before i close forever the theme that has detained me so long, i would fain take a parting survey of all the various characteristics of modern society, and appreciate at last the general influence to be exercised by the principle of equality upon the fate of mankind; but i am stopped by the difficulty of the task, and in presence of so great an object my sight is troubled, and my reason fails. the society of the modern world which i have sought to delineate, and which i seek to judge, has but just come into existence. time has not yet shaped it into perfect form: the great revolution by which it has been created is not yet over: and amidst the occurrences of our time, it is almost impossible to discern what will pass away with the revolution itself, and what will survive its close. the world which is rising into existence is still half encumbered by the remains of the world which is waning into decay; and amidst the vast perplexity of human affairs, none can say how much of ancient institutions and former manners will remain, or how much will completely disappear. although the revolution which is taking place in the social condition, the laws, the opinions, and the feelings of men, is still very far from being terminated, yet its results already admit of no comparison with anything that the world has ever before witnessed. i go back from age to age up to the remotest antiquity; but i find no parallel to what is occurring before my eyes: as the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity. nevertheless, in the midst of a prospect so wide, so novel and so confused, some of the more prominent characteristics may already be discerned and pointed out. the good things and the evils of life are more equally distributed in the world: great wealth tends to disappear, the number of small fortunes to increase; desires and gratifications are multiplied, but extraordinary prosperity and irremediable penury are alike unknown. the sentiment of ambition is universal, but the scope of ambition is seldom vast. each individual stands apart in solitary weakness; but society at large is active, provident, and powerful: the performances of private persons are insignificant, those of the state immense. there is little energy of character; but manners are mild, and laws humane. if there be few instances of exalted heroism or of virtues of the highest, brightest, and purest temper, men's habits are regular, violence is rare, and cruelty almost unknown. human existence becomes longer, and property more secure: life is not adorned with brilliant trophies, but it is extremely easy and tranquil. few pleasures are either very refined or very coarse; and highly polished manners are as uncommon as great brutality of tastes. neither men of great learning, nor extremely ignorant communities, are to be met with; genius becomes more rare, information more diffused. the human mind is impelled by the small efforts of all mankind combined together, not by the strenuous activity of certain men. there is less perfection, but more abundance, in all the productions of the arts. the ties of race, of rank, and of country are relaxed; the great bond of humanity is strengthened. if i endeavor to find out the most general and the most prominent of all these different characteristics, i shall have occasion to perceive, that what is taking place in men's fortunes manifests itself under a thousand other forms. almost all extremes are softened or blunted: all that was most prominent is superseded by some mean term, at once less lofty and less low, less brilliant and less obscure, than what before existed in the world.

when i survey this countless multitude of beings, shaped in each other's likeness, amidst whom nothing rises and nothing falls, the sight of such universal uniformity saddens and chills me, and i am tempted to regret that state of society which has ceased to be. when the world was full of men of great importance and extreme insignificance, of great wealth and extreme poverty, of great learning and extreme ignorance, i turned aside from the latter to fix my observation on the former alone, who gratified my sympathies. but i admit that this gratification arose from my own weakness: it is because i am unable to see at once all that is around me, that i am allowed thus to select and separate the objects of my predilection from among so many others. such is not the case with that almighty and eternal being whose gaze necessarily includes the whole of created things, and who surveys distinctly, though at once, mankind and man. we may naturally believe that it is not the singular prosperity of the few, but the greater well-being of all, which is most pleasing in the sight of the creator and preserver of men. what appears to me to be man's decline, is to his eye advancement; what afflicts me is acceptable to him. a state of equality is perhaps less elevated, but it is more just; and its justice constitutes its greatness and its beauty. i would strive then to raise myself to this point of the divine contemplation, and thence to view and to judge the concerns of men.

no man, upon the earth, can as yet affirm absolutely and generally, that the new state of the world is better than its former one; but it is already easy to perceive that this state is different. some vices and some virtues were so inherent in the constitution of an aristocratic nation, and are so opposite to the character of a modern people, that they can never be infused into it; some good tendencies and some bad propensities which were unknown to the former, are natural to the latter; some ideas suggest themselves spontaneously to the imagination of the one, which are utterly repugnant to the mind of the other. they are like two distinct orders of human beings, each of which has its own merits and defects, its own advantages and its own evils. care must therefore be taken not to judge the state of society, which is now coming into existence, by notions derived from a state of society which no longer exists; for as these states of society are exceedingly different in their structure, they cannot be submitted to a just or fair comparison. it would be scarcely more reasonable to require of our own contemporaries the peculiar virtues which originated in the social condition of their forefathers, since that social condition is itself fallen, and has drawn into one promiscuous ruin the good and evil which belonged to it.

but as yet these things are imperfectly understood. i find that a great number of my contemporaries undertake to make a certain selection from amongst the institutions, the opinions, and the ideas which originated in the aristocratic constitution of society as it was: a portion of these elements they would willingly relinquish, but they would keep the remainder and transplant them into their new world. i apprehend that such men are wasting their time and their strength in virtuous but unprofitable efforts. the object is not to retain the peculiar advantages which the inequality of conditions bestows upon mankind, but to secure the new benefits which equality may supply. we have not to seek to make ourselves like our progenitors, but to strive to work out that species of greatness and happiness which is our own. for myself, who now look back from this extreme limit of my task, and discover from afar, but at once, the various objects which have attracted my more attentive investigation upon my way, i am full of apprehensions and of hopes. i perceive mighty dangers which it is possible to ward off—mighty evils which may be avoided or alleviated; and i cling with a firmer hold to the belief, that for democratic nations to be virtuous and prosperous they require but to will it. i am aware that many of my contemporaries maintain that nations are never their own masters here below, and that they necessarily obey some insurmountable and unintelligent power, arising from anterior events, from their race, or from the soil and climate of their country. such principles are false and cowardly; such principles can never produce aught but feeble men and pusillanimous nations. providence has not created mankind entirely independent or entirely free. it is true that around every man a fatal circle is traced, beyond which he cannot pass; but within the wide verge of that circle he is powerful and free: as it is with man, so with communities. the nations of our time cannot prevent the conditions of men from becoming equal; but it depends upon themselves whether the principle of equality is to lead them to servitude or freedom, to knowledge or barbarism, to prosperity or to wretchedness.