appendix g

we read in jefferson's "memoirs" as follows:—

"at the time of the first settlement of the english in virginia, when land was to be had for little or nothing, some provident persons having obtained large grants of it, and being desirous of maintaining the splendor of their families, entailed their property upon their descendants. the transmission of these estates from generation to generation, to men who bore the same name, had the effect of raising up a distinct class of families, who, possessing by law the privilege of perpetuating their wealth, formed by these means a sort of patrician order, distinguished by the grandeur and luxury of their establishments. from this order it was that the king usually chose his councillors of state." *c

c

[ this passage is extracted and translated from m. conseil's work upon the life of jefferson, entitled "melanges politiques et philosophiques de jefferson."]

in the united states, the principal clauses of the english law respecting descent have been universally rejected. the first rule that we follow, says mr. kent, touching inheritance, is the following:—if a man dies intestate, his property goes to his heirs in a direct line. if he has but one heir or heiress, he or she succeeds to the whole. if there are several heirs of the same degree, they divide the inheritance equally amongst them, without distinction of sex. this rule was prescribed for the first time in the state of new york by a statute of february 23, 1786. (see revised statutes, vol. iii. appendix, p. 48.) it has since then been adopted in the revised statutes of the same state. at the present day this law holds good throughout the whole of the united states, with the exception of the state of vermont, where the male heir inherits a double portion. (kent's "commentaries," vol. iv. p. 370.) mr. kent, in the same work, vol. iv. p. 1-22, gives a historical account of american legislation on the subject of entail: by this we learn that, previous to the revolution, the colonies followed the english law of entail. estates tail were abolished in virginia in 1776, on a motion of mr. jefferson. they were suppressed in new york in 1786, and have since been abolished in north carolina, kentucky, tennessee, georgia, and missouri. in vermont, indiana, illinois, south carolina, and louisiana, entail was never introduced. those states which thought proper to preserve the english law of entail, modified it in such a way as to deprive it of its most aristocratic tendencies. "our general principles on the subject of government," says mr. kent, "tend to favor the free circulation of property."

it cannot fail to strike the french reader who studies the law of inheritance, that on these questions the french legislation is infinitely more democratic even than the american. the american law makes an equal division of the father's property, but only in the case of his will not being known; "for every man," says the law, "in the state of new york (revised statutes, vol. iii. appendix, p. 51), has entire liberty, power, and authority, to dispose of his property by will, to leave it entire, or divided in favor of any persons he chooses as his heirs, provided he do not leave it to a political body or any corporation." the french law obliges the testator to divide his property equally, or nearly so, among his heirs. most of the american republics still admit of entails, under certain restrictions; but the french law prohibits entail in all cases. if the social condition of the americans is more democratic than that of the french, the laws of the latter are the most democratic of the two. this may be explained more easily than at first appears to be the case. in france, democracy is still occupied in the work of destruction; in america, it reigns quietly over the ruins it has made.

appendix h

summary of the qualifications of voters in the united states as they existed in 1832

all the states agree in granting the right of voting at the age of twenty-one. in all of them it is necessary to have resided for a certain time in the district where the vote is given. this period varies from three months to two years.

as to the qualification: in the state of massachusetts it is necessary to have an income of pound 3 or a capital of pound 60. in rhode island, a man must possess landed property to the amount of $133.

in connecticut, he must have a property which gives an income of $17. a year of service in the militia also gives the elective privilege.

in new jersey, an elector must have a property of pound 50 a year.

in south carolina and maryland, the elector must possess fifty acres of land.

in tennessee, he must possess some property.

in the states of mississippi, ohio, georgia, virginia, pennsylvania, delaware, new york, the only necessary qualification for voting is that of paying the taxes; and in most of the states, to serve in the militia is equivalent to the payment of taxes. in maine and new hampshire any man can vote who is not on the pauper list.

lastly, in the states of missouri, alabama, illinois, louisiana, indiana, kentucky, and vermont, the conditions of voting have no reference to the property of the elector.

i believe there is no other state besides that of north carolina in which different conditions are applied to the voting for the senate and the electing the house of representatives. the electors of the former, in this case, should possess in property fifty acres of land; to vote for the latter, nothing more is required than to pay taxes.

appendix i

the small number of custom-house officers employed in the united states, compared with the extent of the coast, renders smuggling very easy; notwithstanding which, it is less practised than elsewhere, because everybody endeavors to repress it. in america there is no police for the prevention of fires, and such accidents are more frequent than in europe; but in general they are more speedily extinguished, because the surrounding population is prompt in lending assistance.

appendix k

it is incorrect to assert that centralization was produced by the french revolution; the revolution brought it to perfection, but did not create it. the mania for centralization and government regulations dates from the time when jurists began to take a share in the government, in the time of philippele-bel; ever since which period they have been on the increase. in the year 1775, m. de malesherbes, speaking in the name of the cour des aides, said to louis xiv:— *d

d

[ see "memoires pour servir a l'histoire du droit public de la france en matiere d'impots," p. 654, printed at brussels in 1779.]

". . . every corporation and every community of citizens retained the right of administering its own affairs; a right which not only forms part of the primitive constitution of the kingdom, but has a still higher origin; for it is the right of nature, and of reason. nevertheless, your subjects, sire, have been deprived of it; and we cannot refrain from saying that in this respect your government has fallen into puerile extremes. from the time when powerful ministers made it a political principle to prevent the convocation of a national assembly, one consequence has succeeded another, until the deliberations of the inhabitants of a village are declared null when they have not been authorized by the intendant. of course, if the community has an expensive undertaking to carry through, it must remain under the control of the sub-delegate of the intendant, and, consequently, follow the plan he proposes, employ his favorite workmen, pay them according to his pleasure; and if an action at law is deemed necessary, the intendant's permission must be obtained. the cause must be pleaded before this first tribunal, previous to its being carried into a public court; and if the opinion of the intendant is opposed to that of the inhabitants, or if their adversary enjoys his favor, the community is deprived of the power of defending its rights. such are the means, sire, which have been exerted to extinguish the municipal spirit in france; and to stifle, if possible, the opinions of the citizens. the nation may be said to lie under an interdict, and to be in wardship under guardians." what could be said more to the purpose at the present day, when the revolution has achieved what are called its victories in centralization?

in 1789, jefferson wrote from paris to one of his friends:—"there is no country where the mania for over-governing has taken deeper root than in france, or been the source of greater mischief." (letter to madison, august 28, 1789.) the fact is, that for several centuries past the central power of france has done everything it could to extend central administration; it has acknowledged no other limits than its own strength. the central power to which the revolution gave birth made more rapid advances than any of its predecessors, because it was stronger and wiser than they had been; louis xiv committed the welfare of such communities to the caprice of an intendant; napoleon left them to that of the minister. the same principle governed both, though its consequences were more or less remote.

appendix l

the immutability of the constitution of france is a necessary consequence of the laws of that country. to begin with the most important of all the laws, that which decides the order of succession to the throne; what can be more immutable in its principle than a political order founded upon the natural succession of father to son? in 1814, louis xviii had established the perpetual law of hereditary succession in favor of his own family. the individuals who regulated the consequences of the revolution of 1830 followed his example; they merely established the perpetuity of the law in favor of another family. in this respect they imitated the chancellor meaupou, who, when he erected the new parliament upon the ruins of the old, took care to declare in the same ordinance that the rights of the new magistrates should be as inalienable as those of their predecessors had been. the laws of 1830, like those of 1814, point out no way of changing the constitution: and it is evident that the ordinary means of legislation are insufficient for this purpose. as the king, the peers, and the deputies, all derive their authority from the constitution, these three powers united cannot alter a law by virtue of which alone they govern. out of the pale of the constitution they are nothing: where, when, could they take their stand to effect a change in its provisions? the alternative is clear: either their efforts are powerless against the charter, which continues to exist in spite of them, in which case they only reign in the name of the charter; or they succeed in changing the charter, and then, the law by which they existed being annulled, they themselves cease to exist. by destroying the charter, they destroy themselves. this is much more evident in the laws of 1830 than in those of 1814. in 1814, the royal prerogative took its stand above and beyond the constitution; but in 1830, it was avowedly created by, and dependent on, the constitution. a part, therefore, of the french constitution is immutable, because it is united to the destiny of a family; and the body of the constitution is equally immutable, because there appear to be no legal means of changing it. these remarks are not applicable to england. that country having no written constitution, who can assert when its constitution is changed?

appendix m

the most esteemed authors who have written upon the english constitution agree with each other in establishing the omnipotence of the parliament. delolme says: "it is a fundamental principle with the english lawyers, that parliament can do everything except making a woman a man, or a man a woman." blackstone expresses himself more in detail, if not more energetically, than delolme, in the following terms:—"the power and jurisdiction of parliament, says sir edward coke (4 inst. 36), 'is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds.' and of this high court, he adds, may be truly said, 'si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima.' it hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations; ecclesiastical or temporal; civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this being the place where that absolute despotic power which must, in all governments, reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. all mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. it can regulate or new-model the succession to the crown; as was done in the reign of henry viii and william iii. it can alter the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances in the reigns of king henry viii and his three children. it can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom, and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the act of union and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. it can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible to be done; and, therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament."

appendix n

there is no question upon which the american constitutions agree more fully than upon that of political jurisdiction. all the constitutions which take cognizance of this matter, give to the house of delegates the exclusive right of impeachment; excepting only the constitution of north carolina, which grants the same privilege to grand juries. (article 23.) almost all the constitutions give the exclusive right of pronouncing sentence to the senate, or to the assembly which occupies its place.

the only punishments which the political tribunals can inflict are removal, or the interdiction of public functions for the future. there is no other constitution but that of virginia (p. 152), which enables them to inflict every kind of punishment. the crimes which are subject to political jurisdiction are, in the federal constitution (section 4, art. 1); in that of indiana (art. 3, paragraphs 23 and 24); of new york (art. 5); of delaware (art. 5), high treason, bribery, and other high crimes or offences. in the constitution of massachusetts (chap. i, section 2); that of north carolina (art. 23); of virginia (p. 252), misconduct and maladministration. in the constitution of new hampshire (p. 105), corruption, intrigue, and maladministration. in vermont (chap. 2, art. 24), maladministration. in south carolina (art. 5); kentucky (art. 5); tennessee (art. 4); ohio (art. 1, 23, 24); louisiana (art. 5); mississippi (art. 5); alabama (art. 6); pennsylvania (art. 4), crimes committed in the non-performance of official duties. in the states of illinois, georgia, maine, and connecticut, no particular offences are specified.

appendix o

it is true that the powers of europe may carry on maritime wars with the union; but there is always greater facility and less danger in supporting a maritime than a continental war. maritime warfare only requires one species of effort. a commercial people which consents to furnish its government with the necessary funds, is sure to possess a fleet. and it is far easier to induce a nation to part with its money, almost unconsciously, than to reconcile it to sacrifices of men and personal efforts. moreover, defeat by sea rarely compromises the existence or independence of the people which endures it. as for continental wars, it is evident that the nations of europe cannot be formidable in this way to the american union. it would be very difficult to transport and maintain in america more than 25,000 soldiers; an army which may be considered to represent a nation of about 2,000,000 of men. the most populous nation of europe contending in this way against the union, is in the position of a nation of 2,000,000 of inhabitants at war with one of 12,000,000. add to this, that america has all its resources within reach, whilst the european is at 4,000 miles distance from his; and that the immensity of the american continent would of itself present an insurmountable obstacle to its conquest.

appendix p

the first american journal appeared in april, 1704, and was published at boston. see "collection of the historical society of massachusetts," vol. vi. p. 66. it would be a mistake to suppose that the periodical press has always been entirely free in the american colonies: an attempt was made to establish something analogous to a censorship and preliminary security. consult the legislative documents of massachusetts of january 14, 1722. the committee appointed by the general assembly (the legislative body of the province) for the purpose of examining into circumstances connected with a paper entitled "the new england courier," expresses its opinion that "the tendency of the said journal is to turn religion into derision and bring it into contempt; that it mentions the sacred writers in a profane and irreligious manner; that it puts malicious interpretations upon the conduct of the ministers of the gospel; and that the government of his majesty is insulted, and the peace and tranquillity of the province disturbed by the said journal. the committee is consequently of opinion that the printer and publisher, james franklin, should be forbidden to print and publish the said journal or any other work in future, without having previously submitted it to the secretary of the province; and that the justices of the peace for the county of suffolk should be commissioned to require bail of the said james franklin for his good conduct during the ensuing year." the suggestion of the committee was adopted and passed into a law, but the effect of it was null, for the journal eluded the prohibition by putting the name of benjamin franklin instead of james franklin at the bottom of its columns, and this manoeuvre was supported by public opinion.

appendix q

the federal constitution has introduced the jury into the tribunals of the union in the same way as the states had introduced it into their own several courts; but as it has not established any fixed rules for the choice of jurors, the federal courts select them from the ordinary jury list which each state makes for itself. the laws of the states must therefore be examined for the theory of the formation of juries. see story's "commentaries on the constitution," b. iii. chap. 38, p. 654-659; sergeant's "constitutional law," p. 165. see also the federal laws of the years 1789, 1800, and 1802, upon the subject. for the purpose of thoroughly understanding the american principles with respect to the formation of juries, i examined the laws of states at a distance from one another, and the following observations were the result of my inquiries. in america, all the citizens who exercise the elective franchise have the right of serving upon a jury. the great state of new york, however, has made a slight difference between the two privileges, but in a spirit quite contrary to that of the laws of france; for in the state of new york there are fewer persons eligible as jurymen than there are electors. it may be said in general that the right of forming part of a jury, like the right of electing representatives, is open to all the citizens: the exercise of this right, however, is not put indiscriminately into any hands. every year a body of municipal or county magistrates—called "selectmen" in new england, "supervisors" in new york, "trustees" in ohio, and "sheriffs of the parish" in louisiana—choose for each county a certain number of citizens who have the right of serving as jurymen, and who are supposed to be capable of exercising their functions. these magistrates, being themselves elective, excite no distrust; their powers, like those of most republican magistrates, are very extensive and very arbitrary, and they frequently make use of them to remove unworthy or incompetent jurymen. the names of the jurymen thus chosen are transmitted to the county court; and the jury who have to decide any affair are drawn by lot from the whole list of names. the americans have contrived in every way to make the common people eligible to the jury, and to render the service as little onerous as possible. the sessions are held in the chief town of every county, and the jury are indemnified for their attendance either by the state or the parties concerned. they receive in general a dollar per day, besides their travelling expenses. in america, the being placed upon the jury is looked upon as a burden, but it is a burden which is very supportable. see brevard's "digest of the public statute law of south carolina," vol. i. pp. 446 and 454, vol. ii. pp. 218 and 338; "the general laws of massachusetts, revised and published by authority of the legislature," vol. ii. pp. 187 and 331; "the revised statutes of the state of new york," vol. ii. pp. 411, 643, 717, 720; "the statute law of the state of tennessee," vol. i. p. 209; "acts of the state of ohio," pp. 95 and 210; and "digeste general des actes de la legislature de la louisiane."

appendix r

if we attentively examine the constitution of the jury as introduced into civil proceedings in england, we shall readily perceive that the jurors are under the immediate control of the judge. it is true that the verdict of the jury, in civil as well as in criminal cases, comprises the question of fact and the question of right in the same reply; thus—a house is claimed by peter as having been purchased by him: this is the fact to be decided. the defendant puts in a plea of incompetency on the part of the vendor: this is the legal question to be resolved. but the jury do not enjoy the same character of infallibility in civil cases, according to the practice of the english courts, as they do in criminal cases. the judge may refuse to receive the verdict; and even after the first trial has taken place, a second or new trial may be awarded by the court. see blackstone's "commentaries," book iii. ch. 24.

appendix s

i find in my travelling journal a passage which may serve to convey a more complete notion of the trials to which the women of america, who consent to follow their husbands into the wilds, are often subjected. this description has nothing to recommend it to the reader but its strict accuracy:

". . . from time to time we come to fresh clearings; all these places are alike; i shall describe the one at which we have halted to-night, for it will serve to remind me of all the others.

"the bell which the pioneers hang round the necks of their cattle, in order to find them again in the woods, announced our approach to a clearing, when we were yet a long way off; and we soon afterwards heard the stroke of the hatchet, hewing down the trees of the forest. as we came nearer, traces of destruction marked the presence of civilized man; the road was strewn with shattered boughs; trunks of trees, half consumed by fire, or cleft by the wedge, were still standing in the track we were following. we continued to proceed till we reached a wood in which all the trees seemed to have been suddenly struck dead; in the height of summer their boughs were as leafless as in winter; and upon closer examination we found that a deep circle had been cut round the bark, which, by stopping the circulation of the sap, soon kills the tree. we were informed that this is commonly the first thing a pioneer does; as he cannot in the first year cut down all the trees which cover his new parcel of land, he sows indian corn under their branches, and puts the trees to death in order to prevent them from injuring his crop. beyond this field, at present imperfectly traced out, we suddenly came upon the cabin of its owner, situated in the centre of a plot of ground more carefully cultivated than the rest, but where man was still waging unequal warfare with the forest; there the trees were cut down, but their roots were not removed, and the trunks still encumbered the ground which they so recently shaded. around these dry blocks, wheat, suckers of trees, and plants of every kind, grow and intertwine in all the luxuriance of wild, untutored nature. amidst this vigorous and various vegetation stands the house of the pioneer, or, as they call it, the log house. like the ground about it, this rustic dwelling bore marks of recent and hasty labor; its length seemed not to exceed thirty feet, its height fifteen; the walls as well as the roof were formed of rough trunks of trees, between which a little moss and clay had been inserted to keep out the cold and rain.

"as night was coming on, we determined to ask the master of the log house for a lodging. at the sound of our footsteps, the children who were playing amongst the scattered branches sprang up and ran towards the house, as if they were frightened at the sight of man; whilst two large dogs, almost wild, with ears erect and outstretched nose, came growling out of their hut, to cover the retreat of their young masters. the pioneer himself made his appearance at the door of his dwelling; he looked at us with a rapid and inquisitive glance, made a sign to the dogs to go into the house, and set them the example, without betraying either curiosity or apprehension at our arrival.

"we entered the log house: the inside is quite unlike that of the cottages of the peasantry of europe: it contains more than is superfluous, less than is necessary. a single window with a muslin blind; on a hearth of trodden clay an immense fire, which lights the whole structure; above the hearth a good rifle, a deer's skin, and plumes of eagles' feathers; on the right hand of the chimney a map of the united states, raised and shaken by the wind through the crannies in the wall; near the map, upon a shelf formed of a roughly hewn plank, a few volumes of books—a bible, the six first books of milton, and two of shakespeare's plays; along the wall, trunks instead of closets; in the centre of the room a rude table, with legs of green wood, and with the bark still upon them, looking as if they grew out of the ground on which they stood; but on this table a tea-pot of british ware, silver spoons, cracked tea-cups, and some newspapers.

"the master of this dwelling has the strong angular features and lank limbs peculiar to the native of new england. it is evident that this man was not born in the solitude in which we have met with him: his physical constitution suffices to show that his earlier years were spent in the midst of civilized society, and that he belongs to that restless, calculating, and adventurous race of men, who do with the utmost coolness things only to be accounted for by the ardor of the passions, and who endure the life of savages for a time, in order to conquer and civilize the backwoods.

"when the pioneer perceived that we were crossing his threshold, he came to meet us and shake hands, as is their custom; but his face was quite unmoved; he opened the conversation by inquiring what was going on in the world; and when his curiosity was satisfied, he held his peace, as if he were tired by the noise and importunity of mankind. when we questioned him in our turn, he gave us all the information we required; he then attended sedulously, but without eagerness, to our personal wants. whilst he was engaged in providing thus kindly for us, how came it that in spit of ourselves we felt our gratitude die upon our lips? it is that our host whilst he performs the duties of hospitality, seems to be obeying an irksome necessity of his condition: he treats it as a duty imposed upon him by his situation, not as a pleasure. by the side of the hearth sits a woman with a baby on her lap: she nods to us without disturbing herself. like the pioneer, this woman is in the prime of life; her appearance would seem superior to her condition, and her apparel even betrays a lingering taste for dress; but her delicate limbs appear shrunken, her features are drawn in, her eye is mild and melancholy; her whole physiognomy bears marks of a degree of religious resignation, a deep quiet of all passions, and some sort of natural and tranquil firmness, ready to meet all the ills of life, without fearing and without braving them. her children cluster about her, full of health, turbulence, and energy: they are true children of the wilderness; their mother watches them from time to time with mingled melancholy and joy: to look at their strength and her languor, one might imagine that the life she has given them has exhausted her own, and still she regrets not what they have cost her. the house inhabited by these emigrants has no internal partition or loft. in the one chamber of which it consists, the whole family is gathered for the night. the dwelling is itself a little world—an ark of civilization amidst an ocean of foliage: a hundred steps beyond it the primeval forest spreads its shades, and solitude resumes its sway."

appendix t

it is not the equality of conditions which makes men immoral and irreligious; but when men, being equal, are at the same time immoral and irreligious, the effects of immorality and irreligion easily manifest themselves outwardly, because men have but little influence upon each other, and no class exists which can undertake to keep society in order. equality of conditions never engenders profligacy of morals, but it sometimes allows that profligacy to show itself.

appendix u

setting aside all those who do not think at all, and those who dare not say what they think, the immense majority of the americans will still be found to appear satisfied with the political institutions by which they are governed; and, i believe, really to be so. i look upon this state of public opinion as an indication, but not as a demonstration, of the absolute excellence of american laws. the pride of a nation, the gratification of certain ruling passions by the law, a concourse of circumstances, defects which escape notice, and more than all the rest, the influence of a majority which shuts the mouth of all cavillers, may long perpetuate the delusions of a people as well as those of a man. look at england throughout the eighteenth century. no nation was ever more prodigal of self-applause, no people was ever more self-satisfied; then every part of its constitution was right—everything, even to its most obvious defects, was irreproachable: at the present day a vast number of englishmen seem to have nothing better to do than to prove that this constitution was faulty in many respects. which was right?—the english people of the last century, or the english people of the present day?

the same thing has occurred in france. it is certain that during the reign of louis xiv the great bulk of the nation was devotedly attached to the form of government which, at that time, governed the community. but it is a vast error to suppose that there was anything degraded in the character of the french of that age. there might be some sort of servitude in france at that time, but assuredly there was no servile spirit among the people. the writers of that age felt a species of genuine enthusiasm in extolling the power of their king; and there was no peasant so obscure in his hovel as not to take a pride in the glory of his sovereign, and to die cheerfully with the cry "vive le roi!" upon his lips. these very same forms of loyalty are now odious to the french people. which are wrong?—the french of the age of louis xiv, or their descendants of the present day?

our judgment of the laws of a people must not then be founded future condition of three races in the united states exclusively upon its inclinations, since those inclinations change from age to age; but upon more elevated principles and a more general experience. the love which a people may show for its law proves only this:—that we should not be in too great a hurry to change them.

appendix v

in the chapter to which this note relates i have pointed out one source of danger: i am now about to point out another kind of peril, more rare indeed, but far more formidable if it were ever to make its appearance. if the love of physical gratification and the taste for well-being, which are naturally suggested to men by a state of equality, were to get entire possession of the mind of a democratic people, and to fill it completely, the manners of the nation would become so totally opposed to military tastes, that perhaps even the army would eventually acquire a love of peace, in spite of the peculiar interest which leads it to desire war. living in the midst of a state of general relaxation, the troops would ultimately think it better to rise without efforts, by the slow but commodious advancement of a peace establishment, than to purchase more rapid promotion at the cost of all the toils and privations of the field. with these feelings, they would take up arms without enthusiasm, and use them without energy; they would allow themselves to be led to meet the foe, instead of marching to attack him. it must not be supposed that this pacific state of the army would render it adverse to revolutions; for revolutions, and especially military revolutions, which are generally very rapid, are attended indeed with great dangers, but not with protracted toil; they gratify ambition at less cost than war; life only is at stake, and the men of democracies care less for their lives than for their comforts. nothing is more dangerous for the freedom and the tranquillity of a people than an army afraid of war, because, as such an army no longer seeks to maintain its importance and its influence on the field of battle, it seeks to assert them elsewhere. thus it might happen that the men of whom a democratic army consists should lose the interests of citizens without acquiring the virtues of soldiers; and that the army should cease to be fit for war without ceasing to be turbulent. i shall here repeat what i have said in the text: the remedy for these dangers is not to be found in the army, but in the country: a democratic people which has preserved the manliness of its character will never be at a loss for military prowess in its soldiers.

appendix w

men connect the greatness of their idea of unity with means, god with ends: hence this idea of greatness, as men conceive it, leads us into infinite littleness. to compel all men to follow the same course towards the same object is a human notion;—to introduce infinite variety of action, but so combined that all these acts lead by a multitude of different courses to the accomplishment of one great design, is a conception of the deity. the human idea of unity is almost always barren; the divine idea pregnant with abundant results. men think they manifest their greatness by simplifying the means they use; but it is the purpose of god which is simple—his means are infinitely varied.

appendix x

a democratic people is not only led by its own tastes to centralize its government, but the passions of all the men by whom it is governed constantly urge it in the same direction. it may easily be foreseen that almost all the able and ambitious members of a democratic community will labor without 2 ceasing to extend the powers of government, because they all hope at some time or other to wield those powers. it is a waste of time to attempt to prove to them that extreme centralization may be injurious to the state, since they are centralizing for their own benefit. amongst the public men of democracies there are hardly any but men of great disinterestedness or extreme mediocrity who seek to oppose the centralization of government: the former are scarce, the latter powerless.

appendix y

i have often asked myself what would happen if, amidst the relaxation of democratic manners, and as a consequence of the restless spirit of the army, a military government were ever to be founded amongst any of the nations of the present age. i think that even such a government would not differ very much from the outline i have drawn in the chapter to which this note belongs, and that it would retain none of the fierce characteristics of a military oligarchy. i am persuaded that, in such a case, a sort of fusion would take place between the habits of official men and those of the military service. the administration would assume something of a military character, and the army some of the usages of the civil administration. the result would be a regular, clear, exact, and absolute system of government; the people would become the reflection of the army, and the community be drilled like a garrison.

appendix z

it cannot be absolutely or generally affirmed that the greatest danger of the present age is license or tyranny, anarchy or despotism. both are equally to be feared; and the one may as easily proceed as the other from the selfsame cause, namely, that "general apathy," which is the consequence of what i have termed "individualism": it is because this apathy exists, that the executive government, having mustered a few troops, is able to commit acts of oppression one day, and the next day a party, which has mustered some thirty men in its ranks, can also commit acts of oppression. neither one nor the other can found anything to last; and the causes which enable them to succeed easily, prevent them from succeeding long: they rise because nothing opposes them, and they sink because nothing supports them. the proper object therefore of our most strenuous resistance, is far less either anarchy or despotism than the apathy which may almost indifferently beget either the one or the other.