from the beginning of the boer war to the battle of modder river

(1899)

“she stands alone: ally nor friend has she,”

saith europe of our england—her who bore

drake, blake, and nelson—warrior-queen who wore

light’s conquering glaive that strikes the conquered free.

alone?—from canada comes o’er the sea,

and from that english coast with coral shore,

the old-world cry europe hath heard of yore

from dover cliffs: “ready, aye ready we!”

“europe,” saith england, “hath forgot my boys!—

forgot how tall, in yonder golden zone

‘neath austral skies, my youngest born have grown

(bearers of bayonets now and swords for toys)—

forgot ‘mid boltless thunder—harmless noise—

the sons with whom old england ‘stands alone’!”

theodore watts-dunton.

in an earlier chapter we have seen how the humiliating defeat of majuba left the boers in possession of the transvaal. since that event many things had happened. the discovery of gold had brought great numbers of people into the boer territories; the rivalry between the britisher and the dutchman grew fiercer and fiercer year by year, till eventually there was this curious situation—that a comparatively small body of boers ruled with the utmost severity, and taxed with the greatest heaviness a very large population of englishmen. the government at pretoria was as corrupt as a south american republic; it was determined to embarrass in every way the newcomers who came under its authority, and this constant friction was one of the main causes that were to bring about one of the most critical, most costly, and most humiliating wars in which we have ever taken part.

the troubles of the uitlanders, as they were called, reached a head when dr. jameson, supported by a few hundred men, crossed the transvaal border on december 29, 1895. it will probably never be known how wide was the conspiracy which inspired this futile raid, but we find it difficult to believe that so small a body of men could have hoped to achieve anything by themselves. in all likelihood the scheme was premature, at any rate dr. jameson and his men were rounded up and forced to surrender. the british government was not in a position to defend jameson, while kruger threatened that if the uitlanders, who, of course, were sympathetic with the raid, rose in rebellion, he would not hesitate to shoot their leader. instead of doing the boer government any damage, the unfortunate uitlanders had played into kruger’s hands. it was impossible to deny that he had been attacked in an unwarrantable and illegal fashion, but when he acted with apparent leniency he was merely playing a cunning part. he stated—and it sounded quite reasonable under the circumstances—that it would be impossible to give the uitlanders the vote after such a conspiracy had been on foot.

the raid made things awkward all round. for some time england had learnt with anxiety that arms were being freely imported into the transvaal. after the raid it was impossible to make any expostulation, and from now onwards until the war the uitlanders—like the israelites of old—groaned under kruger. their plight was indeed a very hapless one. they had attempted by great patience and industry, and without protesting unduly when the boers grew rich upon their labours, to win some legal recognition, and had failed. they had then planned for a rising with a view to winning their own freedom by their own arms. this, too, had failed. finally, they had so embarrassed the mother-country that she could do nothing to help them. at last they decided that they would openly petition the queen, and in a moment the whole quarrel was lifted from pretoria to the throne of england. a conference took place between sir alfred milner and president kruger at bloemfontein on may 30, 1899. it is doubtful whether the boer president desired that any agreement should be come to; it is more probable that he was playing for time—at any rate no conclusion was reached, and later on sir alfred milner brought it home, perhaps for the first time, to england that she must take action. “the case for intervention,” he said, “is overwhelming, the only attempted answer is that things will right themselves if left alone. but, in fact, the policy of leaving things alone has been tried for years, and it has led to their going from bad to worse. it is not true that this is owing to the raid. they were going from bad to worse before the raid. we were on the verge of war before the raid, and the transvaal was on the verge of revolution....”[9]

still, the british government struggled to maintain peace, and to come to some amicable arrangement. but the boers, like the amir of afghanistan, did not believe england would ever face trouble. they were also contemptuous of the british soldier.

to-day, when the long conspiracy of prussia is admitted by the most unsuspicious person, it can be recalled that, without question, the boer government was in touch with germany, and that not only cases of rifles passed into pretoria and johannesburg, but that krupp guns, outranging our own artillery, were shortly to create the first of many surprises in that surprising war. the sympathies of europe were entirely with the boers, and, doubtless, kruger had been advised from berlin. many germans took part in the campaign, and it was in certain measure to their expert knowledge that the boer artillery was so well manned. beyond that the boers could fully hold their own. botha, joubert, and de wet were in their several capacities brilliant strategists and resourceful leaders. the burghers were well armed, well mounted, exceedingly courageous, and inspired by the deepest hatred for the british. the british, on the other hand, were very ignorant regarding the boer, greatly under-estimated the numbers they could put in the field, had no expert knowledge regarding the country or manner of the fighting there, and could not persuade themselves that this was anything but a kind of punitive expedition. by this time, with so many campaigns behind us, some judgment can be formed upon the british army, not only the highland regiments with whom we have dealt in particular, but those english line regiments and cavalry, whose prestige and courage have won a hundred victories. yet were these to suffer amazing disasters in south africa. the war was indeed to prove the graveyard of many hopes and many reputations. looking back at it now, after the interval of many years, and when the greatest war has shown that the british army is as invincible as ever it was, we can only come to the conclusion that the generalship in south africa had for a season fallen altogether into decay. the days of the crimea and the mutiny were long past; roberts and wolseley were old men; kitchener, the most competent organiser of the younger generation, was still engaged with his great work in egypt, while a kind of dry-rot seems to have come over the generation that lay between. the ultimate good of the south african war was that it cut this dry-rot clean away; but the story of the war is one of great courage and endurance struggling against the grossest incompetence.

the boer government kept the negotiations running until the falling of the rain. with the rain the grass sprouted, the veldt was no longer like a desert, and the days for campaigning were nigh. for many months kruger had been preparing for the conflict, while the british government were so deep in the political negotiations that they thought of nothing else. the boers could place 50,000 burghers, together with their heavy artillery, in the field, while the british forces in south africa were a mere handful. troops were despatched from india, including the 2nd gordon highlanders, and these arrived at the end of september, bringing the number of the british army in south africa to 22,000.

on october 9, 1899, president kruger issued his ultimatum, and within forty-eight hours the boer war had commenced. on october 12 the boer forces were on the march, 12,000 of them, with two batteries of eight krupp guns each, setting out from the north. from the transvaal came another commando accompanied by a number of germans, armed with heavy guns, and led by joubert.

the british forces under the command of sir george white and general penn symons were concentrated at ladysmith. this position was not a strong one, and should really have been vacated, but it was quite unsuspected that the boer artillery was as powerful as to include 6-inch creusot guns. to ladysmith came the gordon highlanders, who eventually were to undergo the famous siege under their old officer. some 4000 britishers there were to meet the advancing boers, who came “winding in and out between the hills as far as eye could reach, the long black string of horsemen stretched like an enormous serpent, with head and tail lost in space.” in this manner the boers entered natal, and on the 12th of october came into touch with the british under general penn symons. general symons was a man of the greatest courage, and with the utmost confidence and pride in his men. he awaited the arrival of the boers at talana hill, where, with the breaking of the dawn the black figures of the enemy were first seen against the sky-line, and the opening action of the long war commenced.

it was evident at once that the boer artillery would make our position untenable, and while our guns were endeavouring to gain a mastery over those of the enemy, the infantry were sent up the front of the hill under a very severe fire. general symons was one of the first to fall. to the last he encouraged his men, and throughout he had refused to take the smallest care for his own safety.

this first conflict, which does not really concern us in this book, was of no strategic value, and resulted in a heavy loss of men, though it was in a sense a success, since the boers were driven back from talana hill. but it was the first indication that in a country like south africa the storming of one hill in a land of hills without any definite strategic gain is simply bad generalship.

in the meantime, general french, already recognised as our most brilliant cavalry leader, had set out towards elandslaagte. coming to the conclusion that the numbers of the enemy were too strong, he communicated with ladysmith that he must have reinforcements. in a very short time the devons, the lancers, with the gordons and some artillery united with his forces, and advanced towards the boer position upon a group of hills overlooking elandslaagte station. the artillery opened the engagement, and succeeded in silencing the enemy’s guns. the boers, whose memories were fresh with the strange spectacle of an untrenched foe at majuba, also received a surprise in this war, so full of surprises. to their great dissatisfaction the manchesters and the gordons, dressed in undistinguishable khaki, advanced under cover, the only colour visible being the kilt of the gordons, which they had refused to discard.

the boer guns, worked by colonel schiel, a german, with eighty german gunners under him, opened fire with practised skill and accuracy. the boer mausers picked off the advancing british infantry, wounding, amongst others, the colonel of the gordons. suddenly a storm burst over the conflict, a deluge of rain beat upon the faces of the advancing troops, the whistle of bullets sang in their ears, and men were falling rapidly. having lost their colonel, the gordons hesitated when within charging distance of the enemy. at that, captain meiklejohn—who was to end his life so heroically in hyde park—rushed to the front, calling upon the highlanders to follow him. for this action meiklejohn lost one arm, but received the victoria cross. the victory was as good as won. “dark figures sprang up from the rocks in front. some held up their rifles in token of surrender. some ran with heads sunk between their shoulders, jumping and ducking among the rocks. the panting, breathless climbers were on the edge of the plateau. there were the two guns which had flashed so brightly, silenced now, with a litter of dead gunners around them, and one wounded officer standing by a trail. it was the famous schiel, the german artillerist. a small body of the boers still resisted. their appearance horrified some of our men. ‘they were dressed in black frock-coats, and looked like a lot of rather seedy business men,’ said a spectator. ‘it seemed like murder to kill them.’ some surrendered, and some fought to the death where they stood.”[10]

hardly had the ridge been taken and the highlanders had flung themselves down, utterly exhausted, from the long advance and the final charge with the bayonet, when a number of boers rushed from a place of concealment and opened fire upon the gordons. it was a moment of dire peril. men dropped on every side, and things were instantly critical, when sergeant-major robertson rallied the battalion and carried the boer position, winning the victoria cross for his gallantry.

next day the gordons returned to ladysmith, where they were to experience a four months’ siege.

things moved quickly after this. on october 30 was the battle of nicholson’s nek; on november 2 the last train left ladysmith. leaving for a while the battalion of the gordons to take their part in the defence of ladysmith, we will follow the highland brigade in their advance upon kimberley.

the opening of the war caused the greatest gratification to all well-wishers of the enemy and a certain amount of despondency at home. on the continent there was the wildest delight that the boer army was carrying everything before them. few nations, apart from america, italy, denmark, and greece, were able to conceal their elation that at last england was likely to pass through her hour of bitter humiliation. after a fortnight, in which five actions had taken place, we had lost a quarter of natal, a great stretch of railway, and saw our troops besieged or on the eve of being besieged in ladysmith, kimberley, and mafeking. the situation could not be regarded as anything but critical. at the same time reinforcements were being hurried out, and should these various positions resist the boer attacks there was no reason to suppose that the ultimate victory was far off. on november 12 lord methuen had reached the orange river, and, accompanied by a well-equipped force—though not a large one in number—he set out towards kimberley, where he found the boers in possession of belmont. the first action has been described by sir arthur conan doyle as “an alma on a small scale.” the british troops took the hill by storm, driving the enemy from their position at the point of the bayonet. but the unfortunate culmination to the majority of these early actions was that the boers bolted to their ponies and galloped away, and owing to our lack of cavalry it was never possible to turn a retreat into a rout. lord methuen repeated this success two days later at graspan, and on the 28th fought the battle of modder river, in which the argyll and sutherland highlanders arrived in time to take a part. having driven the boer before him on two occasions within four days, lord methuen was under the impression that the farmers had lost heart and would no longer put up a formidable resistance.

on the 28th began the advance on modder river, upon whose banks general cronje was entrenched. cronje was a man of considerable strength of character, a skilful general after the boer tactics, trusted implicitly by his men, and in command of a strong and formidable commando. so far the british had met the enemy entirely in hill country; it had become a kind of dream amongst the british soldiers that if they could only catch the boer in a plain the effect of discipline and bravery would teach the enemy a severe lesson. there was a certain amount of truth in this belief, and when the boers did eventually come in sharp contact with the lancers it was a bitter enough experience for them.

unhappily no precautions appear to have been taken to ascertain either the strength of the enemy’s position or the best mode of attack. for some reason or another, probably owing to an under-estimation of cronje’s position, the men were not even permitted to breakfast before the march began, and so on a beautiful morning they set out towards the undulating plain that lay upon the other side of the river.

cronje had laid his plans with the utmost care and assurance, placing his men on both sides of the river, entrenching them upon the sloping ground, and concealing his artillery. the question has been raised—and sir arthur conan doyle raised it again—why the river should have been crossed at that particular point; also why the british forces should have been led over an open plain without any attempt at reconnaissance? such problems as these, however, might be multiplied to little purpose throughout the earlier part of the south african campaign. perhaps the briefest answer to them would be that it was just because of such incidents as these that the country was eventually to plead with its oldest soldier to take over the command. now that we have tested the lessons that south africa taught us, the humiliation has passed into thankfulness that they came in time.

cronje simply waited until the british were within range of his fire, and then very suddenly opened a tornado of bullet and shell fire at a range of seven hundred and fifty yards. one moment, and in front of them had lain an apparently peaceful landscape, a few houses and farms sleeping under the morning sun; the next, and the whole horizon was blazing with death. it was fatal to advance; the cavalry could do nothing, while the infantry were dependent upon the guns to gain the superiority. at this critical moment one of the most dramatic incidents in the war occurred. out of the unknown, with staggering horses and guns caked with mud, lumbered up the 62nd field battery, which had covered thirty-two miles in less than twenty-four hours. it was a providential piece of good fortune.

throughout the long day the infantry lay under the broiling sun, just as the remnants of the highland brigade were to endure it not very long after. the artillery engagement wore on, the heat passed, and as night came the british were gaining the advantage. all day they had been without food. at last, in the late afternoon, the north lancashires managed to get across the river and take up a position on the extreme left, where they were joined by the coldstreams and the argyll and sutherlands. the action was turning against the boers. with this desperate little force on their flank, and the artillery shattering their guns on the front, they took advantage of the night to evacuate their trenches and retreat. it had indeed been a costly action, and might have been a humiliating defeat. what perhaps it was more than anything else was a proof of british bravery under the most dismal conditions.

lord methuen remained upon the modder river until he was joined by the highland brigade, composed of the 2nd seaforths, the highland light infantry, the 1st gordons fresh from dargai, and the 2nd black watch, with whom was major-general andrew wauchope. wauchope had seen service in the soudan, and was one of the best-beloved officers in the history of the highland regiments.

a spectator has written: “watching the arrival of the highland brigade, very magnificent they looked as they swung into camp, pipers strutting before them, kilts swish-swishing, all in perfect order and perfect step—the finest troops in the world.”

the boers, having fallen back from the modder river, halted at magersfontein, a circle of hills which cronje endeavoured—with what success we shall see—to render impregnable. it was the next step towards kimberley, and on saturday, december 9, lord methuen despatched one of the most critical and forlorn expeditions in our history, and the most tragic in the story of the highland regiments.