natural strength of the majority in democracies—most of the american constitutions have increased this strength by artificial means—how this has been done—pledged delegates—moral power of the majority—opinion as to its infallibility—respect for its rights, how augmented in the united states.

unlimited power of the majority in the united states, and its consequences

the very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority; for there is nothing in democratic states which is capable of resisting it. most of the american constitutions have sought to increase this natural strength of the majority by artificial means. *a

a

[ we observed, in examining the federal constitution, that the efforts of the legislators of the union had been diametrically opposed to the present tendency. the consequence has been that the federal government is more independent in its sphere than that of the states. but the federal government scarcely ever interferes in any but external affairs; and the governments of the state are in the governments of the states are in reality the authorities which direct society in america.]

the legislature is, of all political institutions, the one which is most easily swayed by the wishes of the majority. the americans determined that the members of the legislature should be elected by the people immediately, and for a very brief term, in order to subject them, not only to the general convictions, but even to the daily passion, of their constituents. the members of both houses are taken from the same class in society, and are nominated in the same manner; so that the modifications of the legislative bodies are almost as rapid and quite as irresistible as those of a single assembly. it is to a legislature thus constituted that almost all the authority of the government has been entrusted.

but whilst the law increased the strength of those authorities which of themselves were strong, it enfeebled more and more those which were naturally weak. it deprived the representatives of the executive of all stability and independence, and by subjecting them completely to the caprices of the legislature, it robbed them of the slender influence which the nature of a democratic government might have allowed them to retain. in several states the judicial power was also submitted to the elective discretion of the majority, and in all of them its existence was made to depend on the pleasure of the legislative authority, since the representatives were empowered annually to regulate the stipend of the judges.

custom, however, has done even more than law. a proceeding which will in the end set all the guarantees of representative government at naught is becoming more and more general in the united states; it frequently happens that the electors, who choose a delegate, point out a certain line of conduct to him, and impose upon him a certain number of positive obligations which he is pledged to fulfil. with the exception of the tumult, this comes to the same thing as if the majority of the populace held its deliberations in the market-place.

several other circumstances concur in rendering the power of the majority in america not only preponderant, but irresistible. the moral authority of the majority is partly based upon the notion that there is more intelligence and more wisdom in a great number of men collected together than in a single individual, and that the quantity of legislators is more important than their quality. the theory of equality is in fact applied to the intellect of man: and human pride is thus assailed in its last retreat by a doctrine which the minority hesitate to admit, and in which they very slowly concur. like all other powers, and perhaps more than all other powers, the authority of the many requires the sanction of time; at first it enforces obedience by constraint, but its laws are not respected until they have long been maintained.

the right of governing society, which the majority supposes itself to derive from its superior intelligence, was introduced into the united states by the first settlers, and this idea, which would be sufficient of itself to create a free nation, has now been amalgamated with the manners of the people and the minor incidents of social intercourse.

the french, under the old monarchy, held it for a maxim (which is still a fundamental principle of the english constitution) that the king could do no wrong; and if he did do wrong, the blame was imputed to his advisers. this notion was highly favorable to habits of obedience, and it enabled the subject to complain of the law without ceasing to love and honor the lawgiver. the americans entertain the same opinion with respect to the majority.

the moral power of the majority is founded upon yet another principle, which is, that the interests of the many are to be preferred to those of the few. it will readily be perceived that the respect here professed for the rights of the majority must naturally increase or diminish according to the state of parties. when a nation is divided into several irreconcilable factions, the privilege of the majority is often overlooked, because it is intolerable to comply with its demands.

if there existed in america a class of citizens whom the legislating majority sought to deprive of exclusive privileges which they had possessed for ages, and to bring down from an elevated station to the level of the ranks of the multitude, it is probable that the minority would be less ready to comply with its laws. but as the united states were colonized by men holding equal rank amongst themselves, there is as yet no natural or permanent source of dissension between the interests of its different inhabitants.

there are certain communities in which the persons who constitute the minority can never hope to draw over the majority to their side, because they must then give up the very point which is at issue between them. thus, an aristocracy can never become a majority whilst it retains its exclusive privileges, and it cannot cede its privileges without ceasing to be an aristocracy.

in the united states political questions cannot be taken up in so general and absolute a manner, and all parties are willing to recognize the right of the majority, because they all hope to turn those rights to their own advantage at some future time. the majority therefore in that country exercises a prodigious actual authority, and a moral influence which is scarcely less preponderant; no obstacles exist which can impede or so much as retard its progress, or which can induce it to heed the complaints of those whom it crushes upon its path. this state of things is fatal in itself and dangerous for the future.

how the unlimited power of the majority increases in america the instability of legislation and administration inherent in democracy the americans increase the mutability of the laws which is inherent in democracy by changing the legislature every year, and by investing it with unbounded authority—the same effect is produced upon the administration—in america social amelioration is conducted more energetically but less perseveringly than in europe.

i have already spoken of the natural defects of democratic institutions, and they all of them increase at the exact ratio of the power of the majority. to begin with the most evident of them all; the mutability of the laws is an evil inherent in democratic government, because it is natural to democracies to raise men to power in very rapid succession. but this evil is more or less sensible in proportion to the authority and the means of action which the legislature possesses.

in america the authority exercised by the legislative bodies is supreme; nothing prevents them from accomplishing their wishes with celerity, and with irresistible power, whilst they are supplied by new representatives every year. that is to say, the circumstances which contribute most powerfully to democratic instability, and which admit of the free application of caprice to every object in the state, are here in full operation. in conformity with this principle, america is, at the present day, the country in the world where laws last the shortest time. almost all the american constitutions have been amended within the course of thirty years: there is therefore not a single american state which has not modified the principles of its legislation in that lapse of time. as for the laws themselves, a single glance upon the archives of the different states of the union suffices to convince one that in america the activity of the legislator never slackens. not that the american democracy is naturally less stable than any other, but that it is allowed to follow its capricious propensities in the formation of the laws. *b

b

[ the legislative acts promulgated by the state of massachusetts alone, from the year 1780 to the present time, already fill three stout volumes; and it must not be forgotten that the collection to which i allude was published in 1823, when many old laws which had fallen into disuse were omitted. the state of massachusetts, which is not more populous than a department of france, may be considered as the most stable, the most consistent, and the most sagacious in its undertakings of the whole union.]

the omnipotence of the majority, and the rapid as well as absolute manner in which its decisions are executed in the united states, has not only the effect of rendering the law unstable, but it exercises the same influence upon the execution of the law and the conduct of the public administration. as the majority is the only power which it is important to court, all its projects are taken up with the greatest ardor, but no sooner is its attention distracted than all this ardor ceases; whilst in the free states of europe the administration is at once independent and secure, so that the projects of the legislature are put into execution, although its immediate attention may be directed to other objects.

in america certain ameliorations are undertaken with much more zeal and activity than elsewhere; in europe the same ends are promoted by much less social effort, more continuously applied.

some years ago several pious individuals undertook to ameliorate the condition of the prisons. the public was excited by the statements which they put forward, and the regeneration of criminals became a very popular undertaking. new prisons were built, and for the first time the idea of reforming as well as of punishing the delinquent formed a part of prison discipline. but this happy alteration, in which the public had taken so hearty an interest, and which the exertions of the citizens had irresistibly accelerated, could not be completed in a moment. whilst the new penitentiaries were being erected (and it was the pleasure of the majority that they should be terminated with all possible celerity), the old prisons existed, which still contained a great number of offenders. these jails became more unwholesome and more corrupt in proportion as the new establishments were beautified and improved, forming a contrast which may readily be understood. the majority was so eagerly employed in founding the new prisons that those which already existed were forgotten; and as the general attention was diverted to a novel object, the care which had hitherto been bestowed upon the others ceased. the salutary regulations of discipline were first relaxed, and afterwards broken; so that in the immediate neighborhood of a prison which bore witness to the mild and enlightened spirit of our time, dungeons might be met with which reminded the visitor of the barbarity of the middle ages.