this cause of inferiority results from the nature of things, but it is not the only one; the second in importance is as follows: sovereignty may be defined to be the right of making laws: in france, the king really exercises a portion of the sovereign power, since the laws have no weight till he has given his assent to them; he is, moreover, the executor of all they ordain. the president is also the executor of the laws, but he does not really co-operate in their formation, since the refusal of his assent does not annul them. he is therefore merely to be considered as the agent of the sovereign power. but not only does the king of france exercise a portion of the sovereign power, he also contributes to the nomination of the legislature, which exercises the other portion. he has the privilege of appointing the members of one chamber, and of dissolving the other at his pleasure; whereas the president of the united states has no share in the formation of the legislative body, and cannot dissolve any part of it. the king has the same right of bringing forward measures as the chambers; a right which the president does not possess. the king is represented in each assembly by his ministers, who explain his intentions, support his opinions, and maintain the principles of the government. the president and his ministers are alike excluded from congress; so that his influence and his opinions can only penetrate indirectly into that great body. the king of france is therefore on an equal footing with the legislature, which can no more act without him than he can without it. the president exercises an authority inferior to, and depending upon, that of the legislature.

even in the exercise of the executive power, properly so called—the point upon which his position seems to be most analogous to that of the king of france—the president labors under several causes of inferiority. the authority of the king, in france, has, in the first place, the advantage of duration over that of the president, and durability is one of the chief elements of strength; nothing is either loved or feared but what is likely to endure. the president of the united states is a magistrate elected for four years; the king, in france, is an hereditary sovereign. in the exercise of the executive power the president of the united states is constantly subject to a jealous scrutiny. he may make, but he cannot conclude, a treaty; he may designate, but he cannot appoint, a public officer. *q the king of france is absolute within the limits of his authority. the president of the united states is responsible for his actions; but the person of the king is declared inviolable by the french charter. *r

q

[ the constitution had left it doubtful whether the president was obliged to consult the senate in the removal as well as in the appointment of federal officers. "the federalist" (no. 77) seemed to establish the affirmative; but in 1789 congress formally decided that, as the president was responsible for his actions, he ought not to be forced to employ agents who had forfeited his esteem. see kent's "commentaries", vol. i. p. 289.]

r

[ [this comparison applied to the constitutional king of france and to the powers he held under the charter of 1830, till the overthrow of the monarchy in 1848.—translator's note.]]

nevertheless, the supremacy of public opinion is no less above the head of the one than of the other. this power is less definite, less evident, and less sanctioned by the laws in france than in america, but in fact it exists. in america, it acts by elections and decrees; in france it proceeds by revolutions; but notwithstanding the different constitutions of these two countries, public opinion is the predominant authority in both of them. the fundamental principle of legislation—a principle essentially republican—is the same in both countries, although its consequences may be different, and its results more or less extensive. whence i am led to conclude that france with its king is nearer akin to a republic than the union with its president is to a monarchy.

in what i have been saying i have only touched upon the main points of distinction; and if i could have entered into details, the contrast would have been rendered still more striking. i have remarked that the authority of the president in the united states is only exercised within the limits of a partial sovereignty, whilst that of the king in france is undivided. i might have gone on to show that the power of the king's government in france exceeds its natural limits, however extensive they may be, and penetrates in a thousand different ways into the administration of private interests. amongst the examples of this influence may be quoted that which results from the great number of public functionaries, who all derive their appointments from the government. this number now exceeds all previous limits; it amounts to 138,000 *s nominations, each of which may be considered as an element of power. the president of the united states has not the exclusive right of making any public appointments, and their whole number scarcely exceeds 12,000. *t

s

[ the sums annually paid by the state to these officers amount to 200,000,000 fr. ($40,000,000).]

t

[ this number is extracted from the "national calendar" for 1833. the "national calendar" is an american almanac which contains the names of all the federal officers. it results from this comparison that the king of france has eleven times as many places at his disposal as the president, although the population of france is not much more than double that of the union.

[i have not the means of ascertaining the number of appointments now at the disposal of the president of the united states, but his patronage and the abuse of it have largely increased since 1833.—translator's note, 1875.]]

accidental causes which may increase the influence of the executive government

external security of the union—army of six thousand men—few ships—the president has no opportunity of exercising his great prerogatives—in the prerogatives he exercises he is weak.

if the executive government is feebler in america than in france, the cause is more attributable to the circumstances than to the laws of the country.

it is chiefly in its foreign relations that the executive power of a nation is called upon to exert its skill and its vigor. if the existence of the union were perpetually threatened, and if its chief interests were in daily connection with those of other powerful nations, the executive government would assume an increased importance in proportion to the measures expected of it, and those which it would carry into effect. the president of the united states is the commander-in-chief of the army, but of an army composed of only six thousand men; he commands the fleet, but the fleet reckons but few sail; he conducts the foreign relations of the union, but the united states are a nation without neighbors. separated from the rest of the world by the ocean, and too weak as yet to aim at the dominion of the seas, they have no enemies, and their interests rarely come into contact with those of any other nation of the globe.

the practical part of a government must not be judged by the theory of its constitution. the president of the united states is in the possession of almost royal prerogatives, which he has no opportunity of exercising; and those privileges which he can at present use are very circumscribed. the laws allow him to possess a degree of influence which circumstances do not permit him to employ.

on the other hand, the great strength of the royal prerogative in france arises from circumstances far more than from the laws. there the executive government is constantly struggling against prodigious obstacles, and exerting all its energies to repress them; so that it increases by the extent of its achievements, and by the importance of the events it controls, without modifying its constitution. if the laws had made it as feeble and as circumscribed as it is in the union, its influence would very soon become still more preponderant.

why the president of the united states does not require the majority of the two houses in order to carry on the government it is an established axiom in europe that a constitutional king cannot persevere in a system of government which is opposed by the two other branches of the legislature. but several presidents of the united states have been known to lose the majority in the legislative body without being obliged to abandon the supreme power, and without inflicting a serious evil upon society. i have heard this fact quoted as an instance of the independence and the power of the executive government in america: a moment's reflection will convince us, on the contrary, that it is a proof of its extreme weakness.

a king in europe requires the support of the legislature to enable him to perform the duties imposed upon him by the constitution, because those duties are enormous. a constitutional king in europe is not merely the executor of the law, but the execution of its provisions devolves so completely upon him that he has the power of paralyzing its influence if it opposes his designs. he requires the assistance of the legislative assemblies to make the law, but those assemblies stand in need of his aid to execute it: these two authorities cannot subsist without each other, and the mechanism of government is stopped as soon as they are at variance.

in america the president cannot prevent any law from being passed, nor can he evade the obligation of enforcing it. his sincere and zealous co-operation is no doubt useful, but it is not indispensable, in the carrying on of public affairs. all his important acts are directly or indirectly submitted to the legislature, and of his own free authority he can do but little. it is therefore his weakness, and not his power, which enables him to remain in opposition to congress. in europe, harmony must reign between the crown and the other branches of the legislature, because a collision between them may prove serious; in america, this harmony is not indispensable, because such a collision is impossible.

election of the president

dangers of the elective system increase in proportion to the extent of the prerogative—this system possible in america because no powerful executive authority is required—what circumstances are favorable to the elective system—why the election of the president does not cause a deviation from the principles of the government—influence of the election of the president on secondary functionaries.

the dangers of the system of election applied to the head of the executive government of a great people have been sufficiently exemplified by experience and by history, and the remarks i am about to make refer to america alone. these dangers may be more or less formidable in proportion to the place which the executive power occupies, and to the importance it possesses in the state; and they may vary according to the mode of election and the circumstances in which the electors are placed. the most weighty argument against the election of a chief magistrate is, that it offers so splendid a lure to private ambition, and is so apt to inflame men in the pursuit of power, that when legitimate means are wanting force may not unfrequently seize what right denied.

it is clear that the greater the privileges of the executive authority are, the greater is the temptation; the more the ambition of the candidates is excited, the more warmly are their interests espoused by a throng of partisans who hope to share the power when their patron has won the prize. the dangers of the elective system increase, therefore, in the exact ratio of the influence exercised by the executive power in the affairs of state. the revolutions of poland were not solely attributable to the elective system in general, but to the fact that the elected monarch was the sovereign of a powerful kingdom. before we can discuss the absolute advantages of the elective system we must make preliminary inquiries as to whether the geographical position, the laws, the habits, the manners, and the opinions of the people amongst whom it is to be introduced will admit of the establishment of a weak and dependent executive government; for to attempt to render the representative of the state a powerful sovereign, and at the same time elective, is, in my opinion, to entertain two incompatible designs. to reduce hereditary royalty to the condition of an elective authority, the only means that i am acquainted with are to circumscribe its sphere of action beforehand, gradually to diminish its prerogatives, and to accustom the people to live without its protection. nothing, however, is further from the designs of the republicans of europe than this course: as many of them owe their hatred of tyranny to the sufferings which they have personally undergone, it is oppression, and not the extent of the executive power, which excites their hostility, and they attack the former without perceiving how nearly it is connected with the latter.

hitherto no citizen has shown any disposition to expose his honor and his life in order to become the president of the united states; because the power of that office is temporary, limited, and subordinate. the prize of fortune must be great to encourage adventurers in so desperate a game. no candidate has as yet been able to arouse the dangerous enthusiasm or the passionate sympathies of the people in his favor, for the very simple reason that when he is at the head of the government he has but little power, but little wealth, and but little glory to share amongst his friends; and his influence in the state is too small for the success or the ruin of a faction to depend upon the elevation of an individual to power.

the great advantage of hereditary monarchies is, that as the private interest of a family is always intimately connected with the interests of the state, the executive government is never suspended for a single instant; and if the affairs of a monarchy are not better conducted than those of a republic, at least there is always some one to conduct them, well or ill, according to his capacity. in elective states, on the contrary, the wheels of government cease to act, as it were, of their own accord at the approach of an election, and even for some time previous to that event. the laws may indeed accelerate the operation of the election, which may be conducted with such simplicity and rapidity that the seat of power will never be left vacant; but, notwithstanding these precautions, a break necessarily occurs in the minds of the people.

at the approach of an election the head of the executive government is wholly occupied by the coming struggle; his future plans are doubtful; he can undertake nothing new, and the he will only prosecute with indifference those designs which another will perhaps terminate. "i am so near the time of my retirement from office," said president jefferson on the 21st of january, 1809 (six weeks before the election), "that i feel no passion, i take no part, i express no sentiment. it appears to me just to leave to my successor the commencement of those measures which he will have to prosecute, and for which he will be responsible."

on the other hand, the eyes of the nation are centred on a single point; all are watching the gradual birth of so important an event. the wider the influence of the executive power extends, the greater and the more necessary is its constant action, the more fatal is the term of suspense; and a nation which is accustomed to the government, or, still more, one used to the administrative protection of a powerful executive authority would be infallibly convulsed by an election of this kind. in the united states the action of the government may be slackened with impunity, because it is always weak and circumscribed. *u

u

[ [this, however, may be a great danger. the period during which mr. buchanan retained office, after the election of mr. lincoln, from november, 1860, to march, 1861, was that which enabled the seceding states of the south to complete their preparations for the civil war, and the executive government was paralyzed. no greater evil could befall a nation.—translator's note.]]

one of the principal vices of the elective system is that it always introduces a certain degree of instability into the internal and external policy of the state. but this disadvantage is less sensibly felt if the share of power vested in the elected magistrate is small. in rome the principles of the government underwent no variation, although the consuls were changed every year, because the senate, which was an hereditary assembly, possessed the directing authority. if the elective system were adopted in europe, the condition of most of the monarchical states would be changed at every new election. in america the president exercises a certain influence on state affairs, but he does not conduct them; the preponderating power is vested in the representatives of the whole nation. the political maxims of the country depend therefore on the mass of the people, not on the president alone; and consequently in america the elective system has no very prejudicial influence on the fixed principles of the government. but the want of fixed principles is an evil so inherent in the elective system that it is still extremely perceptible in the narrow sphere to which the authority of the president extends.

the americans have admitted that the head of the executive power, who has to bear the whole responsibility of the duties he is called upon to fulfil, ought to be empowered to choose his own agents, and to remove them at pleasure: the legislative bodies watch the conduct of the president more than they direct it. the consequence of this arrangement is, that at every new election the fate of all the federal public officers is in suspense. mr. quincy adams, on his entry into office, discharged the majority of the individuals who had been appointed by his predecessor: and i am not aware that general jackson allowed a single removable functionary employed in the federal service to retain his place beyond the first year which succeeded his election. it is sometimes made a subject of complaint that in the constitutional monarchies of europe the fate of the humbler servants of an administration depends upon that of the ministers. but in elective governments this evil is far greater. in a constitutional monarchy successive ministries are rapidly formed; but as the principal representative of the executive power does not change, the spirit of innovation is kept within bounds; the changes which take place are in the details rather than in the principles of the administrative system; but to substitute one system for another, as is done in america every four years, by law, is to cause a sort of revolution. as to the misfortunes which may fall upon individuals in consequence of this state of things, it must be allowed that the uncertain situation of the public officers is less fraught with evil consequences in america than elsewhere. it is so easy to acquire an independent position in the united states that the public officer who loses his place may be deprived of the comforts of life, but not of the means of subsistence.

i remarked at the beginning of this chapter that the dangers of the elective system applied to the head of the state are augmented or decreased by the peculiar circumstances of the people which adopts it. however the functions of the executive power may be restricted, it must always exercise a great influence upon the foreign policy of the country, for a negotiation cannot be opened or successfully carried on otherwise than by a single agent. the more precarious and the more perilous the position of a people becomes, the more absolute is the want of a fixed and consistent external policy, and the more dangerous does the elective system of the chief magistrate become. the policy of the americans in relation to the whole world is exceedingly simple; for it may almost be said that no country stands in need of them, nor do they require the co-operation of any other people. their independence is never threatened. in their present condition, therefore, the functions of the executive power are no less limited by circumstances than by the laws; and the president may frequently change his line of policy without involving the state in difficulty or destruction.

whatever the prerogatives of the executive power may be, the period which immediately precedes an election and the moment of its duration must always be considered as a national crisis, which is perilous in proportion to the internal embarrassments and the external dangers of the country. few of the nations of europe could escape the calamities of anarchy or of conquest every time they might have to elect a new sovereign. in america society is so constituted that it can stand without assistance upon its own basis; nothing is to be feared from the pressure of external dangers, and the election of the president is a cause of agitation, but not of ruin.

mode of election

skill of the american legislators shown in the mode of election adopted by them—creation of a special electoral body—separate votes of these electors—case in which the house of representatives is called upon to choose the president—results of the twelve elections which have taken place since the constitution has been established.

besides the dangers which are inherent in the system, many other difficulties may arise from the mode of election, which may be obviated by the precaution of the legislator. when a people met in arms on some public spot to choose its head, it was exposed to all the chances of civil war resulting from so martial a mode of proceeding, besides the dangers of the elective system in itself. the polish laws, which subjected the election of the sovereign to the veto of a single individual, suggested the murder of that individual or prepared the way to anarchy.

in the examination of the institutions and the political as well as social condition of the united states, we are struck by the admirable harmony of the gifts of fortune and the efforts of man. the nation possessed two of the main causes of internal peace; it was a new country, but it was inhabited by a people grown old in the exercise of freedom. america had no hostile neighbors to dread; and the american legislators, profiting by these favorable circumstances, created a weak and subordinate executive power which could without danger be made elective.

it then only remained for them to choose the least dangerous of the various modes of election; and the rules which they laid down upon this point admirably correspond to the securities which the physical and political constitution of the country already afforded. their object was to find the mode of election which would best express the choice of the people with the least possible excitement and suspense. it was admitted in the first place that the simple majority should be decisive; but the difficulty was to obtain this majority without an interval of delay which it was most important to avoid. it rarely happens that an individual can at once collect the majority of the suffrages of a great people; and this difficulty is enhanced in a republic of confederate states, where local influences are apt to preponderate. the means by which it was proposed to obviate this second obstacle was to delegate the electoral powers of the nation to a body of representatives. this mode of election rendered a majority more probable; for the fewer the electors are, the greater is the chance of their coming to a final decision. it also offered an additional probability of a judicious choice. it then remained to be decided whether this right of election was to be entrusted to a legislative body, the habitual representative assembly of the nation, or whether an electoral assembly should be formed for the express purpose of proceeding to the nomination of a president. the americans chose the latter alternative, from a belief that the individuals who were returned to make the laws were incompetent to represent the wishes of the nation in the election of its chief magistrate; and that, as they are chosen for more than a year, the constituency they represent might have changed its opinion in that time. it was thought that if the legislature was empowered to elect the head of the executive power, its members would, for some time before the election, be exposed to the manoeuvres of corruption and the tricks of intrigue; whereas the special electors would, like a jury, remain mixed up with the crowd till the day of action, when they would appear for the sole purpose of giving their votes.

it was therefore established that every state should name a certain number of electors, *v who in their turn should elect the president; and as it had been observed that the assemblies to which the choice of a chief magistrate had been entrusted in elective countries inevitably became the centres of passion and of cabal; that they sometimes usurped an authority which did not belong to them; and that their proceedings, or the uncertainty which resulted from them, were sometimes prolonged so much as to endanger the welfare of the state, it was determined that the electors should all vote upon the same day, without being convoked to the same place. *w this double election rendered a majority probable, though not certain; for it was possible that as many differences might exist between the electors as between their constituents. in this case it was necessary to have recourse to one of three measures; either to appoint new electors, or to consult a second time those already appointed, or to defer the election to another authority. the first two of these alternatives, independently of the uncertainty of their results, were likely to delay the final decision, and to perpetuate an agitation which must always be accompanied with danger. the third expedient was therefore adopted, and it was agreed that the votes should be transmitted sealed to the president of the senate, and that they should be opened and counted in the presence of the senate and the house of representatives. if none of the candidates has a majority, the house of representatives then proceeds immediately to elect a president, but with the condition that it must fix upon one of the three candidates who have the highest numbers. *x

v

[ as many as it sends members to congress. the number of electors at the election of 1833 was 288. (see "the national calendar," 1833.)]

w

[ the electors of the same state assemble, but they transmit to the central government the list of their individual votes, and not the mere result of the vote of the majority.] [footnote x: in this case it is the majority of the states, and not the majority of the members, which decides the question; so that new york has not more influence in the debate than rhode island. thus the citizens of the union are first consulted as members of one and the same community; and, if they cannot agree, recourse is had to the division of the states, each of which has a separate and independent vote. this is one of the singularities of the federal constitution which can only be explained by the jar of conflicting interests.]

thus it is only in case of an event which cannot often happen, and which can never be foreseen, that the election is entrusted to the ordinary representatives of the nation; and even then they are obliged to choose a citizen who has already been designated by a powerful minority of the special electors. it is by this happy expedient that the respect which is due to the popular voice is combined with the utmost celerity of execution and those precautions which the peace of the country demands. but the decision of the question by the house of representatives does not necessarily offer an immediate solution of the difficulty, for the majority of that assembly may still be doubtful, and in this case the constitution prescribes no remedy. nevertheless, by restricting the number of candidates to three, and by referring the matter to the judgment of an enlightened public body, it has smoothed all the obstacles *y which are not inherent in the elective system.

y

[ jefferson, in 1801, was not elected until the thirty-sixth time of balloting.]

in the forty-four years which have elapsed since the promulgation of the federal constitution the united states have twelve times chosen a president. ten of these elections took place simultaneously by the votes of the special electors in the different states. the house of representatives has only twice exercised its conditional privilege of deciding in cases of uncertainty; the first time was at the election of mr. jefferson in 1801; the second was in 1825, when mr. quincy adams was named. *z

z

[ [general grant is now (1874) the eighteenth president of the united states.]]

crises of the election

the election may be considered as a national crisis—why?—passions of the people—anxiety of the president—calm which succeeds the agitation of the election.

i have shown what the circumstances are which favored the adoption of the elective system in the united states, and what precautions were taken by the legislators to obviate its dangers. the americans are habitually accustomed to all kinds of elections, and they know by experience the utmost degree of excitement which is compatible with security. the vast extent of the country and the dissemination of the inhabitants render a collision between parties less probable and less dangerous there than elsewhere. the political circumstances under which the elections have hitherto been carried on have presented no real embarrassments to the nation.

nevertheless, the epoch of the election of a president of the united states may be considered as a crisis in the affairs of the nation. the influence which he exercises on public business is no doubt feeble and indirect; but the choice of the president, which is of small importance to each individual citizen, concerns the citizens collectively; and however trifling an interest may be, it assumes a great degree of importance as soon as it becomes general. the president possesses but few means of rewarding his supporters in comparison to the kings of europe, but the places which are at his disposal are sufficiently numerous to interest, directly or indirectly, several thousand electors in his success. political parties in the united states are led to rally round an individual, in order to acquire a more tangible shape in the eyes of the crowd, and the name of the candidate for the presidency is put forward as the symbol and personification of their theories. for these reasons parties are strongly interested in gaining the election, not so much with a view to the triumph of their principles under the auspices of the president-elect as to show by the majority which returned him, the strength of the supporters of those principles.

for a long while before the appointed time is at hand the election becomes the most important and the all-engrossing topic of discussion. the ardor of faction is redoubled; and all the artificial passions which the imagination can create in the bosom of a happy and peaceful land are agitated and brought to light. the president, on the other hand, is absorbed by the cares of self-defence. he no longer governs for the interest of the state, but for that of his re-election; he does homage to the majority, and instead of checking its passions, as his duty commands him to do, he frequently courts its worst caprices. as the election draws near, the activity of intrigue and the agitation of the populace increase; the citizens are divided into hostile camps, each of which assumes the name of its favorite candidate; the whole nation glows with feverish excitement; the election is the daily theme of the public papers, the subject of private conversation, the end of every thought and every action, the sole interest of the present. as soon as the choice is determined, this ardor is dispelled; and as a calmer season returns, the current of the state, which had nearly broken its banks, sinks to its usual level: *a but who can refrain from astonishment at the causes of the storm.

a

[ [not always. the election of president lincoln was the signal of civil war.—translator's note.]]