the wonderful genius of napoleon, which had been so clearly manifested in so many ways during his varied career, was never exhibited to better advantage than in the three months after his return from elba. during that period he reorganized the government, recreated and reëquipped an army. the veterans flocked to his standards, and within the time mentioned he had actually two hundred and fifty thousand men under arms.

with the better moiety of this force, the best armed, the best equipped, the best officered contingent, he took the field early in the month of june. the emperor did not want war any more than france did. he began his new reign with the most pacific of proclamations, which probably reflected absolutely the whole desire of his heart. but the patience of europe had been exhausted and the belief of rulers and peoples in the honesty of his professions, declarations or intentions, had been hopelessly shattered.

his arrival effected an immediate resurrection of the almost moribund congress of vienna. the squabbling, arguing, trifling plenipotentiaries of the powers had burst into gigantic laughter—literally, actual merriment, albeit of a somewhat grim character!—when they received the news of napoleon's return. they were not laughing at napoleon but at themselves. they had been dividing the lion's skin in high-flown phrases, which meant nothing, endeavoring to incorporate the decalogue and the sermon on the mount in their protocols and treaties, when they suddenly discovered that the emperor was still to be reckoned with.

differences were instantly laid aside and forgotten. russia, prussia and austria immediately agreed to put in the field two hundred and fifty thousand men each. the smaller powers, sweden, spain, the low countries, promised contingents. england once more assumed the familiar role of paymaster by immediately placing a vast subsidy at the disposal of the allies. she gave them also what was of more value than a subsidy, a soldier of the first rank to command the armies in the field.

the duke of wellington had never crossed swords with the greatest captain of his day and perhaps of all time. but he had measured himself with the ablest and most famous of napoleon's marshals. with greatly inferior forces, through four years of desperate fighting, he had defeated the marshals and armies of france. the dashing and gallant junot had been routed at vimiero, victor had been overwhelmed at talavera. wily old massena with all his ability could look back to the disaster of the blood-stained hill of busaco, marmont, the dainty tactician, had been smashed at salamanca, stubborn jourdan had been at last decisively defeated at victoria. finally, the brilliant soult had been hurled out of the pyrenees and had met his master at toulouse. still, great as were these soldiers and highly trained as they had been in the best of schools, not one of them was a napoleon; all of them together were not, for that matter. would the luster of wellington's fame, which extended from the ganges to the ebro, be tarnished when he met the emperor? it was a foregone conclusion, of course, that schwarzenberg would command the austrians; blücher, the "hussar general," the hard-fighting, downright old "marshal vorwärts," the prussians; and the emperor alexander, with his veteran captains, the vast horde of russians.

to assemble, arm, equip and move two hundred and fifty thousand men was a great task in those days even for a rich and populous country flushed with victory and in the enjoyment of an abundance of time and unlimited means. the organizing, it almost might be said the creative, ability of napoleon was not shared by his opponents. try as they would, june found their preparations still woefully incomplete. the austrians had scarcely moved at all. the slower russians, who were farther away and were to constitute the reserve army, could be discounted from any present calculation of the enemies of the empire. the english and their smaller allies from the low countries, and the prussians, whose hatred of france and the emperor was greater than that of any other nation, were quicker to move. two hundred and fifteen thousand men, half of them prussians, a third of the other moiety english, the remaining two-thirds belgians, hollanders, and other miscellaneous nationalities, had joined the colors on the northwestern frontier of france. one-half of this joint assembly was commanded by blücher and the other half by wellington.

leaving the weaker half of his own great army to complete its equipment, and placing strong detachments in fortress and at strategetic points to oppose the austrians should they advance, the emperor, as has been said, with about one hundred and twenty-five thousand men took the field. naturally, inevitably, belgium, the immemorial battleground of the nations, and the great english-prussian army were his objectives. he saw clearly the dangers that encompassed him, the demands he must meet and the conditions over which he must triumph.

it was by no means certain, even if he decisively defeated his enemies in belgium and occupied brussels, that his trouble would be over. there would still be left a possible five hundred thousand trained and disciplined men with whom he would have to deal, under rulers and generals the inveteracy of whose hatreds he could well understand. but at least his position would be greatly improved by a successful preliminary campaign, any success in short, to say nothing of so great a one. if he could show himself once more the inimitable captain, the thunderbolt of war, the organizer of victory, the napoleon of other days, the effect upon france, at least, would be electrical. and the world would again take notice.

the emperor had to admit that, save in the army, there had not been much response from tired-out, exhausted france, to the appeals of its once irresistible and beloved leader. but the spirit of the army was that of devotion itself. there was a kind of a blind madness in it of which men spoke afterward as a phenomenon that could only be recognized, that could never be explained or understood. they could not account for it. yet it was a powerful factor, the most powerful, indeed, that enabled the emperor to accomplish so much, and fall short of complete triumph by so narrow a margin.

the spirit of this new army was not that burning love of liberty which had animated the armies of the early republic and turned its tatterdemalion legions into paladins. it was not the heroic consecration of the veterans of later years to their native land. it was a strange, mysterious obsession, a personal attachment to napoleon, the individual—an unlimited, unbounded tribute to his fascination, to his own unique personality. it has not died out, and seems destined to live. even in death napoleon, after a century, exercises the same fascination over all sorts and conditions of men! wise and foolish alike acknowledge his spell. men hate, men loathe much of that for which the corsican adventurer and soldier of fortune stood; they see clearly and admit freely the thorough and entire selfishness of the colossal man, but they cannot resist his appeal, even after one hundred years!

yet in the long run no personal attachment, however deep, however ardent, however complete, can take the place as the inspiration for heroic deeds of that deeper passion of love of country. nor can any personal devotion to a mere man produce such a steadfastness of character as is brought about by adherence to a great cause or a great land. a great passion like the love of a people for a great country and that for which it stands is eternal. usually the feet of clay upon which the idol stands have only to be recognized to dissipate the ardor and fervor of the worshipers. but napoleon was then an exception to all rules. though he slew men, wasted them, threw them away, they trusted him. we look at him through the vista of years and in some way understand his soldiers. reason to the contrary, we can experience in some degree, at least, even in the cold-blooded humanitarian materialism of the present, the old thrill and the old admiration. did his contemporaries love him because they believed he thought in terms of france, we wonder?

so that this body of soldiery was probably the most formidable army in the quality of its units that had ever been mustered on the globe. there was not a man in it who was not a veteran. some of them were veterans of fifteen years of campaigning with napoleon. this that came was to be the sixtieth pitched battle in which some of them had participated. even the younger men had gone through more than one campaign and taken part in much hard fighting. back from the prisons where they had been confined and the great fortresses they had held until the emperor's abdication had come the veterans. the old guard had been reconstituted. as a reward for its action at grenoble, the fifth-of-the-line had been incorporated in it as a supplementary regiment, a second fifth regiment of grenadiers. the ranks of the guard had been most carefully culled, the unserviceable had been weeded out, their places taken by men well fitted by their record, their physical prowess and their personal appearance to belong to that famous corps. not the immortals of xerxes, the spartan band of leonidas, the companion cavalry of alexander, the carthaginians of hannibal, the tenth legion of caesar, the spanish infantry of parma, or the ironsides of cromwell, had surpassed the record of these pretorians of imperial france.

the same weeding-out process had been carried out in the rest of the army. the flower of french cavalry, the matchless french artillery and the famous infantry which had trampled down the world were ranged under the eagles. other corps had been drained for equipment. but in some particulars the army differed from the imperial armies of the past. with two exceptions, the great marshals were not there. murat, king of horsemen and swordsmen, was a prisoner in his ignoble neapolitan realm awaiting trial and execution. marmont and mortier dared not present themselves before the emperor they had betrayed. wily massena, the wisest and ablest of them all, was old and in convenient retirement. macdonald, the incorruptible, was with the fat-bodied, fat-witted bourbon king in ghent. berthier, with his marvelous mastery of detail and his almost uncanny ability to translate the emperor's thoughts even into orders, had not rejoined the eagles—a terrible loss, indeed.

there were but two of the marshals of old with napoleon. soult, in some respects the acutest strategist and finest tactician, was chief of staff. he tried his best to fill berthier's position and did it acceptably, if not with the success of that master. the other marshal was preëminently the battle-leader, red-headed michael ney, the fighter of fighters, a man whose personality was worth an army-corps, whose reputation and influence with the soldiers was of the very highest.

the rest of the officers, while veterans, were younger and less-known men. drouet d'erlon commanded one of the corps; reille another; grouchy another; druot was the leader of the guard; kellerman, milhaud, gerard and maurice the cavalry. it was an army of veterans, officered by young men, commanded by the greatest of soldiers.

but the army had not yet "found itself." it had no natural coherence and there had been no time to acquire any. it had not yet been welded together. officers, men, regiments, brigades, divisions were, more or less, new and strange to one another. there was a vast deal of suspicion in the ranks. the discipline was rather because of past habit than present practice. that army needed a few victories, and badly needed them. a welding process was required. given time and success to shake it together, and it might laugh at the world.

would it get time and win victory? that was the question. and if it got neither, what then? how would it stand up under the strain? would the tie that bound hold in defeat? could the rest of the army live up to the guard, for instance? yes, that was the grave, the all-important question.

there was an enormous disparity in numbers between the french army—or it would better be called napoleon's army—and that of the allies he purposed to attack. the allies were to the french in the ratio of about two to one. whatever else was lacking, napoleon had not lost his audacity, nor when his intentions are disclosed by a study of his plans, can it be argued that his strategic intention was lacking in brilliancy or daring.

he determined with his smaller but compact and manageable army to thrust himself between the two wings of the somewhat loosely coherent enemy under its divided command; to hold off one while he smashed the other and then to concentrate upon the surviving half and mete out to it the same hard fortune. in other words, trusting to his ability, he deliberately placed his own army between two others, each of which practically equaled his own. he thrust himself within the jaws of a trap, to use a homely simile, intending to hold one arm of the trap open while he broke up the other. he intended to burst through the allied line and smash up each half in succession.

of course there was always the danger that he could not burst through that line; or that he could not hold back one half while he fought the other, or that holding back one half he could not beat the other, or having beaten one half he would be too weak to fall on the other. there was always the danger that the trap would be sprung, that he would be caught in its jaws or, to change the metaphor, that he would be like the wheat between the upper and the nether millstone. still he did not think so, and he did not go into the undertaking blindly. as he had said, in his own case, "war was not a conjectural art," and he had most carefully counted the cost, estimated the probabilities. in short, he looked well before he leaped—yet a man may look well and leap wrong after all.

on these considerations he based his grand strategy. the army of the prussians had approached the french frontier from the east; the army of the english and allies from the northwest. napoleon had a complete knowledge of one of the captains opposing him. he knew and accurately estimated blücher. he did not know and he did not accurately estimate wellington. he viewed the latter with contempt; the former with a certain amount of disdainful approbation, for while blücher was no strategist and less of a tactician, he was a fighter and a fighter is always dangerous and to be dreaded. gneisenau, a much more accomplished soldier, was blücher's second in command, but he was a negligible factor in the emperor's mind. the fact that wellington had beaten all of napoleon's marshals with whom he had come in contact had intensified the emperor's hatred. instead of begetting caution in dealing with him, napoleon's antagonism had blinded him as to wellington's ability.

he also rated the prussians higher than the english as fighters, and when his officers, who had felt the power of the thin red line which had so often wrecked the french column, explained to him that there were no better defensive fighters on earth than the english, not even the russians, he had laughed them to scorn, attributing their warnings to the fact that they had been beaten in spain and had grown timid. the emperor did not purpose to be beaten in france or belgium by the stolid english.

in more detail his first plan was to confuse wellington, who held the right of the allied line, then fall upon him before he had time to concentrate, and beat him or contain him with a detachment under ney, while the emperor in person thereafter put blücher to rout—and all of these things he came very near accomplishing completely. certainly, he carried out his plans successfully and to the letter until the final day of battle.

he reasoned that if he could beat blücher and threaten his communications, what was left of the prussian army, which napoleon hoped would not be much, would immediately retreat eastward; and that when blücher had been thrown out of the game for the present, he could turn on wellington and his english and allies and make short work of him. it did not occur to him that even if he beat blücher and beat wellington, provided the defeats did not end in utter routs, and they both retreated, they might withdraw on parallel lines and effect a junction later when even after the double defeat they would still so greatly outnumber him that his chances of success would be faint indeed.

the possibility of their pursuing any other course than that he had forecast for them never entered his mind. his own conception of their action was, in fact, an obsession with him. yet that which he thought they would do they did not; and that which he was confident they would not do they did!