it might seem at first a great advantage that the peoples of the soudan, instead of being a multitude of wild, discordant tribes, should unite of their own accord into one strong community, actuated by a common spirit, living under fixed laws, and ruled by a single sovereign. but there is one form of centralised government which is almost entirely unprogressive and beyond all other forms costly and tyrannical—the rule of an army. such a combination depends, not on the good faith and good will of its constituents, but on their discipline and almost mechanical obedience. mutual fear, not mutual trust, promotes the co-operation of its individual members. history records many such dominations, ancient and modern, civilised or barbaric; and though education and culture may modify, they cannot change their predominant characteristics—a continual subordination of justice to expediency, an indifference to suffering, a disdain of ethical principles, a laxity of morals, and a complete ignorance of economics. the evil qualities of military hierarchies are always the same. the results of their rule are universally unfortunate. the degree may vary with time and place, but the political supremacy of an army always leads to the formation of a great centralised capital, to the consequent impoverishment of the provinces, to the degradation of the peaceful inhabitants through oppression and want, to the ruin of commerce, the decay of learning, and the ultimate demoralisation even of the military order through overbearing pride and sensual indulgence.

of the military dominations which history records, the dervish empire was probably the worst. all others have displayed compensating virtues. a high sense of personal honour has counterbalanced a low standard of public justice. an ennobling patriotism may partly repair economic follies. the miseries of the people are often concealed by the magnificence of the army. the laxity of morals is in some degree excused by the elegance of manners. but the dervish empire developed no virtue except courage, a quality more admirable than rare. the poverty of the land prevented magnificence. the ignorance of its inhabitants excluded refinement. the dervish dominion was born of war, existed by war, and fell by war. it began on the night of the sack of khartoum. it ended abruptly thirteen years later in the battle of omdurman. like a subsidiary volcano, it was flung up by one convulsion, blazed during the period of disturbance, and was destroyed by the still more violent shock that ended the eruption.

after the fall of khartoum and the retreat of the british armies the mahdi became the absolute master of the soudan. whatever pleasures he desired he could command, and, following the example of the founder of the mohammedan faith, he indulged in what would seem to western minds gross excesses. he established an extensive harem for his own peculiar use, and immured therein the fairest captives of the war. the conduct of the ruler was imitated by his subjects. the presence of women increased the vanity of the warriors: and it was not very long before the patched smock which had vaunted the holy poverty of the rebels developed into the gaudy jibba of the conquerors. since the unhealthy situation of khartoum amid swamps and marshes did not commend itself to the now luxurious arabs, the mahdi began to build on the western bank of the white nile a new capital, which, from the detached fort which had stood there in egyptian days, was called omdurman. among the first buildings which he set his subjects to construct were a mosque for the services of religion, an arsenal for the storage of military material, and a house for himself. but while he was thus entering at once upon the enjoyments of supreme power and unbridled lust, the god whom he had served, not unfaithfully, and who had given him whatever he had asked, required of mohammed ahmed his soul; and so all that he had won by his brains and bravery became of no more account to him.

in the middle of the month of june, scarcely five months after the completion of his victorious campaigns, the mahdi fell sick. for a few days he did not appear at the mosque. the people were filled with alarm. they were reassured by remembering the prophecy that their liberator should not perish till he had conquered the earth. mohammed, however, grew worse. presently those who attended him could doubt no longer that he was attacked by typhus fever. the khalifa abdullah watched by his couch continually. on the sixth day the inhabitants and the soldiers were informed of the serious nature of their ruler's illness, and public prayers were offered by all classes for his recovery. on the seventh day it was evident that he was dying. all those who had shared his fortunes—the khalifas he had appointed, the chief priests of the religion he had reformed, the leaders of the armies who had followed him to victory, and his own family whom he had hallowed—crowded the small room. for some hours he lay unconscious or in delirium, but as the end approached he rallied a little, and, collecting his faculties by a great effort, declared his faithful follower and friend the khalifa abdullah his successor, and adjured the rest to show him honour. 'he is of me, and i am of him; as you have obeyed me, so you should deal with him. may god have mercy upon me!' [slatin, fire and sword.] then he immediately expired.

grief and dismay filled the city. in spite of the emphatic prohibition by law of all loud lamentations, the sound of 'weeping and wailing arose from almost every house.' the whole people, deprived at once of their acknowledged sovereign and spiritual guide, were shocked and affrighted. only the mahdi's wives, if we may credit slatin, 'rejoiced secretly in their hearts at the death of their husband and master,' and, since they were henceforth to be doomed to an enforced and inviolable chastity, the cause of their satisfaction is as obscure as its manifestation was unnatural. the body of the mahdi, wrapped in linen, was reverently interred in a deep grave dug in the floor of the room in which he had died, nor was it disturbed until after the capture of omdurman by the british forces in 1898, when by the orders of sir h. kitchener the sepulchre was opened and the corpse exhumed.

the khalifa abdullah had been declared by the mahdi's latest breath his successor. he determined to have the choice ratified once for all by the popular vote. hurrying to the pulpit in the courtyard of the mosque, he addressed the assembled multitude in a voice which trembled with intense excitement and emotion. his oratory, his reputation as a warrior, and the mahdi's expressed desire aroused the enthusiasm of his hearers, and the oath of allegiance was at once sworn by thousands. the ceremony continued long after it was dark. with an amazing endurance he harangued till past midnight, and when the exhausted slatin, who hard attended him throughout the crisis, lay down upon the ground to sleep, he knew that his master's succession was assured; for, says he, 'i heard the passers-by loud in their praises of the late mahdi, and assuring each other of their firm resolve to support his successor.'

the sovereignty that abdullah had obtained must be held, as it had been won, by the sword. the passionate agitation which the mahdi had excited survived him. the whole of the soudan was in a ferment. the success which had crowned rebellion encouraged rebels. all the turbulent and fanatical elements were aroused. as the various provinces had been cleared of the egyptians, the new executive had appointed military governors by whom the country was ruled and taxed, subject to the pleasure of mohammed ahmed. his death was the signal for a long series of revolts of all kinds—military, political, and religious. garrisons mutinied; emirs plotted; prophets preached. nor was the land torn only by internal struggles. its frontiers were threatened. on the east the tremendous power of abyssinia loomed terrible and menacing. there was war in the north with egypt and around suakin with england. the italians must be confronted from the direction of massowa. far to the south emin pasha still maintained a troublesome resistance. yet the khalifa triumphed over nearly all his enemies; and the greatest spectacle which the soudan presented from 1885 to 1898 was of this strong, capable ruler bearing up against all reverses, meeting each danger, overcoming each difficulty, and offering a firm front to every foe.

it is unlikely that any complete history of these events will ever be written in a form and style which will interest a later generation. the complications of extraordinary names and the imperfection of the records might alone deter the chronicler. the universal squalor of the scenes and the ignorance of the actors add discouragements. nor, upon the other hand, are there great incentives. the tale is one of war of the cruellest, bloodiest, and most confused type. one savage army slaughters another. one fierce general cuts his rival's throat. the same features are repeated with wearying monotony. when one battle is understood, all may be imagined. above the tumult the figure of the khalifa rises stern and solitary, the only object which may attract the interest of a happier world. yet even the khalifa's methods were oppressively monotonous. for although the nature or courage of the revolts might differ with the occasion, the results were invariable; and the heads of all his chief enemies, of many of his generals, of most of his councillors, met in the capacious pit which yawned in omdurman.

during the thirteen years of his reign abdullah tried nearly every device by which oriental rulers have sought to fortify their perilous sovereignty. he shrank from nothing. self-preservation was the guiding principle of his policy, his first object and his only excuse. among many wicked and ingenious expedients three main methods are remarkable. first, he removed or rendered innocuous all real or potential rivals. secondly, he pursued what sir alfred milner has called 'a well-considered policy of military concentration.' thirdly, he maintained among the desert and riverain people a balance of power on the side of his own tribe. all these three methods merit some attention or illustration.

the general massacre of all possible claimants usually follows the accession of a usurper to an oriental throne. the khalifa was able to avoid this extreme measure. nevertheless he took precautions. availing himself of the grief and terror that had followed mohammed ahmed's death, he had extorted the oath of allegiance from the two other khalifas and from the 'ashraf' or relations of the prophet. [the madhi had superseded the original mohammed as 'the prophet.' his relations consequently became 'ashraf.'] but these complaisant men soon repented of their submission. each khalifa boasted his independence. each marched attended by a numerous retinue. each asserted his right to beat his own great copper drum. both the unsuccessful khalifas combined against abdullah. but while they had been busy with the beating of war-drums and the preparation of pageants, that sagacious ruler had secured the loyalty of the baggara tribe, to a section of which he belonged, and of a considerable force of black riflemen. at length matters reached climax. both parties prepared for war. abdullah drew up his array without the city, and challenged his rivals to the utmost proof. the combined forces of the ousted khalifas were the more numerous. but the fierce baggara waved their swords, and the soudanese riflemen were famous for their valour. for some hours a bloody struggle appeared imminent. then the confederacy broke up. the khalifa ali-wad-helu, a prudent man, talked of compromise and amity. the khalif sherif, thus seriously weakened, hastened to make peace while time remained. eventually both bowed to the superior force of the ruler and the superior courage of his followers. once they had submitted, their power was gone. abdullah reduced their forces to a personal escort of fifty men each, deprived them of their flags and their war-drums—the emblems of royalty—and they became for the future the useful supporters of a government they were unable to subvert.

to other less powerful and more stubborn enemies he showed a greater severity. the mahdi's two uncles, named respectively abdel kerim and abdel kader, were thrown chained into prison, their houses were destroyed, and their wives and other property confiscated. the numerous persons who claimed to be of the 'ashraf' found the saintly honour a burden upon earth; for, in order to keep them out of mischief, the khalifa enjoined them to attend five times every day at the prayers in the mosque. eighteen months of these devotions, declares the christian chronicler, were considered 'the highest punishment.' [ohrwalder, ten years' captivity.] still more barbarous was the treatment meted out to the unfortunate emir who had charge of the treasury. ahmed wad suliman had been accustomed under the mahdi's mild rule to keep no public accounts, and consequently he had amassed a large fortune. he was actively hostile to abdullah, and proclaimed his sympathy with the ashraf. whereupon the khalifa invited him to give an account of his stewardship. this he was, of course, unable to do. he was then dismissed from his appointment. his private property was taken to fill the deficiencies of the state, and the brutal population of omdurman applauded his punishment as 'an act of justice.' [slatin, fire and sword.]

although the khalifa might establish his authority by such atrocities, its maintenance depended on the military policy which he consistently pursued. the terrible power of a standing army may usually be exerted by whoever can control its leaders, as a mighty engine is set in motion by the turning of a handle. yet to turn the handle some muscular force is necessary. abdullah knew that to rule the soudan he must have a great army. to make the great army obedient he must have another separate force; for the influences which keep european armies in subjection were not present among the dervishes. for some years, indeed, he was compelled to leave much to chance or the loyalty of his officers. but latterly, when he had perfected his organisation, he became quite independent and had no need to trust anyone. by degrees and with astonishing ability he carried out his schemes.

he invited his own tribe, the taaisha section of the baggara arabs, to come and live in omdurman. 'come,' he wrote in numerous letters to them, 'and take possession of the lands which the lord your god has given you.' allured by the hopes of wealth and wives and the promise of power, the savage herdsmen came to the number of 7,000 warriors. their path was made smooth and easy. granaries were erected along the route. steamers and sailing-vessels waited on the nile. arrived at the capital, all were newly clothed at the expense of the state. an entire district of the city was forcibly cleared of its inhabitants for the accommodation of the strangers. what the generosity of the khalifa forgot or refused, the predatory habits of his clansmen procured; and they robbed, plundered, and swindled with all the arrogance and impunity of royal favourites. the populace of the city returned a bitter hatred for these injuries; and the khalifa's object was attained. he had created a class in omdurman who were indissolubly attached to him. like him, they were detested by the local tribes. like him, they were foreigners in the land. but, like him, they were fierce and brave and strong. his dangers, his enemies, his interests were their own. their lives depended on their loyalty.

here was the motor muscle which animated the rest. the taaisha baggara controlled the black jehadia, once the irregular troops of the egyptians, now become the regulars of the khalifa. the black jehadia overawed the arab army in the capital. the army in the capital dominated the forces in the provinces. the forces in the provinces subdued the inhabitants. the centralisation of power was assured by the concentration of military material. cannon, rifles, stores of ammunition, all the necessities of war were accumulated in the arsenal. only the armies on the frontiers, the taaisha tribe, and the khalifa's personal bodyguard habitually carried firearms and cartridges. the enormous population of omdurman was forced to be content with spears and swords. rifles were issued to the soudanese whenever safe and necessary; cartridges only when they were about to be used. thus several millions of warlike and savage people, owning scarcely any law but that of might, and scattered about a vast roadless territory, were brought into the firm grip of a single man.

the third principle of government which the khalifa was compelled, or inclined, to adopt was to keep the relative power of the various tribes and classes conveniently proportioned. if an emir rose to great influence and wealth, he became a possible rival, and suffered forthwith death, imprisonment, or spoliation. if a tribe threatened the supremacy of the taaisha it was struck down while its menace was yet a menace. the regulation of classes and tribes was a far more complicated affair than the adjustment of individuals. yet for thirteen years the khalifa held the balance, and held it exact until the very end. such was the statecraft of a savage from kordofan.

his greatest triumph was the abyssinian war. it is not likely that two great barbaric kingdoms living side by side, but differing in race and religion, will long continue at peace; nor was it difficult to discover a cause of the quarrel between the dervishes and the abyssinians. for some time a harassing and desultory warfare disturbed the border. at length in 1885 a dervish—half-trader, half brigand—sacked an abyssinian church. bas adal, the governor of the amhara province, demanded that this sacrilegious robber should be surrendered to justice. the arabs haughtily refused. the response was swift. collecting an army which may have amounted to 30,000 men, the abyssinians invaded the district of gallabat and marched on the town. against this host the emir wad arbab could muster no more than 6,000 soldiers. but, encouraged by the victories of the previous four years, the dervishes accepted battle, in spite of the disparity of numbers. neither valour nor discipline could withstand such odds. the moslems, broken by the fierce onset and surrounded by the overwhelming numbers of their enemies, were destroyed, together with their intrepid leader. scarcely any escaped. the abyssinians indulged in all the triumphs of savagery. the wounded were massacred: the slain were mutilated: the town of gallabat was sacked and burnt. the women were carried into captivity. all these tidings came to omdurman. under this heavy and unexpected blow the khalifa acted with prudence. he opened negotiations with king john of abyssinia, for the ransom of the captured wives and children, and at the same time he sent the emir yunes with a large force to gallabat. the immediate necessities having thus been dealt with, abdullah prepared for revenge.

of all the arab leaders which fifteen years of continual war and tumult throughout the soudan produced, none displayed higher ability, none obtained greater successes, and none were more honourable, though several were more famous, than the man whom the khalifa selected to avenge the destruction of the gallabat army. abu anga had been a slave in abdullah's family long before the mahdi had preached at abba island and while egypt yet oppressed the country. after the revolt had broken out, his adventurous master summoned him from the distant kordofan home to attend him in the war, and abu anga came with that ready obedience and strange devotion for which he was always distinguished. nominally as a slave, really as a comrade, he fought by abdullah's side in all the earlier battles of the rebellion. nor was it until after the capture of el obeid that he rose suddenly to power and place. the khalifa was a judge of men. he saw very clearly that the black soudanese troops, who had surrendered and were surrendering as town after town was taken, might be welded into a powerful weapon. and in abu anga he knew a man who could not only fashion the blade, but would hold it ever loyally at his master's disposal. the former slave threw himself into the duties of his command with extraordinary energy. his humble origin pleased the hardy blacks, who recognised in their leader their equal in birth, their superior in prowess. more than any other emir, abu anga contributed to the destruction of hicks's army. the jehadia, as his soldiers were called—because they had joined in the jehad, or holy war—were armed with remington rifles, and their harassing fire inflicted heavy losses on the struggling column until it was finally brought to a standstill, and the moment for the spearmen to charge arrived. henceforward the troops of abu anga became famous throughout the land for their weapons, their courage, and their cruelty. their numbers at first did not exceed 5,000; but as more towns were taken and more slaves were turned into soldiers they increased, until at one time they reached the formidable total of 15,000 men. during the siege of khartoum the black riflemen distinguished themselves by the capture of omdurman fort, but their violent natures and predatory instincts made them an undesirable garrison even for the dervish capital, and they were despatched under their general to kordofan, where they increased their reputation by a series of bloody fights with the nubas, an aboriginal mountain people who cared for nothing but their independence.

at the end of june abu anga reached omdurman with an army variously estimated at from 22,000 to 31,000 men, of whom at least 10,000 were armed with remington rifles. the khalifa received him with the utmost honour. after a private interview, which lasted for several hours, a formal entry into the town was arranged. at daybreak on the following morning the whole force marched into the city and camped along the northern suburbs, applauded and welcomed alike by the population and their ruler. a few days after this a great review was held under the kerreri hills, on the very ground where the dervish empire was doomed to be shattered. but the fateful place oppressed the khalifa with no forebodings. he exulted in his power: and well he might, for after the cannon had thundered indefinite salutes, no fewer than 100,000 armed men defiled to the music of the war-drums and the ombyas before the famous black flag. the spectacle of the enormous numbers provoked their enthusiasm. the triumphant khalifa was cheered by his mighty host, who pressed upon him in their exuberant loyalty until he was almost crushed. it was indeed a stirring scene. the whole plain was filled with the throng. banners of every hue and shape waved gaily in the breeze, and the sunlight glinted from innumerable spear-points. the swarming dervishes displayed their bright parti-coloured jibbas. the wild baggara cavalry circled on the flanks of the array. the brown dome of the mahdi's tomb, rising above the city, seemed to assure the warriors of supernatural aid. abdullah was at the summit of his power. the movement initiated by the priest of abba island had attained its climax. behind, in the plain, the frowning rocks of surgham hill rose ragged and gloomy, as if their silence guarded the secrets of the future.

after the feast of bairam had been celebrated on a gigantic scale, abu anga was despatched to gallabat with his army and considerable reinforcements from the troops in omdurman, and it became evident that war with abyssinia was imminent. the great leader relieved the emir yunes, much to the latter's disgust, of the chief command, and, since the strong gallabat garrison was added to his own force, abu anga was able to take the field at the head of 15,000 riflemen and 45,000 spearmen. the khalifa had embarked on a great venture in planning the invasion of abyssinia. the vast strength of the negus was known to the dervishes, and has since been proved to the world. the mahdi had forbidden such a war. an ill-omened prophecy further declared that the king of abyssinia would tether his horse to a solitary tree by khartoum, while his cavalry should ride through the city fetlock deep in blood. but abdullah feared neither god nor man. he reviewed the political situation, and determined at all risks to maintain his frontiers inviolate. his emir wad arbab had been killed. blood must settle the matter.

the abyssinians had not watched the extensive hostile preparations apathetically. ras adal had collected an army which in numbers actually exceeded that of the dervishes. but the latter were far superior in rifles, and the black infantry were of invincible valour. nevertheless, confident in his strength and relying on his powerful cavalry, the abyssinian general allowed the arabs to toil through all the mountainous country, to traverse the mintik pass, and to debouch unmolested on to the plain of debra sin. abu anga neglected no precaution. he knew that since he must fight in the heart of abyssinia, with the mountains behind him, a defeat would involve annihilation. he drew up his army swiftly and with skill. then the abyssinians attacked. the rifle fire of the soudanese repulsed them. the onset was renewed with desperate gallantry. it was resisted with equal valour and superior weapons. after frightful losses the abyssinians wavered, and the wise arab seized the moment for a counterstroke. in spite of the devotion of his cavalry ras adal was driven from the field. great numbers of his army were drowned in the river in front of which he had recklessly elected to fight. his camp was captured, and a valuable spoil rewarded the victors, who also gratified their passions with a wholesale slaughter of the wounded—a practice commonly followed by savages. the effect of the victory was great. the whole of the amhara province submitted to the invaders, and in the spring of 1887 abu anga was able to advance without further fighting to the capture and sack of gondar, the ancient capital of abyssinia.

meanwhile the khalifa had been anxiously expecting tidings of his army. the long silence of thirty days which followed their plunge into the mountains filled him with fear, and ohrwalder relates that he 'aged visibly' during that period. but his judgment was proved by the event, and the arrival of a selected assortment of heads turned doubt to triumph. the dervishes did not long remain in abyssinia, as they suffered from the climate. in december the army returned to gallabat, which they commenced to fortify, and their victorious general followed his grisly but convincing despatch to omdurman, where he received the usual welcome accorded by warlike peoples to military heroes. but the famous and faithful slave may have been more gratified by the tears of joy which his master and sovereign shed on beholding him again safe and successful.

the greater struggle was still to come. the whole of abyssinia was convulsed with fury, and king john in person prepared to take the field and settle the quarrel for ever. he assembled a mighty host, which is said to have amounted to 130,000 foot and 20,000 horsemen. the rumours of this formidable concentration reached gallabat and omdurman, and in spite of the recent victory caused deep alarm. the khalifa saw his frontiers—even his existence—menaced, for king john had declared that he would sweep the dervishes from off the face of the earth: and in the hour of need the general on whom so much depended died of some poisonous medicine with which he had endeavoured to cure himself of indigestion. abu anga was buried in his red-brick house at gallabat amid the lamentations of his brave black soldiers, and gloom pervaded the whole army. but, since the enemy were approaching, the danger had to be faced. the khalifa appointed zeki tummal, one of anga's lieutenants, to the command of the forces at gallabat, which by strenuous exertions he brought up to a total of 85,000 men. king john sent word that he was coming, lest any should say that he had come secretly as a thief. the dervishes resolved to remain on the defensive, and, fortifying themselves in an enormous zeriba around the town, awaited the onslaught.

at dawn on the 9th of march, 1889, the abyssinians came within sight of their enemies, and early the next morning the battle began. great clouds of dust obscured the scene, and all intelligible sounds were lost in the appalling din. the abyssinians, undaunted by the rifle fire of the soudanese, succeeded in setting the zeriba alight. then, concentrating all their force on one part of the defence, they burst into the enclosure and town. the division of wad ali, a fourth part of the entire dervish army, which bore the brunt of this attack, was almost completely destroyed. the interior of the zeriba was crowded with women and children, who were ruthlessly butchered by the exultant abyssinians. the assailants scattered in all directions in search of plunder, and they even had time to begin to disinter the body of abu anga, which they were eager to insult in revenge for gondar. the dervishes already wavered; their ammunition began to fail, when suddenly a rumour spread about among the abyssinians that the king was killed. seizing what booty they could snatch, the victorious army began a general retreat, and the zeriba was soon cleared. the arabs were too exhausted to pursue, but when on the following day the attack was not renewed they learned, to their surprise, that they were the victors and that their enemy was falling back towards the atbara river. zeki tummal resolved to pursue, and his army were further incited to the chase by the fact that the abyssinians had carried off with them a large number of dervish women, including the harem of the late beloved abu anga. two days after the battle the dervishes overtook the enemy's rearguard and, surprising their camp, inflicted severe loss and captured much booty. the temporary negus who had been appointed to fill the vacancy caused by the death of king john was among the killed. the body of that courageous monarch fell into the hands of the dervishes, who struck off the head and sent it—a tangible proof of victory—to omdurman. the abyssinians, still formidable, made good their retreat; nor did zeki tummal venture to follow into the mountains. internal difficulties within his dominions prevented the new negus from resuming the offensive, and thus the dervish-abyssinian war dwindled down to, as it had arisen out of, frontier raids.

the arrival in omdurman of king john's head intoxicated the khalifa with joy. abyssinia was regarded throughout the soudan as a far greater power than egypt, and here was its mighty ruler slain and decapitated. but the victory had been dearly purchased. the two great battles had been fought with indescribable ferocity by both sides, and the slaughter was appalling. no reliable statistics are avaliable, but it may be reasonably asserted that neither side sustained a loss in killed during the war of fewer than 15,000 fighting men. the flower of the dervish army, the heroic blacks of abu anga, were almost destroyed. the khalifa had won a pyrrhic triumph. never again was he able to put so great a force in the field, and, although the army which was shattered at omdurman was better armed and better drilled, it was less formidable than that which broke the might of abyssinia.

during the progress of the struggle with abyssinia the war against egypt languished. the mahdi, counting upon the support of the population, had always declared that he would free the delta from 'the turks,' and was already planning its invasion when he and his schemes were interrupted by death. his successor inherited all the quarrel, but not all the power. much of mohammed ahmed's influence died with him. alive, he might conquer the moslem world; dead, he was only a saint. all fanatical feeling in egypt soon subsided. nevertheless the khalifa persisted in the enterprise. the success of the abyssinian war encouraged and enabled him to resume the offensive on his northern frontier, and he immediately ordered wad-el-nejumi, who commanded in dongola, to march with his scanty force to the invasion of egypt. the mad enterprise ended, as might have been foreseen, in the destruction of both emir and army at toski. the khalifa received the news with apparent grief, but it is difficult to avoid suspecting him of dark schemes. he was far too clever to believe that egypt could be conquered by five thousand men. he knew that besides the egyptians there was a strange white tribe of men, the same that had so nearly saved khartoum. 'but for the english,' he exclaimed on several occasions, 'i would have conquered egypt.' yet, knowing of the british occupation, he deliberately sent an army to its inevitable ruin. it is difficult to reconcile such conduct with the character for sagacity and intelligence which abdullah has deserved. there is no doubt that he wanted to conquer egypt. possibly by some extraordinary chance wad-el-nejumi might succeed, even with his small force. if so, then the glory of god and the power of the khalifa would advance together. if not—and herein lies the true reason for the venture—the riverain tribes would have received a crippling blow.

the terrible slaughter of the abyssinian war had fallen mainly on the jehadia and the eastern arabs. the jealous tribes in the north had not suffered. the balance of power was in need of re-adjustment. the jaalin and barabra were fast becoming dangerous. nejumi's army was recruited almost entirely from these sources. the reinforcements sent from omdurman consisted of men selected from the flag of the khalifa sherif, who was growing too powerful, and of the batahin tribe, who had shown a mutinous spirit [ohrwalder, ten years' captivity.] the success of such an army in egypt would be glorious. its destruction anywhere would be convenient. whatever abdullah's motives may have been, his advantage was certain. but the life of the empire thus compelled to prey upon itself must necessarily be short.

other forces were soon added to the work of exhaustion. the year following the end of the abyssinian war was marked by a fearful famine. slatin and ohrwalder vie with each other in relating its horrors—men eating the raw entrails of donkeys; mothers devouring their babies; scores dying in the streets, all the more ghastly in the bright sunlight; hundreds of corpses floating down the nile—these are among the hideous features, the depopulation caused by the scarcity was even greater than that produced by the fighting. the famine area extended over the whole soudan and ran along the banks of the river as far as lower egypt. the effects of the famine were everywhere appalling. entire districts between omdurman and berber became wholly depopulated. in the salt regions near shendi almost all the inhabitants died of hunger. the camel-breeding tribes ate their she-camels. the riverain peoples devoured their seed-corn. the population of gallabat, gedaref, and kassala was reduced by nine-tenths, and these once considerable towns shrank to the size of hamlets. everywhere the deserted mud houses crumbled back into the plain. the frightful mortality, general throughout the whole country, may be gauged by the fact that zeki tummal's army, which before the famine numbered not fewer than 87,000, could scarcely muster 10,000 men in the spring of 1890.

the new harvest came only in time to save the inhabitants of the soudan from becoming extinct. the remnant were preserved for further misfortunes. war, scarcity, and oppression there had always been. but strange and mysterious troubles began to afflict the tortured tribes. the face of heaven was pitiless or averted. in 1890 innumerable swarms of locusts descended on the impoverished soil. the multitude of their red or yellow bodies veiled the sun and darkened the air, and although their flesh, tasting when roasted like fried shrimps, might afford a delicate meal to the natives, they took so heavy a toll of the crops that the famine was prolonged and scarcity became constant. since their first appearance the locusts are said to have returned annually [ohrwalder, ten years' captivity.] their destructive efforts were aided by millions of little red mice, who destroyed the seeds before they could grow. so vast and immeasurable was the number of these tiny pests that after a heavy rain the whole country was strewn with, and almost tinted by, the squirrel-coloured corpses of the drowned.

yet, in spite of all the strokes of fate, the khalifa maintained his authority unshaken. the centralisation which always occurs in military states was accelerated by the famine. the provincial towns dwindled; thousands and tens of thousands perished; but omdurman continually grew, and its ruler still directed the energies of a powerful army. thus for the present we might leave the dervish empire. yet the gloomy city of blood, mud, and filth that arose by the confluence of the niles deserves a final glance while still in the pride of independent barbarism.

it is early morning, and the sun, lifting above the horizon, throws the shadows of the khartoum ruins on the brimful waters of the nile. the old capital is solitary and deserted. no sound of man breaks the silence of its streets. only memory broods in the garden where the pashas used to walk, and the courtyard where the imperial envoy fell. across the river miles of mud houses, lining the banks as far as khor shambat, and stretching back into the desert and towards the dark hills, display the extent of the arab metropolis. as the sun rises, the city begins to live. along the road from kerreri a score of camels pad to market with village produce. the north wind is driving a dozen sailing-boats, laden to the water's edge with merchandise, to the wharves. one of gordon's old steamers lies moored by the bank. another, worked by the crew that manned it in egyptian days, is threshing up the blue nile, sent by the khalifa to sennar on some errand of state. far away to the southward the dust of a darfur caravan breaks the clear-cut skyline with a misty blur.

the prolonged beating of war-drums and loud booming notes of horns chase away the silence of the night. it is friday, and after the hour of prayer all grown men must attend the review on the plain without the city. already the streets are crowded with devout and obedient warriors. soon the great square of the mosque—for no roof could shelter so many thousand worshippers—is filled with armed men, kneeling in humble supplication to the stern god of islam and his most holy mahdi. it is finished. they rise and hurry to the parade. the emirs plant their flags, and all form in the ranks. woe to the laggard; and let the speedy see that he wear his newest jibba, and carry a sharp sword and at least three spears. presently the array is complete.

a salute of seven guns is fired. mounted on a fine camel, which is led by a gigantic nubian, and attended by perhaps two hundred horsemen in chain armour, the khalifa rides on to the ground and along the ranks. it is a good muster. few have dared absent themselves. yet his brow is clouded. what has happened? is there another revolt in the west? do the abyssinians threaten gallabat? have the black troops mutinied; or is it only some harem quarrel?

the parade is over. the troops march back to the arsenal. the rifles are collected, and the warriors disperse to their homes. many hurry to the market-place to make purchases, to hear the latest rumour, or to watch the executions—for there are usually executions. others stroll to the suk-er-rekik and criticise the points of the slave girls as the dealers offer them for sale. but the khalifa has returned to his house, and his council have been summoned. the room is small, and the ruler sits cross-legged upon his couch. before him squat the emirs and kadis. yakub is there, with ali-wad-helu and the khalifa sherif. only the sheikh-ed-din is absent, for he is a dissolute youth and much given to drinking.

abdullah is grave and anxious. a messenger has come from the north. the turks are on the move. advancing beyond their frontier, they have established themselves at akasha. wad bishara fears lest they may attack the faithful who hold firket. in itself this is but a small matter, for all these years there has been frontier fighting. but what follows is full of menacing significance. the 'enemies of god' have begun to repair the railway—have repaired it, so that the train already runs beyond sarras. even now they push their iron road out into the desert towards their position at akasha and to the south. what is the object of their toil? are they coming again? will they bring those terrible white soldiers who broke the hearts of the hadendoa and almost destroyed the degheim and kenana? what should draw them up the nile? is it for plunder, or in sheer love of war; or is it a blood feud that brings them? true, they are now far off. perchance they will return, as they returned before. yet the iron road is not built in a day, nor for a day, and of a surety there are war-clouds in the north.