from el-teb to omdurman

(1884-1898)

vain is the dream! however hope may rave,

he perished with the folk he could not save.

and though none surely told us he is dead,

and though perchance another in his stead,

another, not less brave, when all was done,

had fled unto the southward and the sun,

had urged a way by force, or won by guile

to streams remotest of the secret nile,

had raised an army of the desert men,

and, waiting for his hour, had turned again

and fallen on that false prophet, yet we know

gordon is dead, and these things are not so!

nay, not for england’s cause, nor to restore

her trampled flag—for he loved honour more—

nay, not for life, revenge, or victory,

would he have fled, whose hour had dawned to die.

the white pasha, andrew lang.

considerably before the events of the last chapter, sir samuel baker, the english explorer, had travelled through the unknown regions of the upper nile, and found that the country was almost entirely devoted to the slave-trade. an effort was made to improve conditions there. the khedive for a time asserted his authority over these regions, two englishmen being appointed in succession as his governors, the first sir samuel baker himself, and the second charles gordon. for many years gordon, who had come fresh from china, struggled to free the natives from the slave-traders, but his labours were rendered useless by the accession of a worthless khedive. shortly afterwards he returned to england, and the soudan relapsed into its old corruption. then, in 1882, appeared one of those strange dramatic figures that in the east spring into prominence and disappear as abruptly—a fanatic named mohammed ahmed, proclaiming himself as mahdi, and calling to his standard all true mahommedans.

the arabs have ever been ready to follow the sword, and very soon 6000 troops under yusef pasha were almost annihilated. swiftly one egyptian garrison fell after another. the mahdi advanced towards the north, and cut to pieces an egyptian army under colonel hicks. the word passed from village to village, from mosque to mosque, from one solitary encampment to another that the mahdi had indeed come at last, and with the defeat of hicks’s army not only was khartoum in hourly peril, but cairo itself was threatened.

fortunately, the arab—like the highlander of old—is satisfied with the booty in hand, and very much prefers to see it safely put away before he takes to the field again in search of more. such practical considerations were a check to the mahdi’s religious zeal, and permitted england to collect her strength—or one should say such strength as lay to her hand; for at this time public interest in egypt was very luke-warm. the result was the tragic page in history that closed with the death of gordon in khartoum. there was one man in egypt who was later on both to avenge gordon and to subdue the soudan, but he as yet was unknown. the name of this young man was kitchener, and the war correspondent, mr. john macdonald, has given the following little sketch of the future victor of omdurman as he was in the year 1883—the year in which the mahdi renewed his activities. it is not without interest at the present time.

“taylor,” he writes, “had invited me the night before to accompany him and his friend and witness the operation which they were both to supervise. a tall, slim, thin-faced, slightly stooping figure in long boots, ‘cut-away’ dark morning-coat and egyptian fez, somewhat tilted over his eyes—such, as i remember him, was the young soldier who was destined to fulfil gordon’s task of ‘smashing the mahdi.’ ‘he’s quiet,’ taylor whispered to me as we were getting ready; ‘that’s his way.’ and, again, with characteristic jerk of the head, ‘he’s clever.’ and so, in the raw, greyish early morning of january 8, 1883, the three of us drove in our dingy rattle-trap over the white dusty road nilewards to meet the fellah cavaliers. taylor did most of the talking. kitchener expressed himself in an occasional nod or monosyllable.

“at the barracks we found some forty men waiting. i remember kitchener’s gaze at the awkward, slipshod group as he took his position in the centre of a circular space round which the riders were to show their paces. ‘we begin with the officers,’ said taylor turning to me; ‘we shall train them first, then put them to drill the troopers. we have no troopers just yet, though we have 440 horses ready for them.’

“and now began the selection of the fellah officers. they were to be tested in horsemanship. the first batch were ordered to mount. round they went, indian file, kitchener, like a circus-master standing in the centre. had he flourished a long whip he might have passed for a show-master at a rehearsal. neither audible nor visible sign did he give of any feeling roused in him by a performance most disappointing and sometimes ridiculous. his hands buried in his trousers pockets, he quietly watched the emergence of the least unfit. in half an hour or so the first native officers of the fellah cavalry were chosen. it was then that kitchener made his longest speech, ‘we’ll have to drive it into those fellows,’ he muttered, as if thinking aloud.”

the importance of this extract is the glimpse it gives of the material that was the hope of egypt.

that was the type of man that kitchener took in hand, and that was the type of man who was to uphold the supremacy of the british arms against the fanatic forces of the mahdi.

but between 1883 and omdurman there was more than spade work—there was grim tragedy and humiliating defeat. in august 1883, when the mahdi was again on the war-path, general baker despatched native reinforcements from cairo in the vain hope that they would be able to withstand the advance of the arabs. on february 4, 1884, baker’s poorly trained egyptians encountered the sudanese, and were practically annihilated. this disaster, following so quickly upon the rout of hicks’s troops, awakened the government at home to the fact that something must be done. sir gerald graham was ordered to proceed with a force of 4000 british troops to suakin. with his force were the 1st battalion of the gordon highlanders and the black watch. on the 29th of february the british troops set out upon the road over which baker himself had passed, and came in touch with the enemy at el-teb. the arabs were defended to some extent with entrenchments, and for an hour maintained a steady fire. then, having grown confident by their easily-won victories over egyptian troops, the sudanese hurled themselves at the highlanders, shaking their long spears, and shouting their battle-cries. they were met by the solid unbreakable square of the 42nd. checked and demoralised, their advance was quickly turned into a rout. no sooner did the enemy waver than the cavalry were let loose, and the engagement at el-teb was turned into a signal success.

on the 13th of march 1884 was fought the battle of tamai, in which the black watch took a leading part. the highlanders were ordered to charge at the enemy in front, but did not perceive that on their right lay a deep nullah or piece of hidden ground. no sooner was their flank exposed than hosts of the enemy leapt to their feet and broke upon them. the 42nd were caught between two fires and surrounded. the naval brigade, forced back, were compelled to surrender their guns. it became a hand-to-hand struggle, each man fighting for himself.

in the words of kipling:

we took our chanst among the kyber ‘ills,

the boers knocked us silly at a mile,

the burman give us irriwaddy chills,

an’ a zulu impi dished us up in style:

but all we ever got from such as they

was pop to what the fuzzy made us swaller;

we ‘eld our bloomin’ own, the papers say,

but man for man the fuzzy knocked us ‘oller.

then ‘ere’s to you, fuzzy-wuzzy, an’ the missis an’ the kid;

our orders was to break you, an’ of course we went an’ did.

we sloshed you with martinis, an’ it wasn’t ‘ardly fair;

but for all the odds again’ you, fuzzy-wuz, you broke the square.

for a moment it seemed as though baker’s disaster was to be repeated. but the british regulars were very unlike the undisciplined egyptians. “the spectacle,” wrote a war correspondent, “did not so much terrify as exercise a weird, terrible fascination. i do not suppose that either i or any one else who witnessed it will often again see its equal for magnificence. though retreating, our men literally mowed down their assailants. in the smoke and dust of the battle, amid the bright gleam of their myriad spearheads, the semi-nude, brown-skinned, black, shaggy-haired warriors were falling down in scores. of all the savage races of the world none are more desperately brave than the soudan arabs, who were breaking upon our ranks like a tempestuous sea. at last the pressure of the front upon the rear became so great that those of us who were mounted were for a few moments too tightly wedged together to be able to move; but we felt the collapse was only temporary.”

it was touch and go, but the undismayed veterans of the black watch and those other troops who formed the british force were bound, sooner or later, to enforce their superiority. presently, shoulder to shoulder, forming where they could into squares, the 42nd and 65th began to advance. for a moment the conflict was in suspense, then the crisis had passed. the victory was won.

unhappily, the british government took no advantage of graham’s successes, and decided upon the evacuation of the soudan. under these circumstances the only thing left to do was to ensure the safety of the civilians in the various towns more or less under european control. there was one man above all others who was competent to deal with the exigencies of the situation, and that was general gordon. he was begged by the government to leave for egypt to carry out this mission. we must not overlook, in justice to the government, that neither they nor probably gordon himself appreciated the strength of the revolutionary movement in the soudan, so that when he arrived at khartoum in february 1884 he was dismayed to find it was exceedingly likely that he would be isolated there, if not actually besieged by the enemy. accordingly, he advised the government to make good the advantage gained by sir gerald graham, and ensure a lasting peace in the soudan. but the government refused to be interested in the problem. then gordon communicated with the country, stating that he had provisions for only five months. lord granville, without dealing with the situation in any way, instructed him to leave khartoum as best he could, and it was not until the end of march that the grave danger to gordon was realised. lord wolseley, voicing the sympathies of the english people, begged the government to do something to save a man whom they had sent out to represent the country.

then and only then, mr. gladstone, who had placed every possible obstacle in the path of action, permitted the british troops to set out for egypt, with wolseley in command. and so there embarked that melancholy expedition, against which time and ill-luck waged a remorseless warfare—an expedition that was to reach khartoum two days after the murder of gordon.

under major-general earle the black watch came up the nile, while sir charles wilson was heading for khartoum. on the 10th of february earle’s columns came into conflict with the enemy at kirbekan, when, to quote wolseley’s despatch, “the black watch advanced over rocks and broken ground upon the koppies, and after having by their fire in the coolest manner driven off a rush of the enemy, stormed the position under a heavy fire.”

the arabs put up, as always, a desperate resistance; they hurled one attack after another upon the guns, but always to be met with a devastating fire. the black watch in a later stage in the battle attempted to cut off the retreat of the enemy. having placed them in an ambuscade, general earle prepared for a decisive action. “for this assault,” says charles lowe, “the order was about to be given, when a body of the arabs, one of whom bore a banner, the rest being armed with swords and spears, boldly rushed down from the heights in front, and charged towards the nearest companies of the black watch, under colonel green. the highlanders, though standing in line as at balaclava, never budged, but met their assailants with such a withering fire that those who were not mown down by the bullets of the martini-henrys turned and fled towards the river.”

it was the last effort of the arabs, and a counter-attack now began. with ‘the campbells are comin’’ the 42nd rushed up the hill-side, and the battle was soon over. unfortunately, at the conclusion, general earle was killed by one of the fugitives.

the gordons took part in the arduous advance up the nile to abu hamid, and when they reached that place news came of the death of gordon. the tragic words ‘too late!’ echoed throughout egypt and the world. to those who had strained every nerve to reach him the news was bitter indeed. the expedition had failed, and there was nothing for it but to return. the water in the nile was falling, and the advance must needs be stopped.

the government, now roused to action and anxious to satisfy the indignation of the public, decided that the mahdi must be crushed; but the matter was long delayed, and it was many years before kitchener came to avenge the murder of a great scotsman, and one of the most memorable figures of the last century.

the failure of the gordon relief expedition encouraged the mahdi in the belief that his success was due to the direct guidance of god. in his own mind, at least, he had driven the british home again, and although his death occurred in 1885, it in no way concluded the threatening of egypt. there were many contests between the dervishes and the egyptian troops, who, led by british officers, were now able to hold their own. the labours of kitchener were already beginning to bear fruit.

in august 1886 he was appointed governor of suakin, and instantly set about fortifying the place against the dervishes. various engagements followed during the forthcoming years, and the struggle with the mahdi’s forces went on until the campaign opened which was to end in the final and crushing victory of omdurman. it must not be thought that this success was simply a success of arms; there had been many of those in the past. it was rather the culminating and final achievement in a long and silent campaign extending over many years, opening, as we have seen, with the first rather dismal efforts at training the egyptians, passing on to that wonderful system of railways which crossed over five hundred miles of bare desert, to reach its appointed end in the fall of omdurman and mahdism.

it had taken sixteen years to make the anglo-egyptian army, and by the time the battle of omdurman was fought it numbered 18,000 men, with 140 english officers.

from 1888 to 1892 kitchener was adjutant-general of the egyptian army; in 1892 he became sirdar. at last, in 1894, he seized his opportunity. there was at this time a new khedive—a young man who showed signs of resisting or criticising british rule. without hesitation the sirdar showed him very clearly that this would be unwise behaviour. he followed up his action by pushing forward his railways, mile by mile, towards omdurman, the city of the khalifa. it was impossible for the latter to surrender the city, for such an action would proclaim throughout the soudan that the mahdi was little better than a fugitive. the dawn of peace was already breaking. omdurman was within striking distance.

the dongola expedition took place in 1896, resulting in the capture of dongola and the dispersal of the arabs in that quarter. in 1897 the government at last came to a practical decision, and determined to crush for ever the power of the khalifa, and for that purpose despatched an army in which were included the seaforth highlanders and the camerons. it was no unexpected event for kitchener. more truly was it the last mile of the journey. his organisation was complete, his troops were efficient, he could take his own time, and the result was certain.

the khalifa’s army was roughly estimated at 60,000 men, and divided into one division of 40,000 at omdurman and another of 20,000 at metammeh. the sirdar, accompanied by general gatacre and general sir archibald hunter, was in command of a force of some 12,000 men perfectly equipped, and with some eight squadrons of egyptian cavalry. the camerons and seaforths were brigaded under general gatacre.

mahmoud, who commanded the khalifa’s troops at metammeh, left that place and marched towards the river atbara, where he settled down in a zeriba, and calmly awaited the british advance. this was a new turn in dervish tactics; formerly they had been only too ready to rush upon the british bayonet. but mahmoud had learnt with native shrewdness the foolishness of throwing men upon the british square. he also knew who best could play a waiting game. it was imperative that kitchener should act, and act quickly, and so, on the night of april 7 he advanced to open the conflict. as the late g. w. steevens has so graphically written: “all england and all egypt and the flower of the black lands beyond, birmingham and the west highlands, the half-regenerated children of the earth’s earliest civilisation, and grinning savages from the uttermost swamps of equatoria, muscle and machinery, lord and larrikin, balliol and board school, the sirdar’s brain and the camel’s back—all welded into one, the awful war machine went forward into action.”

the dervish zeriba lay some twenty miles distant. at about a quarter to four in the morning the advance guard came in sight of the enemy, and instantly the british force halted. it was, indeed, a formidable position that faced them. mahmoud had studied the lie of the ground very carefully, and sheltered himself from artillery fire by a ridge of rising country. all around his camp was knotted and twisted together an entanglement of desert thorn some 10 feet high, and as much as 20 feet broad in some places. behind these were trenches and bomb-proof shelters. without the help of heavy artillery a frontal attack was the only possible way to gain the victory. and so in two ranks the british began their advance on the zeriba, headed by the camerons and the seaforth highlanders. it has been said that general gatacre was the first man to reach the formidable entanglement of desert thorn. at his heels came the camerons, who, forcing a way through, managed to enter the zeriba. one of their pipers, standing upon a height of earth, began to play ‘the march of the cameron men,’ and fell almost at once, riddled with bullets. in the fierce conflict that followed none fought more staunchly than lewis’s half brigade of egyptians. that in itself was worth as much as half a dozen minor victories.

the fire of the dervishes from their trenches rained thick and fast upon the highlanders as they came through the break in the hedges, but when they had gained a real foothold inside the zeriba, the dervishes lost heart, and made away towards the atbara river. the fine strategy of kitchener forcing an engagement at this point was now apparent. the enemy were faced with thirty miles of waterless desert, at the end of which it was probable they would encounter the british gunboats. it was more than a victory in arms; it struck the first devastating blow at the power of the khalifa.

in answer to kitchener’s despatch, queen victoria replied: “anxious to know how the wounded british and egyptians are going on. am proud of the gallantry of my soldiers. so glad my cameron highlanders should have been amongst them.”

a writer in blackwood’s magazine relates the following striking incident, doubly pregnant with meaning to-day. “after atbara,” he says, “and as we rode through the ‘dem,’ lord cecil joined us, and presently k. pulled up among the charred corpses on the burning ground to make some enquiries. cecil made a grimace and pointed to the ground; it was strewn with dervish shells lying about under our horses’ hoofs and the hoofs of the chief’s horse, with the grass on fire all around them. neither of us spoke, but kismet, destiny, or whatever it is that sits behind the crupper, impelled k. to move on, and a few minutes later a column of smoke shot up into the air—the shells had exploded. but k. had passed on—destiny had need of him still.”

in july 1898 began the advance on omdurman, in which the camerons and seaforths took part. the battle was fought on september 2nd. the khalifa’s army numbered some 50,000 men, and the fight that was to end in the utter defeat of mahdism extended over five hours. the highlanders did not take as prominent a part here as at atbara, and the chief battle honours lie with brigadier-general hector macdonald, whose soudanese troops were handled with much brilliancy, and the 21st lancers, the glory of whose charge rang throughout england and the empire.

the dervishes, trusting to their overwhelming superiority in numbers, advanced in dense hordes against the british lines, and at this point of the engagement the camerons and seaforths withstood the fury of the opening attack with magnificent steadiness. the enemy were met with a murderous fire; whole lines and ranks were simply mown down by our shrapnel: attack upon attack was launched with reckless gallantry, always to be repulsed.

in one portion of this campaign it has been related that for two hours a company of the seaforths were engaged with a great number of the dervishes, and as their ammunition had run short, they were compelled to use the bayonet. “not one shot was fired,” says an eye-witness, “for two hours, and yet the greatest and most serious losses amongst the enemy occurred during the time when the seaforths were getting in with the bayonet.” at omdurman, in that great charge of the dervishes, it became impossible to check them altogether, and so heavy was the fire that the rifles of the cameron highlanders became too hot to hold. to avert a repulse the curious spectacle was seen of men carrying and exchanging rifles with the reserve lines behind.

the stand made by the dervishes has earned the praise of g. w. steevens, who witnessed it. “our men,” he says, “were perfect, but the dervishes were superb—beyond perfection. it was their largest, best, and bravest army that ever fought against us for mahdism, and it died worthily of the huge empire that mahdism won and kept so long.” they lost, roughly, 11,000 men killed with 16,000 wounded; and with the battle of omdurman came the end of the long struggle in the soudan, and not only that, but the avenging of the death of gordon.

the losses amongst the two highland regiments, and indeed the british force as a whole, were trifling for such a hard-fought action.

whatever else the highland regiments may have been asked to face before or since—for whirlwind fury and deathless courage, for wild disturbing swiftness and noisy violence, nothing could surpass a dervish charge.

troops that can meet that without wavering—front, rear, and flank—need have no qualms for the future exigencies of war.