it was early in november, 1834, and a large shooting party was assembled at beaumanoir, the seat of that great nobleman, who was the father of henry sydney. england is unrivalled for two things, sporting and politics. they were combined at beaumanoir; for the guests came not merely to slaughter the duke’s pheasants, but to hold council on the prospects of the party, which it was supposed by the initiated, began at this time to indicate some symptoms of brightening.

the success of the reform ministry on their first appeal to the new constituency which they had created, had been fatally complete. but the triumph was as destructive to the victors as to the vanquished.

‘we are too strong,’ prophetically exclaimed one of the fortunate cabinet, which found itself supported by an inconceivable majority of three hundred. it is to be hoped that some future publisher of private memoirs may have preserved some of the traits of that crude and short-lived parliament, when old cobbett insolently thrust sir robert from the prescriptive seat of the chief of opposition, and treasury understrappers sneered at the ‘queer lot’ that had arrived from ireland, little foreseeing what a high bidding that ‘queer lot’ would eventually command. gratitude to lord grey was the hustings-cry at the end of 1832, the pretext that was to return to the new-modelled house of commons none but men devoted to the whig cause. the successful simulation, like everything that is false, carried within it the seeds of its own dissolution. ingratitude to lord grey was more the fashion at the commencement of 1834, and before the close of that eventful year, the once popular reform ministry was upset, and the eagerly-sought reformed parliament dissolved!

it can scarcely be alleged that the public was altogether unprepared for this catastrophe. many deemed it inevitable; few thought it imminent. the career of the ministry, and the existence of the parliament, had indeed from the first been turbulent and fitful. it was known, from authority, that there were dissensions in the cabinet, while a house of commons which passed votes on subjects not less important than the repeal of a tax, or the impeachment of a judge, on one night, and rescinded its resolutions on the following, certainly established no increased claims to the confidence of its constituents in its discretion. nevertheless, there existed at this period a prevalent conviction that the whig party, by a great stroke of state, similar in magnitude and effect to that which in the preceding century had changed the dynasty, had secured to themselves the government of this country for, at least, the lives of the present generation. and even the well-informed in such matters were inclined to look upon the perplexing circumstances to which we have alluded rather as symptoms of a want of discipline in a new system of tactics, than as evidences of any essential and deeply-rooted disorder.

the startling rapidity, however, of the strange incidents of 1834; the indignant, soon to become vituperative, secession of a considerable section of the cabinet, some of them esteemed too at that time among its most efficient members; the piteous deprecation of ‘pressure from without,’ from lips hitherto deemed too stately for entreaty, followed by the trades’ union, thirty thousand strong, parading in procession to downing-street; the irish negotiations of lord hatherton, strange blending of complex intrigue and almost infantile ingenuousness; the still inexplicable resignation of lord althorp, hurriedly followed by his still more mysterious resumption of power, the only result of his precipitate movements being the fall of lord grey himself, attended by circumstances which even a friendly historian could scarcely describe as honourable to his party or dignified to himself; latterly, the extemporaneous address of king william to the bishops; the vagrant and grotesque apocalypse of the lord chancellor; and the fierce recrimination and memorable defiance of the edinburgh banquet, all these impressive instances of public affairs and public conduct had combined to create a predominant opinion that, whatever might be the consequences, the prolonged continuance of the present party in power was a clear impossibility.

it is evident that the suicidal career of what was then styled the liberal party had been occasioned and stimulated by its unnatural excess of strength. the apoplectic plethora of 1834 was not less fatal than the paralytic tenuity of 1841. it was not feasible to gratify so many ambitions, or to satisfy so many expectations. every man had his double; the heels of every placeman were dogged by friendly rivals ready to trip them up. there were even two cabinets; the one that met in council, and the one that met in cabal. the consequence of destroying the legitimate opposition of the country was, that a moiety of the supporters of government had to discharge the duties of opposition.

herein, then, we detect the real cause of all that irregular and unsettled carriage of public men which so perplexed the nation after the passing of the reform act. no government can be long secure without a formidable opposition. it reduces their supporters to that tractable number which can be managed by the joint influences of fruition and of hope. it offers vengeance to the discontented, and distinction to the ambitious; and employs the energies of aspiring spirits, who otherwise may prove traitors in a division or assassins in a debate.

the general election of 1832 abrogated the parliamentary opposition of england, which had practically existed for more than a century and a half. and what a series of equivocal transactions and mortifying adventures did the withdrawal of this salutary restraint entail on the party which then so loudly congratulated themselves and the country that they were at length relieved from its odious repression! in the hurry of existence one is apt too generally to pass over the political history of the times in which we ourselves live. the two years that followed the reform of the house of commons are full of instruction, on which a young man would do well to ponder. it is hardly possible that he could rise from the study of these annals without a confirmed disgust for political intrigue; a dazzling practice, apt at first to fascinate youth, for it appeals at once to our invention and our courage, but one which really should only be the resource of the second-rate. great minds must trust to great truths and great talents for their rise, and nothing else.

while, however, as the autumn of 1834 advanced, the people of this country became gradually sensible of the necessity of some change in the councils of their sovereign, no man felt capable of predicting by what means it was to be accomplished, or from what quarry the new materials were to be extracted. the tory party, according to those perverted views of toryism unhappily too long prevalent in this country, was held to be literally defunct, except by a few old battered crones of office, crouched round the embers of faction which they were fanning, and muttering ‘reaction’ in mystic whispers. it cannot be supposed indeed for a moment, that the distinguished personage who had led that party in the house of commons previously to the passing of the act of 1832, ever despaired in consequence of his own career. his then time of life, the perfection, almost the prime, of manhood; his parliamentary practice, doubly estimable in an inexperienced assembly; his political knowledge; his fair character and reputable position; his talents and tone as a public speaker, which he had always aimed to adapt to the habits and culture of that middle class from which it was concluded the benches of the new parliament were mainly to be recruited, all these were qualities the possession of which must have assured a mind not apt to be disturbed in its calculations by any intemperate heats, that with time and patience the game was yet for him.

unquestionably, whatever may have been insinuated, this distinguished person had no inkling that his services in 1834 might be claimed by his sovereign. at the close of the session of that year he had quitted england with his family, and had arrived at rome, where it was his intention to pass the winter. the party charges that have imputed to him a previous and sinister knowledge of the intentions of the court, appear to have been made not only in ignorance of the personal character, but of the real position, of the future minister.

it had been the misfortune of this eminent gentleman when he first entered public life, to become identified with a political connection which, having arrogated to itself the name of an illustrious historical party, pursued a policy which was either founded on no principle whatever, or on principles exactly contrary to those which had always guided the conduct of the great tory leaders. the chief members of this official confederacy were men distinguished by none of the conspicuous qualities of statesmen. they had none of the divine gifts that govern senates and guide councils. they were not orators; they were not men of deep thought or happy resource, or of penetrative and sagacious minds. their political ken was essentially dull and contracted. they expended some energy in obtaining a defective, blundering acquaintance with foreign affairs; they knew as little of the real state of their own country as savages of an approaching eclipse. this factious league had shuffled themselves into power by clinging to the skirts of a great minister, the last of tory statesmen, but who, in the unparalleled and confounding emergencies of his latter years, had been forced, unfortunately for england, to relinquish toryism. his successors inherited all his errors without the latent genius, which in him might have still rallied and extricated him from the consequences of his disasters. his successors did not merely inherit his errors; they exaggerated, they caricatured them. they rode into power on a springtide of all the rampant prejudices and rancorous passions of their time. from the king to the boor their policy was a mere pandering to public ignorance. impudently usurping the name of that party of which nationality, and therefore universality, is the essence, these pseudo-tories made exclusion the principle of their political constitution, and restriction the genius of their commercial code.

the blind goddess that plays with human fortunes has mixed up the memory of these men with traditions of national glory. they conducted to a prosperous conclusion the most renowned war in which england has ever been engaged. yet every military conception that emanated from their cabinet was branded by their characteristic want of grandeur. chance, however, sent them a great military genius, whom they treated for a long time with indifference, and whom they never heartily supported until his career had made him their master. his transcendent exploits, and european events even greater than his achievements, placed in the manikin grasp of the english ministry, the settlement of europe.

the act of the congress of vienna remains the eternal monument of their diplomatic knowledge and political sagacity. their capital feats were the creation of two kingdoms, both of which are already erased from the map of europe. they made no single preparation for the inevitable, almost impending, conjunctures of the east. all that remains of the pragmatic arrangements of the mighty congress of vienna is the mediatisation of the petty german princes.

but the settlement of europe by the pseudo-tories was the dictate of inspiration compared with their settlement of england. the peace of paris found the government of this country in the hands of a body of men of whom it is no exaggeration to say that they were ignorant of every principle of every branch of political science. so long as our domestic administration was confined merely to the raising of a revenue, they levied taxes with gross facility from the industry of a country too busy to criticise or complain. but when the excitement and distraction of war had ceased, and they were forced to survey the social elements that surrounded them, they seemed, for the first time, to have become conscious of their own incapacity. these men, indeed, were the mere children of routine. they prided themselves on being practical men. in the language of this defunct school of statesmen, a practical man is a man who practises the blunders of his predecessors.

now commenced that condition-of-england question of which our generation hears so much. during five-and-twenty years every influence that can develop the energies and resources of a nation had been acting with concentrated stimulation on the british isles. national peril and national glory; the perpetual menace of invasion, the continual triumph of conquest; the most extensive foreign commerce that was ever conducted by a single nation; an illimitable currency; an internal trade supported by swarming millions whom manufacturers and inclosure-bills summoned into existence; above all, the supreme control obtained by man over mechanic power, these are some of the causes of that rapid advance of material civilisation in england, to which the annals of the world can afford no parallel. but there was no proportionate advance in our moral civilisation. in the hurry-skurry of money-making, men-making, and machine-making, we had altogether outgrown, not the spirit, but the organisation, of our institutions.

the peace came; the stimulating influences suddenly ceased; the people, in a novel and painful position, found themselves without guides. they went to the ministry; they asked to be guided; they asked to be governed. commerce requested a code; trade required a currency; the unfranchised subject solicited his equal privilege; suffering labour clamoured for its rights; a new race demanded education. what did the ministry do?

they fell into a panic. having fulfilled during their lives the duties of administration, they were frightened because they were called upon, for the first time, to perform the functions of government. like all weak men, they had recourse to what they called strong measures. they determined to put down the multitude. they thought they were imitating mr. pitt, because they mistook disorganisation for sedition.

their projects of relief were as ridiculous as their system of coercion was ruthless; both were alike founded in intense ignorance. when we recall mr. vansittart with his currency resolutions; lord castlereagh with his plans for the employment of labour; and lord sidmouth with his plots for ensnaring the laborious; we are tempted to imagine that the present epoch has been one of peculiar advances in political ability, and marvel how england could have attained her present pitch under a series of such governors.

we should, however, be labouring under a very erroneous impression. run over the statesmen that have figured in england since the accession of the present family, and we may doubt whether there be one, with the exception perhaps of the duke of newcastle, who would have been a worthy colleague of the council of mr. perceval, or the early cabinet of lord liverpool. assuredly the genius of bolingbroke and the sagacity of walpole would have alike recoiled from such men and such measures. and if we take the individuals who were governing england immediately before the french revolution, one need only refer to the speeches of mr. pitt, and especially to those of that profound statesman and most instructed man, lord shelburne, to find that we can boast no remarkable superiority either in political justice or in political economy. one must attribute this degeneracy, therefore, to the long war and our insular position, acting upon men naturally of inferior abilities, and unfortunately, in addition, of illiterate habits.

in the meantime, notwithstanding all the efforts of the political panglosses who, in evening journals and quarterly reviews were continually proving that this was the best of all possible governments, it was evident to the ministry itself that the machine must stop. the class of rigbys indeed at this period, one eminently favourable to that fungous tribe, greatly distinguished themselves. they demonstrated in a manner absolutely convincing, that it was impossible for any person to possess any ability, knowledge, or virtue, any capacity of reasoning, any ray of fancy or faculty of imagination, who was not a supporter of the existing administration. if any one impeached the management of a department, the public was assured that the accuser had embezzled; if any one complained of the conduct of a colonial governor, the complainant was announced as a returned convict. an amelioration of the criminal code was discountenanced because a search in the parish register of an obscure village proved that the proposer had not been born in wedlock. a relaxation of the commercial system was denounced because one of its principal advocates was a socinian. the inutility of parliamentary reform was ever obvious since mr. rigby was a member of the house of commons.

to us, with our times newspaper every morning on our breakfast-table, bringing, on every subject which can interest the public mind, a degree of information and intelligence which must form a security against any prolonged public misconception, it seems incredible that only five-and-twenty years ago the english mind could have been so ridden and hoodwinked, and that, too, by men of mean attainments and moderate abilities. but the war had directed the energies of the english people into channels by no means favourable to political education. conquerors of the world, with their ports filled with the shipping of every clime, and their manufactories supplying the european continent, in the art of self-government, that art in which their fathers excelled, they had become literally children; and rigby and his brother hirelings were the nurses that frightened them with hideous fables and ugly words.

notwithstanding, however, all this successful mystification, the arch-mediocrity who presided, rather than ruled, over this cabinet of mediocrities, became hourly more conscious that the inevitable transition from fulfilling the duties of an administration to performing the functions of a government could not be conducted without talents and knowledge. the arch-mediocrity had himself some glimmering traditions of political science. he was sprung from a laborious stock, had received some training, and though not a statesman, might be classed among those whom the lord keeper williams used to call ‘statemongers.’ in a subordinate position his meagre diligence and his frigid method might not have been without value; but the qualities that he possessed were misplaced; nor can any character be conceived less invested with the happy properties of a leader. in the conduct of public affairs his disposition was exactly the reverse of that which is the characteristic of great men. he was peremptory in little questions, and great ones he left open.

in the natural course of events, in 1819 there ought to have been a change of government, and another party in the state should have entered into office; but the whigs, though they counted in their ranks at that period an unusual number of men of great ability, and formed, indeed, a compact and spirited opposition, were unable to contend against the new adjustment of borough influence which had occurred during the war, and under the protracted administration by which that war had been conducted. new families had arisen on the tory side that almost rivalled old newcastle himself in their electioneering management; and it was evident that, unless some reconstruction of the house of commons could be effected, the whig party could never obtain a permanent hold of official power. hence, from that period, the whigs became parliamentary reformers.

it was inevitable, therefore, that the country should be governed by the same party; indispensable that the ministry should be renovated by new brains and blood. accordingly, a mediocrity, not without repugnance, was induced to withdraw, and the great name of wellington supplied his place in council. the talents of the duke, as they were then understood, were not exactly of the kind most required by the cabinet, and his colleagues were careful that he should not occupy too prominent a post; but still it was an impressive acquisition, and imparted to the ministry a semblance of renown.

there was an individual who had not long entered public life, but who had already filled considerable, though still subordinate offices. having acquired a certain experience of the duties of administration, and distinction for his mode of fulfilling them, he had withdrawn from his public charge; perhaps because he found it a barrier to the attainment of that parliamentary reputation for which he had already shown both a desire and a capacity; perhaps because, being young and independent, he was not over-anxious irremediably to identify his career with a school of politics of the infallibility of which his experience might have already made him a little sceptical. but he possessed the talents that were absolutely wanted, and the terms were at his own dictation. another, and a very distinguished mediocrity, who would not resign, was thrust out, and mr. peel became secretary of state.

from this moment dates that intimate connection between the duke of wellington and the present first minister, which has exercised a considerable influence over the career of individuals and the course of affairs. it was the sympathetic result of superior minds placed among inferior intelligences, and was, doubtless, assisted by a then mutual conviction, that the difference of age, the circumstance of sitting in different houses, and the general contrast of their previous pursuits and accomplishments, rendered personal rivalry out of the question. from this moment, too, the domestic government of the country assumed a new character, and one universally admitted to have been distinguished by a spirit of enlightened progress and comprehensive amelioration.

a short time after this, a third and most distinguished mediocrity died; and canning, whom they had twice worried out of the cabinet, where they had tolerated him some time in an obscure and ambiguous position, was recalled just in time from his impending banishment, installed in the first post in the lower house, and intrusted with the seals of the foreign office. the duke of wellington had coveted them, nor could lord liverpool have been insensible to his grace’s peculiar fitness for such duties; but strength was required in the house of commons, where they had only one secretary of state, a young man already distinguished, yet untried as a leader, and surrounded by colleagues notoriously incapable to assist him in debate.

the accession of mr. canning to the cabinet, in a position, too, of surpassing influence, soon led to a further weeding of the mediocrities, and, among other introductions, to the memorable entrance of mr. huskisson. in this wise did that cabinet, once notable only for the absence of all those qualities which authorise the possession of power, come to be generally esteemed as a body of men, who, for parliamentary eloquence, official practice, political information, sagacity in council, and a due understanding of their epoch, were inferior to none that had directed the policy of the empire since the revolution.

if we survey the tenor of the policy of the liverpool cabinet during the latter moiety of its continuance, we shall find its characteristic to be a partial recurrence to those frank principles of government which mr. pitt had revived during the latter part of the last century from precedents that had been set us, either in practice or in dogma, during its earlier period, by statesmen who then not only bore the title, but professed the opinions, of tories. exclusive principles in the constitution, and restrictive principles in commerce, have grown up together; and have really nothing in common with the ancient character of our political settlement, or the manners and customs of the english people. confidence in the loyalty of the nation, testified by munificent grants of rights and franchises, and favour to an expansive system of traffic, were distinctive qualities of the english sovereignty, until the house of commons usurped the better portion of its prerogatives. a widening of our electoral scheme, great facilities to commerce, and the rescue of our roman catholic fellow-subjects from the puritanic yoke, from fetters which have been fastened on them by english parliaments in spite of the protests and exertions of english sovereigns; these were the three great elements and fundamental truths of the real pitt system, a system founded on the traditions of our monarchy, and caught from the writings, the speeches, the councils of those who, for the sake of these and analogous benefits, had ever been anxious that the sovereign of england should never be degraded into the position of a venetian doge.

it is in the plunder of the church that we must seek for the primary cause of our political exclusion, and our commercial restraint. that unhallowed booty created a factitious aristocracy, ever fearful that they might be called upon to regorge their sacrilegious spoil. to prevent this they took refuge in political religionism, and paltering with the disturbed consciences, or the pious fantasies, of a portion of the people, they organised them into religious sects. these became the unconscious praetorians of their ill-gotten domains. at the head of these religionists, they have continued ever since to govern, or powerfully to influence this country. they have in that time pulled down thrones and churches, changed dynasties, abrogated and remodelled parliaments; they have disfranchised scotland and confiscated ireland. one may admire the vigour and consistency of the whig party, and recognise in their career that unity of purpose that can only spring from a great principle; but the whigs introduced sectarian religion, sectarian religion led to political exclusion, and political exclusion was soon accompanied by commercial restraint.

it would be fanciful to assume that the liverpool cabinet, in their ameliorating career, was directed by any desire to recur to the primordial tenets of the tory party. that was not an epoch when statesmen cared to prosecute the investigation of principles. it was a period of happy and enlightened practice. a profounder policy is the offspring of a time like the present, when the original postulates of institutions are called in question. the liverpool cabinet unconsciously approximated to these opinions, because from careful experiment they were convinced of their beneficial tendency, and they thus bore an unintentional and impartial testimony to their truth. like many men, who think they are inventors, they were only reproducing ancient wisdom.

but one must ever deplore that this ministry, with all their talents and generous ardour, did not advance to principles. it is always perilous to adopt expediency as a guide; but the choice may be sometimes imperative. these statesmen, however, took expediency for their director, when principle would have given them all that expediency ensured, and much more.

this ministry, strong in the confidence of the sovereign, the parliament, and the people, might, by the courageous promulgation of great historical truths, have gradually formed a public opinion, that would have permitted them to organise the tory party on a broad, a permanent, and national basis. they might have nobly effected a complete settlement of ireland, which a shattered section of this very cabinet was forced a few years after to do partially, and in an equivocating and equivocal manner. they might have concluded a satisfactory reconstruction of the third estate, without producing that convulsion with which, from its violent fabrication, our social system still vibrates. lastly, they might have adjusted the rights and properties of our national industries in a manner which would have prevented that fierce and fatal rivalry that is now disturbing every hearth of the united kingdom.

we may, therefore, visit on the laches of this ministry the introduction of that new principle and power into our constitution which ultimately may absorb all, agitation. this cabinet, then, with so much brilliancy on its surface, is the real parent of the roman catholic association, the political unions, the anti-corn-law league.

there is no influence at the same time so powerful and so singular as that of individual character. it arises as often from the weakness of the character as from its strength. the dispersion of this clever and showy ministry is a fine illustration of this truth. one morning the arch-mediocrity himself died. at the first blush, it would seem that little difficulties could be experienced in finding his substitute. his long occupation of the post proved, at any rate, that the qualification was not excessive. but this cabinet, with its serene and blooming visage, had been all this time charged with fierce and emulous ambitions. they waited the signal, but they waited in grim repose. the death of the nominal leader, whose formal superiority, wounding no vanity, and offending no pride, secured in their councils equality among the able, was the tocsin of their anarchy. there existed in this cabinet two men, who were resolved immediately to be prime ministers; a third who was resolved eventually to be prime minister, but would at any rate occupy no ministerial post without the lead of a house of parliament; and a fourth, who felt himself capable of being prime minister, but despaired of the revolution which could alone make him one; and who found an untimely end when that revolution had arrived.

had mr. secretary canning remained leader of the house of commons under the duke of wellington, all that he would have gained by the death of lord liverpool was a master. had the duke of wellington become secretary of state under mr. canning he would have materially advanced his political position, not only by holding the seals of a high department in which he was calculated to excel, but by becoming leader of the house of lords. but his grace was induced by certain court intriguers to believe that the king would send for him, and he was also aware that mr. peel would no longer serve under any ministry in the house of commons. under any circumstances it would have been impossible to keep the liverpool cabinet together. the struggle, therefore, between the duke of wellington and ‘my dear mr. canning’ was internecine, and ended somewhat unexpectedly.

and here we must stop to do justice to our friend mr. rigby, whose conduct on this occasion was distinguished by a bustling dexterity which was quite charming. he had, as we have before intimated, on the credit of some clever lampoons written during the queen’s trial, which were, in fact, the effusions of lucian gay, wriggled himself into a sort of occasional unworthy favour at the palace, where he was half butt and half buffoon. here, during the interregnum occasioned by the death, or rather inevitable retirement, of lord liverpool, mr. rigby contrived to scrape up a conviction that the duke was the winning horse, and in consequence there appeared a series of leading articles in a notorious evening newspaper, in which it was, as tadpole and taper declared, most ‘slashingly’ shown, that the son of an actress could never be tolerated as a prime minister of england. not content with this, and never doubting for a moment the authentic basis of his persuasion, mr. rigby poured forth his coarse volubility on the subject at several of the new clubs which he was getting up in order to revenge himself for having been black-balled at white’s.

what with arrangements about lord monmouth’s boroughs, and the lucky bottling of some claret which the duke had imported on mr. rigby’s recommendation, this distinguished gentleman contrived to pay almost hourly visits at apsley house, and so bullied tadpole and taper that they scarcely dared address him. about four-and-twenty hours before the result, and when it was generally supposed that the duke was in, mr. rigby, who had gone down to windsor to ask his majesty the date of some obscure historical incident, which rigby, of course, very well knew, found that audiences were impossible, that majesty was agitated, and learned, from an humble but secure authority, that in spite of all his slashing articles, and lucian gay’s parodies of the irish melodies, canning was to be prime minister.

this would seem something of a predicament! to common minds; there are no such things as scrapes for gentlemen with mr. rigby’s talents for action. he had indeed, in the world, the credit of being an adept in machinations, and was supposed ever to be involved in profound and complicated contrivances. this was quite a mistake. there was nothing profound about mr. rigby; and his intellect was totally incapable of devising or sustaining an intricate or continuous scheme. he was, in short, a man who neither felt nor thought; but who possessed, in a very remarkable degree, a restless instinct for adroit baseness. on the present occasion he got into his carriage, and drove at the utmost speed from windsor to the foreign office. the secretary of state was engaged when he arrived; but mr. rigby would listen to no difficulties. he rushed upstairs, flung open the door, and with agitated countenance, and eyes suffused with tears, threw himself into the arms of the astonished mr. canning.

‘all is right,’ exclaimed the devoted rigby, in broken tones; ‘i have convinced the king that the first minister must be in the house of commons. no one knows it but myself; but it is certain.’

we have seen that at an early period of his career, mr. peel withdrew from official life. his course had been one of unbroken prosperity; the hero of the university had become the favourite of the house of commons. his retreat, therefore, was not prompted by chagrin. nor need it have been suggested by a calculating ambition, for the ordinary course of events was fast bearing to him all to which man could aspire. one might rather suppose, that he had already gained sufficient experience, perhaps in his irish secretaryship, to make him pause in that career of superficial success which education and custom had hitherto chalked out for him, rather than the creative energies of his own mind. a thoughtful intellect may have already detected elements in our social system which required a finer observation, and a more unbroken study, than the gyves and trammels of office would permit. he may have discovered that the representation of the university, looked upon in those days as the blue ribbon of the house of commons, was a sufficient fetter without unnecessarily adding to its restraint. he may have wished to reserve himself for a happier occasion, and a more progressive period. he may have felt the strong necessity of arresting himself in his rapid career of felicitous routine, to survey his position in calmness, and to comprehend the stirring age that was approaching.

for that, he could not but be conscious that the education which he had consummated, however ornate and refined, was not sufficient. that age of economical statesmanship which lord shelburne had predicted in 1787, when he demolished, in the house of lords, bishop watson and the balance of trade, which mr. pitt had comprehended; and for which he was preparing the nation when the french revolution diverted the public mind into a stronger and more turbulent current, was again impending, while the intervening history of the country had been prolific in events which had aggravated the necessity of investigating the sources of the wealth of nations. the time had arrived when parliamentary preeminence could no longer be achieved or maintained by gorgeous abstractions borrowed from burke, or shallow systems purloined from de lolme, adorned with horatian points, or varied with virgilian passages. it was to be an age of abstruse disquisition, that required a compact and sinewy intellect, nurtured in a class of learning not yet honoured in colleges, and which might arrive at conclusions conflicting with predominant prejudices.

adopting this view of the position of mr. peel, strengthened as it is by his early withdrawal for a while from the direction of public affairs, it may not only be a charitable but a true estimate of the motives which influenced him in his conduct towards mr. canning, to conclude that he was not guided in that transaction by the disingenuous rivalry usually imputed to him. his statement in parliament of the determining circumstances of his conduct, coupled with his subsequent and almost immediate policy, may perhaps always leave this a painful and ambiguous passage in his career; but in passing judgment on public men, it behoves us ever to take large and extended views of their conduct; and previous incidents will often satisfactorily explain subsequent events, which, without their illustrating aid, are involved in misapprehension or mystery.

it would seem, therefore, that sir robert peel, from an early period, meditated his emancipation from the political confederacy in which he was implicated, and that he has been continually baffled in this project. he broke loose from lord liverpool; he retired from mr. canning. forced again into becoming the subordinate leader of the weakest government in parliamentary annals, he believed he had at length achieved his emancipation, when he declared to his late colleagues, after the overthrow of 1830, that he would never again accept a secondary position in office. but the duke of wellington was too old a tactician to lose so valuable an ally. so his grace declared after the reform bill was passed, as its inevitable result, that thenceforth the prime minister must be a member of the house of commons; and this aphorism, cited as usual by the duke’s parasites as demonstration of his supreme sagacity, was a graceful mode of resigning the preeminence which had been productive of such great party disasters. it is remarkable that the party who devised and passed the reform bill, and who, in consequence, governed the nation for ten years, never once had their prime minister in the house of commons: but that does not signify; the duke’s maxim is still quoted as an oracle almost equal in prescience to his famous query, ‘how is the king’s government to be carried on?’ a question to which his grace by this time has contrived to give a tolerably practical answer.

sir robert peel, who had escaped from lord liverpool, escaped from mr. canning, escaped even from the duke of wellington in 1832, was at length caught in 1834; the victim of ceaseless intriguers, who neither comprehended his position, nor that of their country.