shortly before midnight on the 12th of march, 1896, the sirdar received instructions from lord cromer authorising an expedition into the dongola province and directing him to occupy akasha. the next morning the news was published in the times, ostensibly as coming from its correspondent in cairo: and the egyptian cabinet was convened to give a formal assent by voting the decree. on the 14th the reserves were called out. on the 15th the khedive reviewed the cairo garrison; and at the termination of the parade sir h. kitchener informed him that the earliest battalions would start for the front that night.

the egyptian frontier force had always been kept in a condition of immediate readiness by the restless activity of the enemy. the beginning of the long-expected advance was hailed with delight by the british officers sweltering at wady halfa and sarras. on sunday, the 15th of march, three days after the sirdar had received his orders, and before the first reinforcements had started from cairo, colonel hunter, who commanded on the frontier, formed a small column of all arms to seize and hold akasha. at dawn on the 18th the column started, and the actual invasion of the territory which for ten years had been abandoned to the dervishes began. the route lay through a wild and rocky country—the debatable ground, desolated by years of war—and the troops straggled into a long procession, and had several times for more than an hour to move in single file over passes and through narrow defiles strewn with the innumerable boulders from which the 'belly of stones' has derived its name. the right of their line of march was protected by the nile, and although it was occasionally necessary to leave the bank, to avoid difficult ground, the column camped each night by the river. the cavalry and the camel corps searched the country to the south and east; for it was expected that the dervishes would resist the advance. creeping along the bank, and prepared at a moment's notice to stand at bay at the water's edge, the small force proceeded on its way. wady atira was reached on the 18th, tanjore on the 19th, and on the 20th the column marched into akasha.

the huts of the mud village were crumbling back into the desert sand. the old british fort and a number of storehouses—relics of the gordon relief expedition—were in ruins. the railway from sarras had been pulled to pieces. most of the sleepers had disappeared, but the rails lay scattered along the track. all was deserted: yet one grim object proclaimed the dervish occupation. beyond the old station and near the river a single rail had been fixed nearly upright in the ground. from one of the holes for the fishplate bolts there dangled a rotten cord, and on the sand beneath this improvised yet apparently effective gallows lay a human skull and bones, quite white and beautifully polished by the action of sun and wind. half-a-dozen friendly arabs, who had taken refuge on the island below the cataract, were the only inhabitants of the district.

the troops began to place themselves in a defensive position without delay. on the 22nd the cavalry and camel corps returned with the empty convoy to sarras to escort to the front a second and larger column, under the command of major macdonald, and consisting of the xith and xiith soudanese, one company of the 3rd egyptians (dropped as a garrison at ambigole wells), and a heavy convoy of stores numbering six hundred camels. starting from sarras on the 24th, the column, after four days' marching, arrived without accident or attack, and macdonald assumed command of the whole advanced force.

akasha was now converted into a strong entrenched camp, in which an advanced base was formed. its garrison of three battalions, a battery, and the mounted troops, drew their supplies by camel transport from sarras. the country to the south and east was continually patrolled, to guard against a turning movement, and the communications were further strengthened by the establishment of fortified posts at semna, wady atira, and tanjore. the friendly arab tribes—bedouin, kabbabish, and foggara—ranged still more widely in the deserts and occupied the scattered wells. all this time the dervishes watched supinely from their position at fuket, and although they were within a single march of akasha they remained inactive and made no attempt to disturb the operations.

meanwhile the concentration of the egyptian army on the frontier was proceeding. the reservists obeyed the summons to the colours of their own free will and with gratifying promptness, instead of being tardily dragged from their homes in chains as in the days of ismail. all the battalions of the army were brought up to war strength. two new battalions of reservists were formed, the 15th and 16th. the 15th was placed at assuan and korosko on the line of communications. the 16th was despatched to suakin to release the two battalions in garrison there for service on the nile. the 1st battalion of the north staffordshire regiment was moved up the river from cairo to take the place of the wady halfa garrison of six battalions, which had moved on to sarras and akasha. a maxim battery of four guns was formed from the machine-gun sections of the staffordshires and connaught rangers and hurried south. the 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 6th egyptian battalions from cairo were passed in a continual succession along the railway and river to the front. in all this busy and complicated movement of troops the egyptian war office worked smoothly, and clearly showed the ability with which it was organised.

the line of communications from cairo, the permanent base, to the advanced post at akasha was 825 miles in length. but of this distance only the section lying south of assuan could be considered as within the theatre of war. the ordinary broad-gauge railway ran from cairo to balliana, where a river base was established. from balliana to assuan reinforcements and supplies were forwarded by messrs. cook's fleet of steamers, by barges towed by small tugs, and by a number of native sailing craft. a stretch of seven miles of railway avoids the first cataract, and joins assuan and shellal. above shellal a second flotilla of gunboats, steamers, barges, and nile boats was collected to ply between shellal and halfa. the military railway ran from halfa to sarras. south of sarras supplies were forwarded by camels. to meet the increased demands of transport, 4,500 camels were purchased in egypt and forwarded in boats to assuan, whence they marched via korosko to the front. the british government had authorised the construction of the military railway to akasha, and a special railway battalion was collected at assuan, through which place sleepers and other material at once began to pass to sarras. the strategic railway construction will, however, form the subject of a later chapter, which i shall not anticipate.

by the 1st of april, less than three weeks from the commencement of the advance, the whole line of communications had been organised and was working efficiently, although still crowded with the concentrating troops.

as soon as the 16th battalion of reservists arrived at suakin, the ixth soudanese were conveyed by transports to kossier, and marched thence across the desert to kena. the distance was 120 miles, and the fact that in spite of two heavy thunderstorms—rare phenomena in egypt—it was covered in four days is a notable example of the marching powers of the black soldiers. it had been determined that the xth soudanese should follow at once, but circumstances occurred which detained them on the red sea littoral and must draw the attention of the reader thither.

the aspect and history of the town and port of suakin might afford a useful instance to a cynical politician. most of the houses stand on a small barren island which is connected with the mainland by a narrow causeway. at a distance the tall buildings of white coral, often five storeys high, present an imposing appearance, and the prominent chimneys of the condensing machinery—for there is scarcely any fresh water—seem to suggest manufacturing activity. but a nearer view reveals the melancholy squalor of the scene. a large part of the town is deserted. the narrow streets wind among tumbled-down and neglected houses. the quaintly carved projecting windows of the facades are boarded up. the soil exhales an odour of stagnation and decay. the atmosphere is rank with memories of waste and failure. the scenes that meet the eye intensify these impressions. the traveller who lands on quarantine island is first confronted with the debris of the projected suakin-berber railway. two or three locomotives that have neither felt the pressure of steam nor tasted oil for a decade lie rusting in the ruined workshops. huge piles of railway material rot, unguarded and neglected, on the shore. rolling stock of all kinds—carriages, trucks, vans, and ballast waggons—are strewn or heaped near the sheds. the christian cemetery alone shows a decided progress, and the long lines of white crosses which mark the graves of british soldiers and sailors who lost their lives in action or by disease during the various campaigns, no less than the large and newly enclosed areas to meet future demands, increase the depression of the visitor. the numerous graves of greek traders—a study of whose epitaphs may conveniently refresh a classical education—protest that the climate of the island is pestilential. the high loopholed walls declare that the desolate scrub of the mainland is inhabited only by fierce and valiant savages who love their liberty.

for eleven years all trade had been practically stopped, and the only merchants remaining were those who carried on an illicit traffic with the arabs or, with eastern apathy, were content to wait for better days. being utterly unproductive, suakin had been wisely starved by the egyptian government, and the gloom of the situation was matched by the poverty of its inhabitants.

the island on which the town stands is joined to the mainland by a causeway, at the further end of which is an arched gateway of curious design called 'the gate of the soudan.' upon the mainland stands the crescent-shaped suburb of el kaff. it comprises a few mean coral-built houses, a large area covered with mud huts inhabited by arabs and fishermen, and all the barracks and military buildings. the whole is surrounded by a strong wall a mile and a half long, fifteen feet high, six feet thick, with a parapet pierced for musketry and strengthened at intervals by bastions armed with krupp guns.

three strong detached posts complete the defences of suakin. ten miles to the northward, on the scene of sir h. kitchener's unfortunate enterprise, is the fort of handub. tambuk is twenty-five miles inland and among the hills. situate upon a high rock, and consisting only of a store, a formidable blockhouse, and a lookout tower, this place is safe from any enemy unprovided with artillery. both handub and tambuk were at the outset of the campaign provisioned for four months. the third post, tokar fort, lies fifty miles along the coast to the south. its function is to deprive the arabs of a base in the fertile delta of the tokar river. the fort is strong, defended by artillery, and requires for its garrison an entire battalion of infantry.

no description of suakin would be complete without some allusion to the man to whom it owes its fame. osman digna had been for many years a most successful and enterprising arab slave dealer. the attempted suppression of his trade by the egyptian government drove him naturally into opposition. he joined in the revolt of the mahdi, and by his influence roused the whole of the hadendoa and other powerful tribes of the red sea shore. the rest is upon record. year after year, at a horrid sacrifice of men and money, the imperial government and the old slaver fought like wolves over the dry bone of suakin. baker's teb, el teb, tamai, tofrek, hashin, handub, gemaiza, afafit—such were the fights of osman digna, and through all he passed unscathed. often defeated, but never crushed, the wily arab might justly boast to have run further and fought more than any emir in the dervish armies.

it had scarcely seemed possible that the advance on dongola could influence the situation around kassala, yet the course of events encouraged the belief that the british diversion in favour of italy had been effective; for at the end of march—as soon, that is to say, as the news of the occupation of akasha reached him—osman digna separated himself from the army threatening kassala, and marched with 300 cavalry, 70 camelry, and 2,500 foot towards his old base in the tokar delta. on the first rumour of his advance the orders of the xth soudanese to move via kossier and kena to the nile were cancelled, and they remained in garrison at tokar. at home the war office, touched in a tender spot, quivered apprehensively, and began forthwith to make plans to strengthen the suakin garrison with powerful forces.

the state of affairs in the eastern soudan has always been turbulent. the authority of the governor of the red sea littoral was not at this time respected beyond the extreme range of the guns of suakin. the hadendoa and other tribes who lived under the walls of the town professed loyalty to the egyptian government, not from any conviction that their rule was preferable to that of osman digna, but simply for the sake of a quiet life. as their distance from suakin increased, the loyalty of the tribesmen became even less pronounced, and at a radius of twenty miles all the sheikhs oscillated alternately between osman digna and the egyptian government, and tried to avoid open hostilities with either. omar tita, sheikh of the district round about erkowit, found himself situated on this fringe of intriguing neutrality. although he was known to have dealings with osman, it was believed that if he had the power to choose he would side with the egyptian government. early in april omar tita reported that osman digna was in the neighbourhood of erkowit with a small force, and that he, the faithful ally of the government, had on the 3rd of the month defeated him with a loss of four camels. he also said that if the egyptian government would send up a force to fight osman, he, the aforesaid ally, would keep him in play until it arrived.

after a few days of hesitation and telegraphic communication with the sirdar, colonel lloyd, the governor of suakin, who was then in very bad health, decided that he had not enough troops to justify him in taking the risk of going up to erkowit to fight osman. around suakin, as along the indian frontier, a battle was always procurable on the shortest notice. when a raid has taken place, the government may choose the scale of their reprisals. if they are poor, they will arrange a counter-raid by means of 'friendlies,' and nothing more will be heard of the affair. if they are rich, they will mobilise two or three brigades, and make an expedition or fight a pitched battle, so that another glory may be added to the annals of the british army. in the present instance the egyptian government were poor, and as the british government did not desire to profit by the opportunity it was determined to have only a small-scale operation. the governor therefore arranged a plan for a demonstration at the foot of the hills near khor wintri by means of combined movements from suakin and tokar. the garrison of suakin consisted of the 1st and half the 5th egyptian battalions; the 16th egyptian reservists, who had just replaced the ixth soudanese, and were as yet hardly formed into a military body; one squadron of cavalry, one company of camel corps, and some detachments of artillery. the garrison of tokar consisted of the xth soudanese and a few gunners. from these troops there was organised in the second week in april, with all due ceremony, a 'suakin field force.'

the plan of campaign was simple. colonel lloyd was to march out from suakin and effect a junction with the 'tokar column' at khor wintri, where the erkowit road enters the hills. it was then hoped that osman digna would descend and fight a battle of the required dimensions in the open; after which, if victorious, the force would return to suakin and tokar.

in order to make the suakin column as mobile as possible, the whole force was mounted on camels, of which more than 1,000 were requisitioned, as well as 60 mules and 120 donkeys. two hundred arabs accompanied the column to hold these beasts when necessary. six days' forage and rations, one day's reserve of water, 200 rounds per man, and 100 shell per gun were carried. at five o'clock on the afternoon of tuesday, the 14th of april, the troops paraded outside the walls of suakin, and bivouacked in the open ready to march at daylight.

the next morning the column, which numbered about 1,200 men of all arms, started. after marching for four or five hours in the direction of khor wintri the cavalry, who covered the advance, came in contact with the dervish scouts. the force thereupon assumed an oblong formation: the mixed soudanese company and the two guns in front, three egyptian companies on each flank, the camel corps company in the rear, and the transport in the centre. the pace was slow, and, since few of the camels had ever been saddled or ridden, progress was often interrupted by their behaviour and by the broken and difficult nature of the country. nevertheless at about four o'clock in the afternoon, teroi wells, eight miles from khor wintri, were reached; and here, having marched nineteen miles, colonel lloyd determined to halt. while the infantry were making the zeriba, the cavalry were sent on under captain fenwick (an infantry officer employed on the staff) to gain touch with the tokar force, who were expected to have already reached the rendezvous. apparently under the belief that omar tita and his arabs would give timely notice of an attack, the cavalry seem to have neglected many of the usual precautions, and in consequence at about five o'clock, when approaching khor wintri, they found themselves suddenly confronted with a force of about 200 dervish horsemen supported by a large body of infantry. the squadron wheeled about with promptitude, and began to retire at a trot. the dervish horsemen immediately pursued. the result was that the egyptians began a disorderly flight at a gallop through the thick and treacherous scrub and over broken, dangerous ground. sixteen horses fell; their riders were instantly speared by the pursuers. rallying thirty-eight troopers, captain fenwick seized a rocky hillock, and dismounting with the natural instinct of an infantry soldier, prepared to defend himself to the last. the remainder of the squadron continued their flight, and thirty-two troopers, under an egyptian officer (whose horse is said to have bolted), arrived at the teroi zeriba with the news that their comrades had been destroyed, or had perhaps 'returned to suakin,' and that they themselves had been closely followed by the enemy. the news caused the gravest anxiety, which was not diminished when it was found that the bush around the zeriba was being strongly occupied by dervish spearmen. two mounted men, who volunteered for the perilous duty, were sent to make their way through this savage cordon, and try to find either the remainder of the cavalry or the tokar column. both were hunted down and killed. the rest of the force continued in hourly expectation of an attack.

their suspense was aggravated towards midnight, when the dervishes began to approach the zeriba. in the darkness what was thought to be a body of horsemen was seen moving along a shallow khor opposite the right face of the defence. at the same moment a loud yell was raised by the enemy on the other side. an uncontrolled musketry fire immediately broke out. the guns fired blindly up the valley; the infantry wildly on all sides. the fusillade continued furiously for some time, and when by the efforts of the british officers the troops were restrained, it was found that the dervishes had retired, leaving behind them a single wounded man. occasional shots were fired from the scrub until the morning, but no fresh attack was attempted by the dervishes.

meanwhile captain fenwick maintained his solitary and perilous position on the hillock. he was soon surrounded by considerable bodies of the enemy, and as soon as it became dark he was sharply attacked. but the dervishes fortunately possessed few rifles, and the officers and troopers, by firing steady volleys, succeeded in holding their ground and repulsing them. the sound of the guns at teroi encouraged the egyptians and revealed the direction of their friends. with the daylight the dervishes, who seem throughout the affair to have been poor-spirited fellows, drew off, and the detachment, remounting, made haste to rejoin the main body.

the force, again united, pursued their way to khor wintri, where they found the column from tokar already arrived. marching early on the 15th, major sidney with 250 men of the xth soudanese, the only really trustworthy troops in the force, had reached khor wintri the same afternoon. he drove out the small dervish post occupying the khor, and was about to bivouac, when he was sharply attacked by a force of arabs said to have numbered 80 horsemen and 500 foot. the soudanese fought with their usual courage, and the dervishes were repulsed, leaving thirty dead upon the ground. the regulars had three men wounded.

up to this point colonel lloyd's plan had been successfully carried out. the columns from suakin and tokar had effected a junction at khor wintri on the erkowit road. it now remained to await the attack of osman digna, and inflict a heavy blow upon him. it was decided, however, in view of what had occurred, to omit this part of the scheme, and both forces returned together without delay to suakin, which they reached on the 18th, having lost in the operations eighteen egyptian soldiers killed and three wounded.

their arrival terminated a period of anxious doubt as to their fate. the town, which had been almost entirely denuded of troops, was left in charge of captain ford-hutchinson. at about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 16th a few stragglers from the egyptian cavalry with half-a-dozen riderless horses knocked at the gates, and vague but sinister rumours spread on all sides. the belief that a disaster had overtaken the egyptian force greatly excited the arabs living within the walls, and it appeared that they were about to rise, plunder the town, and massacre the christians. her majesty's ship scout was, however, by good fortune in the harbour. strong parties of bluejackets were landed to patrol the streets. the guns of the warship were laid on the arab quarter. these measures had a tranquillising effect, and order reigned in suakin until the return of the field force, when their victory was celebrated with appropriate festivities.

it was announced that as a result of the successful operations the dervish enterprise against the tokai delta had collapsed, and that osman digna's power was for ever broken. in order, however, that no unfortunate incident should mar the triumph, the xth soudanese were sent back to tokar by sea via trinkitat, instead of marching direct and the garrison of suakin confined themselves henceforward strictly to their defences. osman digna remained in the neighbourhood and raided the friendly villages. on the arrival of the indian contingent he was supposed to be within twelve miles of the town, but thereafter he retired to adarama on the atbara river, where he remained during the dongola campaign. the fact that no further offensive operations were undertaken in the eastern soudan prevented all fighting, for the dervishes were, of course, unable to assail the strong permanent fortifications behind which the egyptians took shelter. they nevertheless remained in actual possession of the surrounding country, until the whole situation was altered by the successful advance of powerful forces behind them along the nile and by the occupation of berber.

after the affair of khor wintri it was evident that it would not be possible to leave suakin to the defence only of the 16th battalion of reservists. on the other hand, sir h. kitchener required every soldier the egyptian army could muster to carry out the operations on the nile. it was therefore determined to send indian troops to suakin to garrison the town and forts, and thus release the xth soudanese and the egyptian battalions for the dongola expedition. accordingly early in the month of may the indian army authorities were ordered to prepare a brigade of all arms for service in egypt.

the troops selected were as follow: 26th bengal infantry, 35th sikhs, 1st bombay lancers, 5th bombay mountain battery, two maxim guns, one section queen's own (madras) sappers and miners—in all about 4,000 men. the command was entrusted to colonel egerton, of the corps of guides.

on the 30th of may the dreary town of suakin was enlivened by the arrival of the first detachments, and during the following week the whole force disembarked at the rotten piers and assumed the duties of the defence. it is mournful to tell how this gallant brigade, which landed so full of high hope and warlike enthusiasm, and which was certainly during the summer the most efficient force in the soudan, was reduced in seven months to the sullen band who returned to india wasted by disease, embittered by disappointment, and inflamed by feelings of resentment and envy.

the indian contingent landed in the full expectation of being immediately employed against the enemy. after a week, when all the stores had been landed, officers and men spent their time speculating when the order to march would come. it was true that there was no transport in suakin, but that difficulty was easily overcome by rumours that 5,000 camels were on their way from the somali coast to enable the force to move on kassala or berber. as these did not arrive, general egerton sent in a proposed scheme to the sirdar, in which he undertook to hold all the advanced posts up to the kokreb range, if he were supplied with 1,000 camels for transport. a characteristic answer was returned, to the effect that it was not intended to use the indian contingent as a mobile force. they had come as a garrison for suakin, and a garrison for suakin they should remain. this information was not, however, communicated to the troops, who continued to hope for orders to advance until the fall of dongola.

the heat when the contingent arrived was not great, but as the months wore on the temperature rose steadily, until in august and september the thermometer rarely fell below 103° during the night, and often rose to 115° by day. dust storms were frequent. a veritable plague of flies tormented the unhappy soldiers. the unhealthy climate, the depressing inactivity, and the scantiness of fresh meat or the use of condensed water, provoked an outbreak of scurvy. at one time nearly all the followers and 50 per cent of the troops were affected. several large drafts were invalided to india. the symptoms were painful and disgusting—open wounds, loosening of the teeth, curious fungoid growths on the gums and legs. the cavalry horses and transport animals suffered from bursati, and even a pinprick expanded into a large open sore. it is doubtful whether the brigade could have been considered fit for active service after september. all the europeans suffered acutely from prickly heat. malarial fever was common. there were numerous cases of abscess on the liver. twenty-five per cent of the british officers were invalided to england or india, and only six escaped a stay in hospital. the experiences of the battalion holding tokar fort were even worse than those of the troops in suakin. at length the longed-for time of departure arrived. with feelings of relief and delight the indian contingent shook the dust of suakin off their feet and returned to india. it is a satisfaction to pass from the dismal narrative of events in the eastern soudan to the successful campaign on the nile.

by the middle of april the concentration on the frontier was completed. the communications were cleared of their human freight, and occupied only by supplies and railway material, which continued to pour south at the utmost capacity of the transport. eleven thousand troops had been massed at and beyond wady halfa. but no serious operations could take place until a strong reserve of stores had been accumulated at the front. meanwhile the army waited, and the railway grew steadily. the battalions were distributed in three principal fortified camps—halfa, sarras, and akasha—and detachments held the chain of small posts which linked them together.

including the north staffordshire regiment, the garrison of wady halfa numbered about 3,000 men. the town and cantonment, nowhere more than 400 yards in width, straggle along the river-bank, squeezed in between the water and the desert, for nearly three miles. the houses, offices, and barracks are all built of mud, and the aspect of the place is brown and squalid. a few buildings, however, attain to the dignity of two storeys. at the northern end of the town a group of fairly well-built houses occupy the river-front, and a distant view of the clusters of palm-trees, of the white walls, and the minaret of the mosque refreshes the weary traveller from korosko or shellal with the hopes of civilised entertainment. the whole town is protected towards the deserts by a ditch and mud wall; and heavy krupp field-pieces are mounted on little bastions where the ends of the rampart rest upon the river. five small detached forts strengthen the land front, and the futility of an arab attack at this time was evident. halfa had now become the terminus of a railway, which was rapidly extending; and the continual arrival and despatch of tons of material, the building of sheds, workshops, and storehouses lent the african slum the bustle and activity of a civilised city.

sarras fort is an extensive building, perched on a crag of black rock rising on the banks of the nile about thirty miles south of halfa. during the long years of preparation it had been egypt's most advanced outpost and the southern terminus of the military railway. the beginning of the expedition swelled it into an entrenched camp, holding nearly 6,000 men. from each end of the black rock on which the fort stood a strong stone wall and wire entanglement ran back to the river. the space thus enclosed was crowded with rows of tents and lines of animals and horses; and in the fort colonel hunter, commanding the district known as 'sarras and the south,' had his headquarters.

from sarras the army seemed to have chosen a double line of advance. the railway reconstruction followed the old track which had been prepared through the desert in 1885. the convoy route wound along by the river. both were protected from attack. the 7th egyptians guarded railhead, while the chain of small posts secured the road by the nile to akasha. the advanced base grew during the months of april and may into a strong position. only once did the arabs venture to approach within artillery range. a small body of horse and camel men made a sort of haphazard reconnaissance, and, being seen from the outpost line, were fired on at a great distance by a field-gun. they fell back immediately, but it was believed that the range was too great for the projectile to have harmed them; and it was not until two days later that the discovery on the spot of a swollen, blistering corpse, clad in bright jibba, apprised the delighted gunners of the effect of their fire. warned by this lucky shot the dervishes came no more, or came unseen.

the sirdar, accompanied by colonel bundle, his chief of staff, had left cairo on the 22nd of march, and after a short stay at assuan reached wady halfa on the 29th. here he remained during the month of april, superintending and pressing the extension of the railroad and the accumulation of supplies. on the 1st of may he arrived at akasha, with a squadron of cavalry, under major burn-murdoch, as his escort. it happened that a convoy had come in the previous day, so that there were two extra cavalry squadrons at the advanced post. almost at the same moment that sir h. kitchener entered the camp, a party of friendly arabs came in with the news that they had been surprised some four miles to the eastward by a score of dervish camel-men, and had only succeeded in escaping with the loss of two of their number. in the belief that the enemy in the immediate vicinity were not in force, the sirdar ordered the three squadrons of egyptian cavalry, supported by the xith soudanese, to go out and reconnoitre towards firket and endeavour to cut off any hostile patrols that might be found.

at ten o'clock major burn-murdoch started with four british officers and 240 lances. after moving for seven or eight miles among the hills which surround akasha, the cavalry passed through a long, sandy defile, flanked on either side by rocky peaks and impracticable ravines. as the head of the column was about to debouch from this, the advanced scouts reported that there was a body of dervishes in the open ground in front of the defile. the cavalry commander rode forward to look at them, and found himself confronted, not, as he had expected, by a score of camel-men, but by a strong force of dervishes, numbering at least 1,500 foot and 250 horse. the cavalry, by trotting, had left the supporting infantry some distance behind them. the appearance of the enemy was threatening. the horsemen, who were drawn up scarcely 300 yards away, were already advancing to the attack, their right flank protected by a small force of camelry; and behind was the solid array of the spearmen.

major burn-murdoch determined to fall back on his infantry support and escape from the bad ground. he gave the order, and the squadrons wheeled about by troops and began to retire. forthwith the dervish horse charged, and, galloping furiously into the defile, attacked the cavalry in rear. both sides were crowded in the narrow space. the wildest confusion followed, and the dust raised by the horses' hoofs hung over all like a yellow london fog, amid which the bewildered combatants discharged their pistols and thrust at random. the egyptian cavalry, thus highly tried, showed at first no disposition to turn to meet the attack. the tumult drowned all words of command. a disaster appeared imminent. but the british officers, who had naturally been at the head of the column during its advance, were now at the rear and nearest the enemy. collecting a score of troopers, they made such resistance with their swords and revolvers that they actually held the defile and beat back the dervish horse, who retired on their infantry, leaving a dozen dead upon the ground. two of the egyptian squadrons continued to retreat until clear of the defile, a distance of 700 yards; but the third and rearmost was compelled by the british officers to face about, and, galloping with this force down the ravine, major burn-murdoch drove the arabs pell-mell out of it. the other two squadrons had now returned, and the whole force dismounted, and, taking up a position among the sandhills near the mouth of the defile, opened fire with their carbines. the repulse of their cavalry seemed to have disheartened the dervishes, for they made no attempt to attack the dismounted troopers, and contented themselves with maintaining a desultory fire, which was so ill-aimed that but little loss was caused. the heat of the weather was terrific, and both men and horses suffered acutely from thirst. the squadron which had escorted the sirdar had performed a long march before the reconnaissance and was exhausted. the cavalry, however, held their position among the sandhills and easily defeated a feeble attempt to turn their right. at a quarter past twelve the dervishes began to retire slowly and deliberately, and by one o'clock, when the xith soudanese arrived, eager and agog, the last arab had disappeared. the force then returned to camp, bearing many spears and leading six captured horses as trophies of victory. the intensity of the heat may be gauged by the fact that one of the soudanese soldiers—that is to say, an african negro—died of sunstroke. such was the affair of the 1st of may, and it is pleasing to relate that in this fierce fight the loss was not severe. one british officer, captain fitton, was slightly wounded. one native soldier was killed; one was mortally and eight severely wounded.

during may the preparations for the advance on the dervish position at firket continued, and towards the end of the month it became evident that they were nearly complete. the steady accumulation of stores at akasha had turned that post into a convenient base from which the force might operate for a month without drawing supplies of any kind from the north. the railway, which had progressed at the rate of about half a mile a day, had reached and was working to ambigole wells, where a four-gun fort and entrenchment had been built. the distance over which convoys must plod was reduced by half, and the business of supply was doubly accelerated. by degrees the battalions and squadrons began to move forward towards akasha. sarras, deprived of its short-lived glory, became again the solitary fort on a crag. wady halfa was also deserted, and, except for the british battalion in garrison, could scarcely boast a soldier. both the egyptian battalions from suakin had arrived on the nile. the xth soudanese were on their way. the country beyond akasha had been thoroughly reconnoitred and mapped to within three miles of the dervish position. everything was ready.

the actual concentration may be said to have begun on the 1st of june, when the sirdar started for the front from halfa, whither he had returned after the cavalry skirmish. construction work on the railway came to a full stop. the railway battalions, dropping their picks and shovels, shouldered their remington rifles and became the garrisons of the posts on the line of communications. on the 2nd of june the correspondents were permitted to proceed to akasha. on the 3rd the xth soudanese passed through ambigole and marched south. the horse battery from halfa followed. the egyptian battalions and squadrons which had been camped along the river at convenient spots from ambigole to akasha marched to a point opposite okma. between this place and the advanced post an extensive camp, stretching three miles along the nile bank, arose with magic swiftness. on the 4th the 7th egyptians moved from railhead, and with these the last battalion reached the front. nine thousand men, with ample supplies, were collected within striking distance of the enemy.

all this time the dervishes at firket watched in senseless apathy the deliberate, machine-like preparations for their destruction. they should have had good information, for although the egyptian cavalry patrolled ceaselessly, and the outpost line was impassable to scouts, their spies, as camel-drivers, water-carriers, and the like, were in the camp. they may not, perhaps, have known the exact moment of the intended blow, for the utmost secrecy was observed. but though they must have realised that it was imminent, they did nothing. there was, indeed, no course open to them but retreat. once the army was concentrated with sufficient supplies at akasha, their position was utterly untenable. the emir-in-chief, hammuda, then had scarcely 3,000 men around his flag. their rifles and ammunition were bad; their supplies scanty. nor could the valour of fifty-seven notable emirs sustain the odds against them. there was still time to fall back on kosheh, or even on suarda—anywhere outside the sweep of their terrible enemy's sword. they would not budge. obstinate and fatuous to the last, they dallied and paltered on the fatal ground, until sudden, blinding, inevitable catastrophe fell upon them from all sides at once, and swept them out of existence as a military force.