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A Modern Utopia

Section 2
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the social theorists of utopia, my double explained, did not base their schemes upon the classification of men into labour and capital, the landed interest, the liquor trade, and the like. they esteemed these as accidental categories, indefinitely amenable to statesmanship, and they looked for some practical and real classification upon which to base organisation. [footnote: in that they seem to have profited by a more searching criticism of early social and political speculations than our earth has yet undertaken. the social speculations of the greeks, for example, had just the same primary defect as the economic speculations of the eighteenth century — they began with the assumption that the general conditions of the prevalent state of affairs were permanent.] but, on the other hand, the assumption that men are unclassifiable, because practically homogeneous, which underlies modern democratic methods and all the fallacies of our equal justice, is even more alien to the utopian mind. throughout utopia there is, of course, no other than provisional classifications, since every being is regarded as finally unique, but for political and social purposes things have long rested upon a classification of temperaments, which attends mainly to differences in the range and quality and character of the individual imagination.

this utopian classification was a rough one, but it served its purpose to determine the broad lines of political organisation; it was so far unscientific that many individuals fall between or within two or even three of its classes. but that was met by giving the correlated organisation a compensatory looseness of play. four main classes of mind were distinguished, called, respectively, the poietic, the kinetic, the dull, and the base. the former two are supposed to constitute the living tissue of the state; the latter are the fulcra and resistances, the bone and cover of its body. they are not hereditary classes, nor is there any attempt to develop any class by special breeding, simply because the intricate interplay of heredity is untraceable and incalculable. they are classes to which people drift of their own accord. education is uniform until differentiation becomes unmistakable, and each man (and woman) must establish his position with regard to the lines of this abstract classification by his own quality, choice, and development. . . .

the poietic or creative class of mental individuality embraces a wide range of types, but they agree in possessing imaginations that range beyond the known and accepted, and that involve the desire to bring the discoveries made in such excursions, into knowledge and recognition. the scope and direction of the imaginative excursion may vary very greatly. it may be the invention of something new or the discovery of something hitherto unperceived. when the invention or discovery is primarily beauty then we have the artistic type of poietic mind; when it is not so, we have the true scientific man. the range of discovery may be narrowed as it is in the art of whistler or the science of a cytologist, or it may embrace a wide extent of relevance, until at last both artist or scientific inquirer merge in the universal reference of the true philosopher. to the accumulated activities of the poietic type, reacted upon by circumstances, are due almost all the forms assumed by human thought and feeling. all religious ideas, all ideas of what is good or beautiful, entered life through the poietic inspirations of man. except for processes of decay, the forms of the human future must come also through men of this same type, and it is a primary essential to our modern idea of an abundant secular progress that these activities should be unhampered and stimulated.

the kinetic class consists of types, various, of course, and merging insensibly along the boundary into the less representative constituents of the poietic group, but distinguished by a more restricted range of imagination. their imaginations do not range beyond the known, experienced, and accepted, though within these limits they may imagine as vividly or more vividly than members of the former group. they are often very clever and capable people, but they do not do, and they do not desire to do, new things. the more vigorous individuals of this class are the most teachable people in the world, and they are generally more moral and more trustworthy than the poietic types. they live — while the poietics are always something of experimentalists with life. the characteristics of either of these two classes may be associated with a good or bad physique, with excessive or defective energy, with exceptional keenness of the senses in some determinate direction or such-like “bent,” and the kinetic type, just as the poietic type, may display an imagination of restricted or of the most universal range. but a fairly energetic kinetic is probably the nearest thing to that ideal our earthly anthropologists have in mind when they speak of the “normal” human being. the very definition of the poietic class involves a certain abnormality.

the utopians distinguished two extremes of this kinetic class according to the quality of their imaginative preferences, the dan and beersheba, as it were, of this division. at one end is the mainly intellectual, unoriginal type, which, with energy of personality, makes an admirable judge or administrator and without it an uninventive, laborious, common mathematician, or common scholar, or common scientific man; while at the other end is the mainly emotional, unoriginal man, the type to which — at a low level of personal energy — my botanist inclines. the second type includes, amidst its energetic forms, great actors, and popular politicians and preachers. between these extremes is a long and wide region of varieties, into which one would put most of the people who form the reputable workmen, the men of substance, the trustworthy men and women, the pillars of society on earth.

below these two classes in the utopian scheme of things, and merging insensibly into them, come the dull. the dull are persons of altogether inadequate imagination, the people who never seem to learn thoroughly, or hear distinctly, or think clearly. (i believe if everyone is to be carefully educated they would be considerably in the minority in the world, but it is quite possible that will not be the reader’s opinion. it is clearly a matter of an arbitrary line.) they are the stupid people, the incompetent people, the formal, imitative people, the people who, in any properly organised state, should, as a class, gravitate towards and below the minimum wage that qualifies for marriage. the laws of heredity are far too mysterious for such offspring as they do produce to be excluded from a fair chance in the world, but for themselves, they count neither for work nor direction in the state.

finally, with a bold disregard of the logician’s classificatory rules, these utopian statesmen who devised the world state, hewed out in theory a class of the base. the base may, indeed, be either poietic, kinetic, or dull, though most commonly they are the last, and their definition concerns not so much the quality of their imagination as a certain bias in it, that to a statesman makes it a matter for special attention. the base have a narrower and more persistent egoistic reference than the common run of humanity; they may boast, but they have no frankness; they have relatively great powers of concealment, and they are capable of, and sometimes have an aptitude and inclination towards, cruelty. in the queer phrasing of earthly psychology with its clumsy avoidance of analysis, they have no “moral sense.” they count as an antagonism to the state organisation.

obviously, this is the rudest of classifications, and no utopian has ever supposed it to be a classification for individual application, a classification so precise that one can say, this man is “poietic,” and that man is “base.” in actual experience these qualities mingle and vary in every possible way. it is not a classification for truth, but a classification to an end. taking humanity as a multitude of unique individuals in mass, one may, for practical purposes, deal with it far more conveniently by disregarding its uniquenesses and its mixed cases altogether, and supposing it to be an assembly of poietic, kinetic, dull, and base people. in many respects it behaves as if it were that. the state, dealing as it does only with non-individualised affairs, is not only justified in disregarding, but is bound to disregard, a man’s special distinction, and to provide for him on the strength of his prevalent aspect as being on the whole poietic, kinetic, or what not. in a world of hasty judgments and carping criticism, it cannot be repeated too often that the fundamental ideas of a modern utopia imply everywhere and in everything, margins and elasticities, a certain universal compensatory looseness of play.

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