, the cossacks, which had done the mischief to the grand army; and that mischief? why, it would be soon repaired. “i shall be back on the nieman in the spring.”

but the very man who in public and private calmed and reassured the nation, was sometimes himself so overwhelmed at the thought of the disaster which he had just witnessed, that he let escape a cry which showed that it was only his indomitable will which was carrying him through; that his heart was bleeding. in the midst of a glowing account to the legislative body of his success during the invasion, he suddenly stopped. “in a few nights everything changed. i have suffered great losses. they would have broken my heart if i had been accessible to any other feelings than the interest, the glory, and the future of my people.”

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they grumbled, but they followed always.

raffet shows us a napoleon worn out by the disastrous excess even of his victories, marching under a sad, rainy sky, at the head of his little army, which, although hopeful, decreased daily in numbers after repeated fights—all of them victorious. the legend chosen by the artist sums up the state of mind of these old grognards—always discontented, and yet always ready, in spite of wearing fatigue and increasing discouragements, to run even to death on a sign from their emperor. meissonier meditated long and earnestly before this beautiful picture, inspired by the campaign of france, previous to painting his immortal canvas, “1814.”—a. d.

251in the teeth of the terrible news coming daily to paris, napoleon began preparations for another campaign. to every one he talked of victory as certain. those who argued against the enterprise he silenced temporarily. “you should say,” he wrote eugène, “and yourself believe, that in the next campaign i shall drive the russians back across the nieman.” with the first news of the passage of the beresina chilling them, the senate voted an army of three hundred and fifty thousand men; the allies were called upon; even the marine was obliged to turn men over to the land force.

but something besides men was necessary. an army means muskets and powder and sabres, clothes and boots and headgear, wagons and cannon and caisson; and all these it was necessary to manufacture afresh. the task was gigantic; but before the middle of april it was completed, and the emperor was ready to join his army.

the force against which napoleon went in 1813 was the most formidable, in many respects, he had ever encountered. its strength was greater. it included russia, england, spain, prussia, and sweden, and the allies believed austria would soon join them. an element of this force more powerful than its numbers was its spirit. the allied armies fought napoleon in 1813 as they would fight an enemy of freedom. central europe had come to feel that further french interference was intolerable. the war had become a crusade. the extent of this feeling is illustrated by an incident in the prussian army. in the war of 1812 prussia was an ally of the french, but at the end of the year general yorck, who commanded a prussian division, went over to the enemy. it was a dishonorable action from a military point of view, but his explanation that he deserted as “a patriot acting for the welfare of his country” touched 252prussia; and though the king disavowed the act, the people applauded it.

throughout the german states the feeling against napoleon was bitter. a veritable crusade had been undertaken against him by such men as stein, and most of the youth of the country were united in the tagendbund, or league of virtue, which had sworn to take arms for german freedom.

when alexander followed the french across the nieman, announcing that he came bringing “deliverance to europe,” and calling on the people to unite against the “common enemy,” he found them quick to understand and respond.

thus, in 1813 napoleon did not go against kings and armies, but against peoples. no one understood this better than he did himself, and he counselled his allies that it was not against the foreign enemy alone that they had to protect themselves. “there is one more dangerous to be feared—the spirit of revolt and anarchy.”