the army in south and west africa—1834–86

omitting such small “affairs” as were consequent on the extension and for long purely coastal expansion of our empire in africa after the long war, there is little to record until 1834. the conquest of the dark continent had been gradual, and practically commercial. it had been largely based on geographical discoveries. war and political occupation followed missionary enterprise here as elsewhere. nothing is more curious to watch than how often the proselyte is followed by the soldier and the sword. the colonist and trade follow the first, and with him or them come trade-rum, trade-firearms, and all the so-called blessings of civilisation. after both comes first friction, then fighting, and finally conquest. these are usually the phases of anglo-saxon colonial expansion, unless we add to them the last end of all, the practical extermination of the native races.

so it was in america, where the red man is dying out; and so in new zealand, though to a less degree, for the natives there are of better stock. it is not yet to the same extent in africa, solely because the population, in the latter days of the nineteenth century, is too redundant. but unless the black can assimilate with the white, he must as assuredly give place to those who have the mental and physical power, as the red man has been driven westward against the mountain ridges of america.

asiatics alone, among the races of colour, have held their own, because the people are intellectually sound. in that country, built up of many countries, there has been always,352 as far as historic time goes, civilisation. in africa there has been none, save that alone of immigrants. in china, again, there is no dread of such extermination; its people, though barbaric, are intellectual and more than semi-civilised. in japan the extreme case is met with. a nation of high artistic and intellectual power, not a quarter of a century ago ranking among armour-wearing barbarians, it has shown its strength in its recent war with china, and won respect and equality among the leading nations of the earth.

this africa has never done, and its history therefore, as far as great britain’s army is concerned, is not that of the barbaric or semi-barbaric powers with whom we have come in contact, but that of savage powers who are incapable of improvement or absorption, and whose only destiny is to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water. as the red man numbered millions when the eighteenth century was dying, and within a hundred years is far less than a quantité negligéable, so the black man, numbering millions when the nineteenth century is also a-dying, may possibly, before another century, fade out too. there is no room for either, unless the black mends his ways better than the red man did.

the earliest occupation of the african littoral was that of the north-west coast for purely trading purposes, and that of the cape of good hope for those of colonial expansion, and as one of the chain of ports uniting our eastern and far eastern possessions with the mother country. in early days they were the dep?ts whence the essential necessaries of food, water, and stores were replenished. now they are even more vitally important as the coaling stations for the ocean steamers.

as already referred to, the cape of good hope was seized by conquest in 1805. the west african settlements at gambia, sierra leone, gold coast, and lagos, united in 1806 into one government, bear date from 1787, etc., and were made primarily with little serious opposition. the west african is a less serious fighting personage than either his stalwart brother of zululand or the “fuzzy wuzzy” of the soudan. there was little antagonism at first, that is353 to say, after the conquest of the cape of good hope from the dutch. there was plenty of room for expansion, and the population was for a long time meagre.

but in 1817 the 72nd was engaged in suppressing a rising of the kaffirs of the great fish river; and in 1834 it was again employed against macomo in the same district. the frontier troubles were getting rather more serious, and the kaffir invasion of the colony was marked by the usual savage atrocities. almost the only military operation of the practically peaceful reign of william iv. was the punitive expedition of colonel peddie’s highlanders against these tribes.

the frontier, however, still remained restless for some years after this; and in 1843 the tables were somewhat turned, inasmuch as the 91st regiment was despatched to assist the griquas, who had placed themselves under our protection, against the boers, on the orange river.

shortly after, in 1846, the first serious kaffir war broke out, and in it the first and reserve battalions of the 91st, the 6th, 73rd, 45th, and rifle brigade were actively engaged for nearly two years. there was much hard fighting in the amatola mountains, at burn’s hill and block drift, and one noteworthy act of bravery may be recorded of privates walsh and reilly, who, when fort cox was beleaguered, managed to convey a despatch through the investing savages to governor maitland.

at the close of the year 1850 the racial antagonism again appeared, and this second kaffir war lasted until 1853, requiring the services of the 2nd, 6th, 43rd, 45th, 60th, 73rd, 74th, and 91st regiments of the line, besides the rifle brigade, the cape mounted rifles and colonial irregulars. the british frontier, when war broke out, was supposed to be represented by the kei river, between which and the great fish river the country had been informally considered more or less neutral. but all buffer states are dangers as a rule, and neutral belts are no better. so thought sandilli, a powerful kaffir chieftain; jealous of his own waning power as that of the white man increased, and also at being deposed354 by the governor of the colony, he broke into open revolt. the country was dense forest, roads rare, and the conduct of the war desultory. to destroy the rude kraals of the enemy, carry off his cattle, cut down his crops to starve him out, and finally assault some central stronghold such as are to be found in hill districts like the amatolas, or some isolated hill honeycombed with caves, was the method of procedure then as it is now. nothing has changed less in the army’s history than the tactics of savage war, especially in africa.

sir harry smith, who commanded, was not particularly successful either in his conduct of the campaign or in his judgment of the military situation. there were several small disasters, such as befell detachments of the 6th and 73rd under mackinnon at the keiskamma defile, and which partook then, and often after, of the nature of ambuscades. a detachment of the 45th escorting a convoy was cut off. the garrison of fort cox was for a time surrounded and completely isolated by the kaffirs. meanwhile, numerous european villages were destroyed by the enemy, and in many cases the inhabitants massacred with extreme barbarity and with horrible mutilations.

in the spring of 1852 a determined advance was made against the amatola mountains, in which was sandilli’s stronghold, and the highland “tortoises,” as the enemy called the 74th, from a fancied resemblance of their tartans to the markings of the land tortoise of south africa, after much heavy fighting and hard work, succeeded in clearing the district, but it took until september, when there was a sharp skirmish at kromme.

early in october the kaffirs assembled on the waterkloof heights, where the fortress of chief macomo was attacked seven times before the enemy were subdued. it cost the lives of many officers and men, including that of colonel fordyce of the 74th. thus hostilities practically ended, as the expedition across the orange river against the basuto chief moshesh, with the 2nd, 43rd, 73rd, 74th, rifle brigade, and 12th lancers, with some artillery and irregulars, was not opposed.

355 the next important outbreak of hostilities occurred on the west coast. there had been, long before 1873, frequent troubles in the hinterland of the west coast settlements. there had even been war about 1824 and 1826, when we had to defeat the natives at accra, after much previous desultory skirmishing, in one of which sir charles macarthy, the governor of the coast, was slain, and the force with him practically destroyed. there was a further slight disturbance in 1863; but in 1870, a more serious dispute arose as to the ownership of elmina, which we had taken over from the dutch. many impolitic acts were committed as regards the assistance that might have been rendered by us to those tribes most exposed to the ashanti attack, and finally, in january 1873, the ashanti army crossed the prah, and attacked the assims and fantees, and these after a while were worsted, and the roads to cape coast castle and elmina were thus left open. the elminas and ashantis fraternised, and made an effort to seize the elmina fort, but were repulsed by colonel festing, with some royal marines and a naval brigade; and thus matters remained, with 20,000 ashantis at mampon, ten miles distant from the british forts, until the arrival of the expedition commanded by sir garnet wolseley, which reached the coast in october 1874. partly by way of a diversion, and partly as a punitive expedition, a small force was first sent to elmina, and landing there, advanced against the allied natives at essiaman, and dispersed them with little loss. native levies were raised, and placed under the charge of european officers; posts were prepared, and the road improved between cape coast and the prah, one result of which preparation was the abandonment by the ashantis of their mampon camp, and their falling back behind the river. sundry other small expeditions from dunquah and towards abracampa also assisted.

in addition to the main advance, another was prepared under captain glover and captain r. sartorius, and was designed to advance from accra on coomassie. it was composed entirely of native levies led by a few british officers,356 but did not reach the ashanti capital until it had been captured and abandoned by the main column.

this was composed of the 2nd battalion of the rifle brigade, the 23rd, and the 42nd, and by new year’s day, 1874, these troops had landed at cape coast castle. no expedition could have been better managed or organised. every attention was paid to the slightest detail. sir garnet’s instructions for the officers, as regards their attention to their men, are more than instructive: they evidence the patient study of details necessary for the well-being of his command, which only a careful leader knows to be as essential to success as the fighting of his men when the time for action comes. sir garnet’s notes for the use of the troops should be read by everybody who has to conduct a similar campaign.

when the advance began, the stations between the coast and the prah numbered eight in the sixty-nine miles that covered the distance.

soon the prah was reached, the river that the ashantis believed would never be crossed by a white man; but lieutenant grant of the 5th crossed it first, none the less. here the stream, some 70 feet wide and 9 feet deep, was bridged with a crib bridge, and king koffi calcali sent ambassadors to treat for peace. but it was too late, even if the barbaric potentate could be trusted.

the army pushed on, deserted at times by the carriers, and little helped by the native allies; though the black regiments commanded by russell, wood, and webber did some useful work.

the adansi hills and bahrein river were successively crossed, and a skirmish occurred at a village near adubiassie, in which captain nicol was killed; but the first serious battle was that of amoaful, in which the ashanti army stubbornly fought for more than five hours before they fell back beaten.

the bush was terribly dense, the tracks were but 8 feet broad. paths had therefore to be hewn by the engineers in every case where the slightest width of front was necessary.

357 strong in numbers, and acquainted with the jungle tracks, the ashantis were able to assail both flanks and rear of the column as well as hold it in front. simultaneous attacks could be, and were, made during and immediately after the battle on the fortified posts along the line of communication with the prah and cape coast at quaman, fomanah, etc.

the fighting formation that could best meet these difficulties was, as in most of our african wars, a species of square. the advance was made in three columns. the centre, which formed, so to speak, the front face as far as possible, and was composed of the 42nd and the detachment of the 23rd, with rait’s guns, was to seize the village of egginassie. the left column, the naval brigade, and russell’s native regiment, with some royal engineers and two rocket troughs, was to move by a road cut through the bush some few hundred yards from the central column. the right column was also built up of the naval brigade, with another native regiment, and some engineers and rocket tubes. the 2nd battalion of the rifle brigade formed the reserve or rear face, if required, of the square. the village of egginassie was occupied with but little opposition, and the firing was continuous and heavy, as the troops advanced farther. fortunately the missiles were slugs, not bullets, or the loss would have been serious. as it was, many men were hit, some severely, and captain buckle was killed. the total casualties amounted to 250, while the ashanti loss was heavy, and their leader, ammonquantia, was slain.

the following day the village of bequah was taken, and further severe skirmishing took place at the passage of the ordah, which had to be bridged, and while the baggage convoy was being packed at ordahsu, a further effort was made to disturb the column, and lieutenant eyre was killed. here the defence was half-hearted, and the capture of the capital, coomassie, was not opposed. it was “a town over which the smell of death hangs everywhere and pulsates on each sickly breath of wind—a town where, here and there, a vulture hops at one’s very feet, too gorged to join the filthy flock358 preening itself on the gaunt dead trunks that line the road; where blood is plastered like a pitch coating over trees, floors, and stools—blood of a thousand victims yearly-renewed; where headless bodies make common sport; where murder, pure and simple, monotonous massacre of bound men, is the one employment of the king, and the one spectacle of the populace.”68

one of the many reasons for the war was a wish to put down the barbarous horrors of king koffi calcali’s reign, and a stipulation to that effect was made in the treaty, but it was disregarded. it required a second expedition to carry the measure into effect, by the deposition of the king’s successor, prempeh, and the bloodless occupation of the capital—measures over which gloom was cast by the death of prince henry of battenberg. finally, in the first expedition, the city was set on fire, the king’s palace destroyed, and the army turned back to the coast. it was quite time; the rains had set in, and what were rivulets on the march up were now unfordable streams on the march back. men half swam, were half dragged over these, their clothes being carried on the heads of natives. in one case, the bundle was lost, and, it is said that the unfortunate owner paraded the next morning with nothing but his helmet and rifle!

the war was over, and a treaty of peace signed; but after the retirement of sir garnet wolseley from coomassie, captain reginald sartorius, who led the advance of captain glover’s force from the volta, rode alone through the ruins of the city to communicate with the general commanding, and won thus the victoria cross. but this expedition was too late to join hands with the main column, though it had some skirmishing on the way; as also were those of captain butler with the akims, and captain dalrymple with the wassaws. small as the war was, and of very short duration, it was sufficiently deadly. by july 9, 1874, thirty-eight officers of the whole force were dead.69

359 turning once more to south africa, it will be remembered that the kaffir wars of 1850–53 had been chiefly fought about the valley of the kei, south of which river was british kaffraria, including the tribes of the fingoes and gaikas, while in the transkei district are the galekas, pondos, griquas, etc. the war broke out much as before. the gaika chief sandilli and the galeka chief kreli attacked our old allies the fingoes in 1877, and the kaffirs, being better armed with rifles than in 1850, were now rather more formidable.

the enemy developed an increasing knowledge of tactics. the old irregular rush of a mass of men had given way to more methodical formations. thus kreli in his advance on the police post of ibeka—the frontier police had taken the place of the cape mounted rifles, which had been disbanded—had about 2000 of his 10,000 men mounted, and advanced in line of columns covered by skirmishers. but the fire of the breech-loader, together with that of rockets and 7-pounders, checked then, as before, the savage ardour. the war, which lasted more or less intermittently until 1878, was mainly carried out by colonial and irregular levies; but many detachments for holding the defensive posts with which the country was dotted were furnished by the 88th, the 24th (whose bandsmen were trained as gunners to work a 7-pounder gun), a naval brigade with marines, the 90th (one of whose men emphasised the value of the martini-henry rifle by hitting a man who was whooping and dancing 1800 yards away), the 2nd buffs, and the 13th, and most of these regiments shared in the prolonged war. the losses were more serious both with officers and men, for the better weapons the kaffirs had secured told.

but the end, though long in coming, was decisive. kreli surrendered, sandilli was killed, risings in griqualand were suppressed, and the basutos were crushed when their chief morosi’s heavily-fortified stronghold was stormed. the theatre of war had extended north as far as mafeking, where there was hard fighting with another basuto leader named letherodi.

360 the next campaign against the natives was far more serious than the preceding one. the zulus were probably the bravest of all these southern tribes, and had some form of discipline, organisation, and tactics, though their arms—clubs or “knob-kerries,” shields, muskets of sorts, and assegais—were much the same as in other parts of africa, save that the latter were shorter, blunt at the end, and broader in the blade, being intended for stabbing rather than throwing. in other respects the people were bloodthirsty, superstitious, and sanguinary, given over to “witch doctors” and brutal massacres. there had been frequent raids on the natal frontier by them from 1838 onwards until 1878, when the spirit of restlessness increased, and general thesiger took command of the army at the cape, which then consisted of the 3rd, 13th, 24th, 80th, 88th, and 90th regiments, with two batteries of artillery and some engineers. the country was to be invaded by three columns. the first or southern column, under colonel pearson, consisted of the buffs, the 99th, with some artillery, a naval brigade, and local levies; the second or central column was to move from helpmakaar under colonel glyn, and contained the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 24th, a battery, and other levies; and the northern, which was based on utrecht in the transvaal, under colonel evelyn wood, in which were a battery and the 13th, 60th, and 90th regiments. a fourth column under colonel durnford was to march later, between the first and second columns.

opposed to them were supposed to be about 40,000 fighting men. they were organised in large masses, and used skirmishers. speaking generally, their tactical method was to form a complete ring, if possible, around the body attacked, and then close. on the 12th january 1879 the troops marched, and on the 22nd pearson had a smart brush with the enemy at inyezane, but reached his first objective, etschowe, where a dep?t was to be formed, without further opposition.

the central column had been less fortunate, for, crossing the river at rorke’s drift, where a detachment of the 24th361 were left, the small army pushed on to the isolated hill of isandhlwana. here, while the general was reconnoitring to the south-east, the zulu army passed across his front and attacked the camp. a desperate resistance was made, but against 14,000 zulus there could be only one result. few of the british escaped, and one colour of the 24th was lost, the “queen’s colour” of the 1st battalion being carried safely as far as the river by lieutenants melville and coghill, who gallantly died there in its defence.

this colour was subsequently recovered, and the “regimental” colour had been left safe at helpmakaar. of the regular troops 26 officers and 806 men had fallen, and 24 colonial officers and many men had also perished. the only gleam of sunshine on this gloomy and disastrous day was the gallant defence of the commissariat camp at rorke’s drift by lieutenants chard and bromhead of the royal engineers and 24th respectively. for when the victorious “impi” continued its advance, it found the post hastily fortified with biscuit-boxes, mealie sacks, and bags of indian corn, and so desperate was the resistance of the small band, 139 men in all, of whom 35 were sick, against 4000 zulus, that they fell back beaten. the brave defence had prevented the invasion of natal, and in all the annals of the army there is no more brilliant episode than the defence of rorke’s drift.

wood’s column had meanwhile reached the white umvolosi, and while a stone fort was being built there, and named “fort tinta,” many reconnaissances were made towards the zungen range; but though there were many skirmishes, there was on this side no serious fighting yet.

so ended the first stage of the war. the general’s first idea was to fall back on the tugela and await reinforcements; but, leaving to colonel pearson to act on his own discretion, that officer decided on remaining at etschowe and fortifying it. here for some time he was completely isolated, but several successful raids were made, in one of which dabiulamanzi’s kraal was burned. relief came on the 2nd362 april, when a force under colonel low, consisting of a naval brigade, the argyll and sutherland highlanders, the lanarkshire regiment, detachments of the buffs and 57th, the 37th, the 60th, with some guns, rocket tubes, and gatlings, etc., advanced as far as ginghilovo, and these, when in laager, were attacked by a force 10,000 strong, who fought with the greatest bravery, closing up to the very rifles of the defenders; but the fire was too heavy, and when they fell back in disorder, a charge of barrow’s mounted irregulars completed their discomfiture. they had lost 1200 men, at a cost to their opponents of 9 men killed and 52, including 2 officers, wounded. after the relief of etschowe, the force fell back to ginghilovo and encamped. as the right wing had fought a successful battle and altered its position, so the left wing was to copy its example. for colonel wood, leaving fort tinta and entrenching at kambula, made many raids thence, including that to the inhlobane mountain, a famous natural fastness of the zulus, where the natives had been for some time collecting. here the force was attacked by a strong impi formed in a line of five contiguous columns, forming the “chest” and “two horns,” covered by skirmishers; but, owing to a series of unfortunate misunderstandings, the retirement was effected in some disorder and with much loss. nearly all the border horse were slain, as also was our staunch boer ally, “splendid, manly, honest, simple, and taciturn piet uys, whose fathers, uncles, and cousins fought and fell in the old war with dingaan”; while 15 officers and 79 men were killed, and 1 officer and 7 men wounded. but colonel buller, lieutenant lysons, and private fowler, for distinguished bravery, earned the victoria cross. success emboldened the zulu chieftains, and, pushing on, they attacked the kambula laagers on the 20th march, with 25,000 men, and after one of the most serious and prolonged battles of the war, fell back beaten, and were pursued for many miles. out of the british force of some 2000 men, only 18 men were killed, and 8 officers and 57 men were wounded.

363 as rorke’s drift saved natal from invasion, so kambula preserved utrecht and the transvaal.

an incident in this phase of the campaign was the attack by the swazi freebooter umbelini on a convoy, guarded by a detachment of the 80th, when on its way from luneberg to derby in the transvaal, in which the convoy guard lost 62 men out of 106, and lieutenant harward, for riding off to get assistance, was tried by court-martial, but acquitted.

the final stage of the war was approaching. reinforcements were rapidly arriving. these were the 1st dragoon guards and the 17th lancers, two more batteries, and royal engineers, the royal scots fusiliers, 59th, 60th, 91st, and 94th; and among the fresh arrivals was prince louis napoleon, who was appointed an extra aide-de-camp on the headquarter’s staff, and sir garnet wolseley.

the reorganised army again formed three columns, but wood’s command was to act as an independent flying column in the north; the next column, no. 2 division, under general newdigate, and based on utrecht, moving by landmann drift across the ityolyosi on ulundi.

it was in a reconnaissance towards the last-named river that prince napoleon was slain, an event the sadness of which cannot be over-estimated, and over which it is well to draw a veil. finally, on crossing the white umvolosi the 2nd division was joined by wood’s column, and, leaving one battalion of the 24th to guard the baggage, the remainder formed a huge hollow rectangle, with the baggage in the centre. marching in this formation with bands playing and colours flying, until a suitable position was found within sight of the king’s kraal at ulundi, it there awaited battle four ranks deep, the two front of which knelt. brave as was the assault, a bravery which asked no quarter, it was powerless against better arms and better discipline. the fight had lasted barely an hour when the zulu power was utterly broken.

meanwhile, the 1st division under crealock on the right had been operating in the south by the lower tugela and etschowe, moving somewhat close to the coast and in the364 direction of ulundi; but through no fault of its own it did not reach the field in time, and when the final battle was won, the army as then constituted was practically broken up. other arrangements for its distribution were then made, and a series of forts and fortified posts held by sufficient garrisons were formed all along the zulu frontier. but the closing scene had yet to come. two columns were formed for the final military exploration of zululand, the one under colonel clarke, which had among its number the 57th, 60th, and 80th, and the other under colonel baker russell, which included the 94th. the former was to occupy ulundi, and thence attempt the capture of the king. this was effected by major marter after much trouble, and the war was thus at an end. on being captured, cetewayo remained, though broken, a king, and objected with dignity to being taken by a private of dragoons, with the words, “white soldier, touch me not—i surrender to your chief.”

baker russell was to search the southern and eastern part of the country, and after doing so, enter the transvaal about luneberg. this was done, and the last shots in the zulu war were fired by his column in an attack on the manganobas in the intombe valley.

the war had cost the army 76 officers and 1007 men killed, and 37 officers and 206 men wounded; while in addition 17 officers and 330 men died from disease, and 1286 were invalided home. the cost to the country financially had been ￡5,230,323.

sir garnet wolseley’s lucky star had again shone over him in these operations. his presence in south africa coincided with the period of success and the capture of cetewayo. there was one more knotty point for him to settle, that of the still insurgent chief sekukuni, who had been a thorn in the side of the boers, whose territory we then possessed. it will be seen next how his good fortune, based on careful attention to details both moral and physical, led to the surrender of the last disturbing element in this section of south africa,—at least as far as the natives were concerned.

365 it may be considered a matter of regret that the state did not undertake the annexation of zululand, as it did the absorption of indian tribes a century ago. our brave but bitter enemies, the sikhs, have become our most reliable soldiers in india. similarly there was no personal hostility when war ceased between the zulu and the english soldier; rather the reverse. they had received the elements of military organisation, and had shown themselves apt pupils in applying them. to have substituted for panda’s discipline and training that of our own army under able and skilful officers, accustomed to make of native levies regiments more or less irregular but of the highest military value, would have been easy with our eastern experience. a zulu militia, well trained, well armed, and led by whites, would have conduced to the peace of south africa as much as sikhs, beloochees, and ghoorkas do to the preservation, by military means, of peace among the discordant elements, both national and theological, which go to make up our great eastern satrapy. such a force would have fought for brave leaders, and with them, as the hastily raised levies of the mutiny fought for fane, or probyn, or hodson.

such an army, created mainly for defensive, and not necessarily offensive, purposes, would have created a military peace. fear of it would have kept turbulent and restless peoples in wholesome fear. trained and led by british officers, it would have been the police of south africa at the smallest possible cost to the english state. to have kept alive the military instinct of the zulu, to have instilled into him the soldier’s habit of discipline and cleanliness, would have saved him.

we have won south africa purely and simply by the sword and so must we keep it. but we could keep it best—as we keep the peace in india—by not ignoring the military spirit of the people, but by showing the justice of our rule, and keeping alive the soldier feeling as a national police. any other course is impossible with savage or semi-barbarous people. nothing is despised more than a weakness which they366 translate as fear. it is a fatal day when a nation, whose history throughout is one of conquest, forgets how she has made the empire, and thinks to hold it by other means, such as by a popular opinion which it takes centuries to create and make good. to forget the traditions of the race is equally fatal. our empire was never made by concessions; it was made by forcible possession, and that, as a general rule certainly, for the eventual benefit, as far as civilisation is concerned, of the people we have conquered. the neglect of this is at the bottom of the disastrous campaign that followed the destruction of the zulu power.

“vestigia nulla retrorsum.” to go back is weakness with all except the highest intellectual nations. we took the transvaal, and stated that the former condition of things there should never be restored! the wisdom of the first step may be a matter of opinion. the evil of the “afterwards” is another question altogether.

anyhow, our annexation of the transvaal in 1877 had led to collision with sekukuni, a turbulent basuto chieftain, and at first the operations taken against him were unsuccessful, colonel rowland’s force, which included a company of the 13th, having to fall back to lydenburg. during the zulu campaign he had openly sympathised with cetewayo, and had had frequent skirmishes with the transvaal boers. when, therefore, the zulu war terminated, sir garnet wolseley’s attention was turned towards this constant source of trouble, and in october 1879 he moved against the “fighting koppie” with detachments of the 21st royal scots fusiliers, 86th, and 94th, in all 1400 european troops, and 4000 native levies, to meet a force estimated at 14,000 men, strongly entrenched. the district occupied by sekukuni lies in a bend between the junction of the oliphant and steelpoort rivers, and was surrounded by fortified posts. the fortress itself was naturally strong: “its whole interior was honeycombed by nature, intersected by passage and gallery, leading into great chambers with chinks, clefts, and crannies, forming natural loopholes for musketry, and in one place there yawned an appalling chasm which had never been367 fathomed, and was believed to contain water at the bottom. when in the agonies of thirst on the third day of their blockade, some of sekukuni’s people went down by means of great leather thongs tied together, none of them ever came up again; no more was heard from them.” this is a good type of the african rock-fortress.

on the 28th of november the attack was made, and was fully successful, but some of the caves still held many who would not surrender, and who preferred rather to die of thirst and starvation than give up either themselves or their chief. the conduct of these warriors was chivalric in its devotion to sekukuni, who did not surrender until the 2nd december, and was then conveyed to pretoria. there the 4th, 58th, 80th, the 1st dragoon guards, and curling’s battery paraded for a review of the largest body of regular troops yet seen in that town, and commandant d’arcy as well as privates flawn and fitzpatrick of the 94th received the victoria cross. sir garnet wolseley left the transvaal with a small garrison, and, he thought, at peace.

so it might have been had there been greater firmness and more tact displayed after he left. but there was friction between the british and the dutch settlers, who had refused to remain under our rule long years before. in 1845, three companies of the 91st and some cape mounted rifles defeated 500 boers, who fled after making but a faint resistance. collision again occurred in 1848 at boomplatz, the second of a series of small conflicts which one by one have sought to wrest from the boers the territories they had conquered and in part reclaimed. the tendency throughout had been to treat them as only another sort of semi-barbarous occupant, to be got rid of when their land was wanted by others. in this skirmish were engaged some companies of the 45th, 91st, and rifle brigade, with two squadrons and two guns, and they routed a boer command, estimated at 1000 strong, though strongly entrenched behind breastworks of piled stones. there was but little loss on either side, and it is said that a drummer of the 91st, tired of the long waiting, while the men were lying down firing, himself368 beat the charge, and the men went in with cheers, and the enemy fled without an effort to rally. then they retired behind the vaal to form the transvaal republic, and in 1851 the orange river territory, which had been annexed by us in 1848, was relinquished to form the “orange free state.” but now for reasons that the future historian will wonder at, we annexed the transvaal. our past experience of the boer had taught us nothing. anyone who will read the parliamentary blue book and colonel brackenbury’s despatches must see that war was inevitable. yet, with a fair knowledge of what boers were, and with an idea of superiority which was to have a rude awakening, we entered into a serious war with a light heart and with a force that was insufficient to meet even a zulu impi. the war is remarkable in every way, primarily as the first instance, since the firearm was introduced, in which regular soldiers came under careful, well-directed, aimed, rifle fire, and were in every case beaten. the only parallel instance is that of the war of american independence. there also a people goaded into fighting by wrong were victorious; and succeeded both because the justice of their cause strengthened their moral fibre, and their guerilla warfare, for it was often little else, was in many cases accompanied by careful shooting. but the difference in the nature of the weapons at the end of the eighteenth and that of the nineteenth century is so great as to mark, by the heavy loss the defeated troops sustained, the terrible nature of modern rifle fire when carefully directed.

the transvaal had been annexed in 1877, though in 1852 it had been recognised as a free and independent state; the reason assigned, among others equally unreasonable, being that the state was bankrupt. the true boer, the “dopper,” is the descendant as much of french huguenots as of the dutch employees of the east india company. “they are,” writes sir william butler, “a homely, sober, quiet, dull race of beings, as full of faith in god and fair dealing between man and man as this world holds sample of.” doubtless there are many exceptions to their character as thus drawn, but the369 vast majority agreed in one thing, protest against the loss of their freedom. meeting succeeded meeting, appeal followed appeal. to threats of force the answer was, “we do not rely upon regiments, but on right.” when, therefore, the storm burst, there were but three battalions (the 21st, 58th, and 94th) of regulars in the transvaal, with a detachment of the 4th, a squadron of the king’s dragoon guards, and a battery of artillery, while the nearest reinforcements were the 3-60th in natal, and the 91st at the cape.

hostilities began in this way. in december 1880, the 94th, about 250 strong, under colonel anstruther, was acting as convoy guard on the road from lydenberg to pretoria. on crossing brunker’s spruit, they were opposed by 150 boers, who opened fire when anstruther, on being informed of the declaration of the republic, refused to retire, and in twenty minutes 120 men were hors de combat, of whom 7 were officers. mrs. smith, the wife of the bandmaster, who was shot by her side, and was herself wounded, behaved with the greatest gallantry in assisting the wounded, and was afterwards given the silver medal for deeds of gallantry on land. meanwhile the isolated garrisons in the transvaal at pretoria, rustenberg, wakkerstroom, standerton, heidelberg, lydenberg, middleberg, fort victoria, fort albert, and marabos stadt, were more or less invested, and the boers, crossing the natal frontier, placed a strong force à cheval the road from newcastle to standerton about laing’s nek.

open sympathy with the boers increased rapidly and came from all sources, the cape, the orange free state, the dutch in holland, and even belgium. every effort was made to bring about an understanding, but all to no effect. the evil cry on our side, “restore us our prestige and then we will treat” prevented peace as yet. so a “relief” column left newcastle for potchefstroom and pretoria, under sir george pomeroy colley, consisting of detachments of the 58th, 60th, 2nd scots fusiliers, and a naval brigade with 6 guns and 2 gatlings, but the total strength was not 1000 men. a purely frontal attack, by men conspicuous with white helmets, against the steep and partly entrenched position of the370 boers at laing’s nek, on the 28th january 1881, met with a severe reverse, 208 men being killed and 80 wounded. the fighting had been close, for, as joubert reports, “one of the officers even fired in among our men with his revolver before he was shot, but then the lord helped us!”

the reverse was somewhat startling to those who thought there would be no opposition. two companies of the gordon highlanders were hurried up to mount prospect camp, between which and colley’s base at newcastle ran the ingogo river. it was south of this stream that the second fight took place, and was brought about by despatching a force, including some of the king’s dragoon guards and the 60th, to assist in covering a convoy which was expected from newcastle; but as the boers had already interposed between newcastle and the ingogo, it had returned to the town. the ground favoured the tactical skill of the foe, “men who could neither march, man?uvre, nor even form sections of fours, but were resolute in heart, muscular in figure, and deadly marksmen, who were accustomed to bring down the fleet springbok at full speed from their saddles, and stalk all the great game with which southern africa abounds.”

so the british loss was heavy. most of the killed were shot through the head as they essayed to fire over the boulders that sheltered them; the two guns were soon disabled, and the wearied remnant returned to camp, with a loss of 132 officers and men. still, the men had behaved well and coolly, and suffered no panic.

private 24th regt 1879

meanwhile, reinforcements consisting of the 92nd, 2-60th, the 15th hussars, a naval brigade, and the natal police under sir evelyn wood, met sir george at newcastle. the additional cavalry had enabled the general to make more extended reconnaissances round the boer left, which proved that they were still entrenching, and showed no signs of wishing to avoid battle. on the evening of the 26th february, general colley played his last card, and lost his life as well. contrary to usual custom, he formed, with the utmost secrecy, a force to occupy majuba hill, an isolated and371 precipitous koppie, which to a certain extent dominated the right flank of the laing’s nek position. it was made up of detachments of the highlanders, the 58th, the 2-60th, and 65 bluejackets, in all some 545 bayonets. in the advance, made in the dark, a company of the 92nd and one of the 60th, with a dismounted troop of hussars, were left at a point about midway between the hill and the camp, and the remainder stumbled on, and after great exertion, about 5 a.m., reached the summit. this was a saucer-shaped plateau about 1000 yards round, and when day broke, the presence of british soldiers produced wild confusion in the boer camp. but not for long. while one portion hastened to man the trenches at laing’s nek, the rest rode towards majuba, and, dismounting, opened fire. it was said at the time that the “covering party” consisted of the married men, the storming column of the single men who could best be spared. be that as it may, between twelve and one the fire suddenly increased in intensity and the assault was made. it was only too successful. the british were driven from it in the utmost disorder, and left behind them sir george colley and 18 other officers, with 218 men killed, wounded, or missing, of about 600 men who had left prospect camp the night before. one instance of devoted bravery marked the terrible day, and for it corporal joseph john farmer got the cross for valour, for, “while the boers closed with the british troops near the well, corporal farmer held a white flag over the wounded, and when the arm holding the flag was shot through, he called out that he had another. he then raised the flag with the other arm, and continued to do so until that also was pierced by a bullet.”

the boer loss is stated, by themselves, to have been between 24 and 50, but the details are very conflicting. an armistice was soon agreed to between the belligerents, during which the army, now commanded by sir evelyn wood, consisted of the 6th dragoons, 15th hussars, and a squadron of the king’s dragoon guards, 14 guns, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 60th, the relics of the 58th, the372 83rd, 92nd, and 97th, together with a naval brigade and some mounted infantry. finally peace was declared, and the beleaguered garrisons were relieved.

no war of such small magnitude, as far as the numbers engaged are concerned, has left more grave results. for long years after the peace was signed, the boers showed the greatest arrogance towards all british subjects, whether civilians or soldiers, and in many cases it was accompanied with open and undisguised insult. the surrender of the transvaal was ruin to many an englishman who, “confiding in the public declaration of sir garnet wolseley and sir bartle frere that the annexation of the transvaal was irrevocable, had invested capital in the country, and their property was now worthless and their capital lost, owing to their having put faith in the words of her majesty’s representative.” but the blame does not rest with him.

the disastrous war had cost in all 29 officers killed and 20 wounded, and 366 men killed, with 428 wounded.

one result of the british defeat in the transvaal was to increase, not unnaturally, the restlessness of the boers. both zululand and bechuanaland suffered from unauthorised incursions of what were really filibusters, whose efforts at colonial expansion were too frequently attended with murder. in one of these, against chief montsoia, an englishman named bethel was barbarously murdered, and hence an expedition was despatched, under sir charles warren, to bechuanaland in 1884. an attempt had been made by the boers to annex montsoia’s territory, which, by the convention of 1884, was under our protectorate; there was no doubt, moreover, that the whole of the disturbances had been directed from the transvaal, and if not distinctly fostered by that government, met with its tacit approval. but hostilities were happily averted. president kruger met sir charles warren in conference, and the conflicting clauses were adjusted. but the operations, insignificant as they may seem militarily, were politically important. they, temporarily at least, restored the position of great britain as the paramount power in south africa.373 the last collision in the transvaal between dr. jameson’s troopers, led by british officers, and the boers of pretoria, etc., was decisive in another way; but it is not a part of the story of the regular army, and is of too recent occurrence to be commented on here.