what the real advantages are which american society derives from the government of the democracy

before i enter upon the subject of the present chapter i am induced to remind the reader of what i have more than once adverted to in the course of this book. the political institutions of the united states appear to me to be one of the forms of government which a democracy may adopt; but i do not regard the american constitution as the best, or as the only one, which a democratic people may establish. in showing the advantages which the americans derive from the government of democracy, i am therefore very far from meaning, or from believing, that similar advantages can only be obtained from the same laws.

general tendency of the laws under the rule of the american democracy, and habits of those who apply them

defects of a democratic government easy to be discovered—its advantages only to be discerned by long observation—democracy in america often inexpert, but the general tendency of the laws advantageous—in the american democracy public officers have no permanent interests distinct from those of the majority—result of this state of things.

the defects and the weaknesses of a democratic government may very readily be discovered; they are demonstrated by the most flagrant instances, whilst its beneficial influence is less perceptibly exercised. a single glance suffices to detect its evil consequences, but its good qualities can only be discerned by long observation. the laws of the american democracy are frequently defective or incomplete; they sometimes attack vested rights, or give a sanction to others which are dangerous to the community; but even if they were good, the frequent changes which they undergo would be an evil. how comes it, then, that the american republics prosper and maintain their position?

in the consideration of laws a distinction must be carefully observed between the end at which they aim and the means by which they are directed to that end, between their absolute and their relative excellence. if it be the intention of the legislator to favor the interests of the minority at the expense of the majority, and if the measures he takes are so combined as to accomplish the object he has in view with the least possible expense of time and exertion, the law may be well drawn up, although its purpose be bad; and the more efficacious it is, the greater is the mischief which it causes.

democratic laws generally tend to promote the welfare of the greatest possible number; for they emanate from the majority of the citizens, who are subject to error, but who cannot have an interest opposed to their own advantage. the laws of an aristocracy tend, on the contrary, to concentrate wealth and power in the hands of the minority, because an aristocracy, by its very nature, constitutes a minority. it may therefore be asserted, as a general proposition, that the purpose of a democracy in the conduct of its legislation is useful to a greater number of citizens than that of an aristocracy. this is, however, the sum total of its advantages.

aristocracies are infinitely more expert in the science of legislation than democracies ever can be. they are possessed of a self-control which protects them from the errors of temporary excitement, and they form lasting designs which they mature with the assistance of favorable opportunities. aristocratic government proceeds with the dexterity of art; it understands how to make the collective force of all its laws converge at the same time to a given point. such is not the case with democracies, whose laws are almost always ineffective or inopportune. the means of democracy are therefore more imperfect than those of aristocracy, and the measures which it unwittingly adopts are frequently opposed to its own cause; but the object it has in view is more useful.

let us now imagine a community so organized by nature, or by its constitution, that it can support the transitory action of bad laws, and that it can await, without destruction, the general tendency of the legislation: we shall then be able to conceive that a democratic government, notwithstanding its defects, will be most fitted to conduce to the prosperity of this community. this is precisely what has occurred in the united states; and i repeat, what i have before remarked, that the great advantage of the americans consists in their being able to commit faults which they may afterward repair.

an analogous observation may be made respecting public officers. it is easy to perceive that the american democracy frequently errs in the choice of the individuals to whom it entrusts the power of the administration; but it is more difficult to say why the state prospers under their rule. in the first place it is to be remarked, that if in a democratic state the governors have less honesty and less capacity than elsewhere, the governed, on the other hand, are more enlightened and more attentive to their interests. as the people in democracies is more incessantly vigilant in its affairs and more jealous of its rights, it prevents its representatives from abandoning that general line of conduct which its own interest prescribes. in the second place, it must be remembered that if the democratic magistrate is more apt to misuse his power, he possesses it for a shorter period of time. but there is yet another reason which is still more general and conclusive. it is no doubt of importance to the welfare of nations that they should be governed by men of talents and virtue; but it is perhaps still more important that the interests of those men should not differ from the interests of the community at large; for, if such were the case, virtues of a high order might become useless, and talents might be turned to a bad account. i say that it is important that the interests of the persons in authority should not conflict with or oppose the interests of the community at large; but i do not insist upon their having the same interests as the whole population, because i am not aware that such a state of things ever existed in any country.

no political form has hitherto been discovered which is equally favorable to the prosperity and the development of all the classes into which society is divided. these classes continue to form, as it were, a certain number of distinct nations in the same nation; and experience has shown that it is no less dangerous to place the fate of these classes exclusively in the hands of any one of them than it is to make one people the arbiter of the destiny of another. when the rich alone govern, the interest of the poor is always endangered; and when the poor make the laws, that of the rich incurs very serious risks. the advantage of democracy does not consist, therefore, as has sometimes been asserted, in favoring the prosperity of all, but simply in contributing to the well-being of the greatest possible number.

the men who are entrusted with the direction of public affairs in the united states are frequently inferior, both in point of capacity and of morality, to those whom aristocratic institutions would raise to power. but their interest is identified and confounded with that of the majority of their fellow-citizens. they may frequently be faithless and frequently mistaken, but they will never systematically adopt a line of conduct opposed to the will of the majority; and it is impossible that they should give a dangerous or an exclusive tendency to the government.

the mal-administration of a democratic magistrate is a mere isolated fact, which only occurs during the short period for which he is elected. corruption and incapacity do not act as common interests, which may connect men permanently with one another. a corrupt or an incapable magistrate will not concert his measures with another magistrate, simply because that individual is as corrupt and as incapable as himself; and these two men will never unite their endeavors to promote the corruption and inaptitude of their remote posterity. the ambition and the manoeuvres of the one will serve, on the contrary, to unmask the other. the vices of a magistrate, in democratic states, are usually peculiar to his own person.

but under aristocratic governments public men are swayed by the interest of their order, which, if it is sometimes confounded with the interests of the majority, is very frequently distinct from them. this interest is the common and lasting bond which unites them together; it induces them to coalesce, and to combine their efforts in order to attain an end which does not always ensure the greatest happiness of the greatest number; and it serves not only to connect the persons in authority, but to unite them to a considerable portion of the community, since a numerous body of citizens belongs to the aristocracy, without being invested with official functions. the aristocratic magistrate is therefore constantly supported by a portion of the community, as well as by the government of which he is a member.

the common purpose which connects the interest of the magistrates in aristocracies with that of a portion of their contemporaries identifies it with that of future generations; their influence belongs to the future as much as to the present. the aristocratic magistrate is urged at the same time toward the same point by the passions of the community, by his own, and i may almost add by those of his posterity. is it, then, wonderful that he does not resist such repeated impulses? and indeed aristocracies are often carried away by the spirit of their order without being corrupted by it; and they unconsciously fashion society to their own ends, and prepare it for their own descendants.

the english aristocracy is perhaps the most liberal which ever existed, and no body of men has ever, uninterruptedly, furnished so many honorable and enlightened individuals to the government of a country. it cannot, however, escape observation that in the legislation of england the good of the poor has been sacrificed to the advantage of the rich, and the rights of the majority to the privileges of the few. the consequence is, that england, at the present day, combines the extremes of fortune in the bosom of her society, and her perils and calamities are almost equal to her power and her renown. *a

a

[ [the legislation of england for the forty years is certainly not fairly open to this criticism, which was written before the reform bill of 1832, and accordingly great britain has thus far escaped and surmounted the perils and calamities to which she seemed to be exposed.]]

in the united states, where the public officers have no interests to promote connected with their caste, the general and constant influence of the government is beneficial, although the individuals who conduct it are frequently unskilful and sometimes contemptible. there is indeed a secret tendency in democratic institutions to render the exertions of the citizens subservient to the prosperity of the community, notwithstanding their private vices and mistakes; whilst in aristocratic institutions there is a secret propensity which, notwithstanding the talents and the virtues of those who conduct the government, leads them to contribute to the evils which oppress their fellow-creatures. in aristocratic governments public men may frequently do injuries which they do not intend, and in democratic states they produce advantages which they never thought of.

public spirit in the united states

patriotism of instinct—patriotism of reflection—their different characteristics—nations ought to strive to acquire the second when the first has disappeared—efforts of the americans to it—interest of the individual intimately connected with that of the country.

there is one sort of patriotic attachment which principally arises from that instinctive, disinterested, and undefinable feeling which connects the affections of man with his birthplace. this natural fondness is united to a taste for ancient customs, and to a reverence for ancestral traditions of the past; those who cherish it love their country as they love the mansions of their fathers. they enjoy the tranquillity which it affords them; they cling to the peaceful habits which they have contracted within its bosom; they are attached to the reminiscences which it awakens, and they are even pleased by the state of obedience in which they are placed. this patriotism is sometimes stimulated by religious enthusiasm, and then it is capable of making the most prodigious efforts. it is in itself a kind of religion; it does not reason, but it acts from the impulse of faith and of sentiment. by some nations the monarch has been regarded as a personification of the country; and the fervor of patriotism being converted into the fervor of loyalty, they took a sympathetic pride in his conquests, and gloried in his power. at one time, under the ancient monarchy, the french felt a sort of satisfaction in the sense of their dependence upon the arbitrary pleasure of their king, and they were wont to say with pride, "we are the subjects of the most powerful king in the world."

but, like all instinctive passions, this kind of patriotism is more apt to prompt transient exertion than to supply the motives of continuous endeavor. it may save the state in critical circumstances, but it will not unfrequently allow the nation to decline in the midst of peace. whilst the manners of a people are simple and its faith unshaken, whilst society is steadily based upon traditional institutions whose legitimacy has never been contested, this instinctive patriotism is wont to endure.

but there is another species of attachment to a country which is more rational than the one we have been describing. it is perhaps less generous and less ardent, but it is more fruitful and more lasting; it is coeval with the spread of knowledge, it is nurtured by the laws, it grows by the exercise of civil rights, and, in the end, it is confounded with the personal interest of the citizen. a man comprehends the influence which the prosperity of his country has upon his own welfare; he is aware that the laws authorize him to contribute his assistance to that prosperity, and he labors to promote it as a portion of his interest in the first place, and as a portion of his right in the second.

but epochs sometimes occur, in the course of the existence of a nation, at which the ancient customs of a people are changed, public morality destroyed, religious belief disturbed, and the spell of tradition broken, whilst the diffusion of knowledge is yet imperfect, and the civil rights of the community are ill secured, or confined within very narrow limits. the country then assumes a dim and dubious shape in the eyes of the citizens; they no longer behold it in the soil which they inhabit, for that soil is to them a dull inanimate clod; nor in the usages of their forefathers, which they have been taught to look upon as a debasing yoke; nor in religion, for of that they doubt; nor in the laws, which do not originate in their own authority; nor in the legislator, whom they fear and despise. the country is lost to their senses, they can neither discover it under its own nor under borrowed features, and they entrench themselves within the dull precincts of a narrow egotism. they are emancipated from prejudice without having acknowledged the empire of reason; they are neither animated by the instinctive patriotism of monarchical subjects nor by the thinking patriotism of republican citizens; but they have stopped halfway between the two, in the midst of confusion and of distress.

in this predicament, to retreat is impossible; for a people cannot restore the vivacity of its earlier times, any more than a man can return to the innocence and the bloom of childhood; such things may be regretted, but they cannot be renewed. the only thing, then, which remains to be done is to proceed, and to accelerate the union of private with public interests, since the period of disinterested patriotism is gone by forever.

i am certainly very far from averring that, in order to obtain this result, the exercise of political rights should be immediately granted to all the members of the community. but i maintain that the most powerful, and perhaps the only, means of interesting men in the welfare of their country which we still possess is to make them partakers in the government. at the present time civic zeal seems to me to be inseparable from the exercise of political rights; and i hold that the number of citizens will be found to augment or to decrease in europe in proportion as those rights are extended.

in the united states the inhabitants were thrown but as yesterday upon the soil which they now occupy, and they brought neither customs nor traditions with them there; they meet each other for the first time with no previous acquaintance; in short, the instinctive love of their country can scarcely exist in their minds; but everyone takes as zealous an interest in the affairs of his township, his county, and of the whole state, as if they were his own, because everyone, in his sphere, takes an active part in the government of society.

the lower orders in the united states are alive to the perception of the influence exercised by the general prosperity upon their own welfare; and simple as this observation is, it is one which is but too rarely made by the people. but in america the people regards this prosperity as the result of its own exertions; the citizen looks upon the fortune of the public as his private interest, and he co-operates in its success, not so much from a sense of pride or of duty, as from what i shall venture to term cupidity.

it is unnecessary to study the institutions and the history of the americans in order to discover the truth of this remark, for their manners render it sufficiently evident. as the american participates in all that is done in his country, he thinks himself obliged to defend whatever may be censured; for it is not only his country which is attacked upon these occasions, but it is himself. the consequence is, that his national pride resorts to a thousand artifices, and to all the petty tricks of individual vanity.

nothing is more embarrassing in the ordinary intercourse of life than this irritable patriotism of the americans. a stranger may be very well inclined to praise many of the institutions of their country, but he begs permission to blame some of the peculiarities which he observes—a permission which is, however, inexorably refused. america is therefore a free country, in which, lest anybody should be hurt by your remarks, you are not allowed to speak freely of private individuals, or of the state, of the citizens or of the authorities, of public or of private undertakings, or, in short, of anything at all, except it be of the climate and the soil; and even then americans will be found ready to defend either the one or the other, as if they had been contrived by the inhabitants of the country.

in our times option must be made between the patriotism of all and the government of a few; for the force and activity which the first confers are irreconcilable with the guarantees of tranquillity which the second furnishes.

notion of rights in the united states

no great people without a notion of rights—how the notion of rights can be given to people—respect of rights in the united states—whence it arises.

after the idea of virtue, i know no higher principle than that of right; or, to speak more accurately, these two ideas are commingled in one. the idea of right is simply that of virtue introduced into the political world. it is the idea of right which enabled men to define anarchy and tyranny; and which taught them to remain independent without arrogance, as well as to obey without servility. the man who submits to violence is debased by his compliance; but when he obeys the mandate of one who possesses that right of authority which he acknowledges in a fellow-creature, he rises in some measure above the person who delivers the command. there are no great men without virtue, and there are no great nations—it may almost be added that there would be no society—without the notion of rights; for what is the condition of a mass of rational and intelligent beings who are only united together by the bond of force?

i am persuaded that the only means which we possess at the present time of inculcating the notion of rights, and of rendering it, as it were, palpable to the senses, is to invest all the members of the community with the peaceful exercise of certain rights: this is very clearly seen in children, who are men without the strength and the experience of manhood. when a child begins to move in the midst of the objects which surround him, he is instinctively led to turn everything which he can lay his hands upon to his own purposes; he has no notion of the property of others; but as he gradually learns the value of things, and begins to perceive that he may in his turn be deprived of his possessions, he becomes more circumspect, and he observes those rights in others which he wishes to have respected in himself. the principle which the child derives from the possession of his toys is taught to the man by the objects which he may call his own. in america those complaints against property in general which are so frequent in europe are never heard, because in america there are no paupers; and as everyone has property of his own to defend, everyone recognizes the principle upon which he holds it.

the same thing occurs in the political world. in america the lowest classes have conceived a very high notion of political rights, because they exercise those rights; and they refrain from attacking those of other people, in order to ensure their own from attack. whilst in europe the same classes sometimes recalcitrate even against the supreme power, the american submits without a murmur to the authority of the pettiest magistrate.

this truth is exemplified by the most trivial details of national peculiarities. in france very few pleasures are exclusively reserved for the higher classes; the poor are admitted wherever the rich are received, and they consequently behave with propriety, and respect whatever contributes to the enjoyments in which they themselves participate. in england, where wealth has a monopoly of amusement as well as of power, complaints are made that whenever the poor happen to steal into the enclosures which are reserved for the pleasures of the rich, they commit acts of wanton mischief: can this be wondered at, since care has been taken that they should have nothing to lose? *b

b

[ [this, too, has been amended by much larger provisions for the amusements of the people in public parks, gardens, museums, etc.; and the conduct of the people in these places of amusement has improved in the same proportion.]]

the government of democracy brings the notion of political rights to the level of the humblest citizens, just as the dissemination of wealth brings the notion of property within the reach of all the members of the community; and i confess that, to my mind, this is one of its greatest advantages. i do not assert that it is easy to teach men to exercise political rights; but i maintain that, when it is possible, the effects which result from it are highly important; and i add that, if there ever was a time at which such an attempt ought to be made, that time is our own. it is clear that the influence of religious belief is shaken, and that the notion of divine rights is declining; it is evident that public morality is vitiated, and the notion of moral rights is also disappearing: these are general symptoms of the substitution of argument for faith, and of calculation for the impulses of sentiment. if, in the midst of this general disruption, you do not succeed in connecting the notion of rights with that of personal interest, which is the only immutable point in the human heart, what means will you have of governing the world except by fear? when i am told that, since the laws are weak and the populace is wild, since passions are excited and the authority of virtue is paralyzed, no measures must be taken to increase the rights of the democracy, i reply, that it is for these very reasons that some measures of the kind must be taken; and i am persuaded that governments are still more interested in taking them than society at large, because governments are liable to be destroyed and society cannot perish.

i am not, however, inclined to exaggerate the example which america furnishes. in those states the people are invested with political rights at a time when they could scarcely be abused, for the citizens were few in number and simple in their manners. as they have increased, the americans have not augmented the power of the democracy, but they have, if i may use the expression, extended its dominions. it cannot be doubted that the moment at which political rights are granted to a people that had before been without them is a very critical, though it be a necessary one. a child may kill before he is aware of the value of life; and he may deprive another person of his property before he is aware that his own may be taken away from him. the lower orders, when first they are invested with political rights, stand, in relation to those rights, in the same position as the child does to the whole of nature, and the celebrated adage may then be applied to them, homo puer robustus. this truth may even be perceived in america. the states in which the citizens have enjoyed their rights longest are those in which they make the best use of them.

it cannot be repeated too often that nothing is more fertile in prodigies than the art of being free; but there is nothing more arduous than the apprenticeship of liberty. such is not the case with despotic institutions: despotism often promises to make amends for a thousand previous ills; it supports the right, it protects the oppressed, and it maintains public order. the nation is lulled by the temporary prosperity which accrues to it, until it is roused to a sense of its own misery. liberty, on the contrary, is generally established in the midst of agitation, it is perfected by civil discord, and its benefits cannot be appreciated until it is already old.